US And British Complicity in Indonesia 1965

by Mark Curtis

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US officials at the time called a “reign of terror” and British officials “ruthless terror”. However, unlike the terrorists responsible for the outrage of September 11, precisely nothing has ever been done to bring those responsible in Indonesia – and their supporters in Washington and London - to account.

The killings in Indonesia started when a group of army officers loyal to President Sukarno assassinated several generals on 30 September 1965. They believed the generals were about to stage a coup to overthrow Sukarno. The instability, however, provided other anti-Sukarno generals, led by General Suharto, with an excuse for the army to move against a powerful and popular political faction with mass support, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). It did so brutally: in a few months hundreds of thousands of PKI members and ordinary people were killed and the PKI destroyed. Suharto emerged as leader and instituted a repressive regime that lasted until 1998.

The declassified documents show five ways in which the US and Britain were complicit in this slaughter. First, both the US and Britain wanted the army to act and encouraged them to do it. US officials expressed their hope of “army at long last to act effectively against Communists” [sic]. “We are, as always, sympathetic to army’s desire to eliminate communist influence” and “it is important to assure the army of our full support of its efforts to crush the PKI”, other officials noted.

The British were equally enthusiastic. “I have never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change”, the ambassador in Jakarta, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, informed the Foreign Office on 5 October.

The following day the Foreign Office in London stated that “the crucial question still remains whether the Generals will pluck up enough courage to take decisive action against the PKI”. Later it noted that “we must surely prefer an Army to a Communist regime” and declared: “It seems pretty clear that the Generals are going to need all the help they can get and accept without being tagged as hopelessy pro-Western, if they are going to be able to gain ascendancy over the Communists. In the short run, and while the present confusion continues, we can hardly go wrong by tacitly backing the Generals”. British policy was “to encourage the emergence of a General’s regime”, one intelligence official explained.

Support for army actions continued throughout the period of the worst killings; there is no question that US and British officials knew exactly what they were supporting. US Ambassador Marshall Green noted three weeks after the attempted coup and with the killings having begun, that “Army has… been working hard at destroying PKI and I, for one, have increasing respect for its determination and organisation in carrying out this crucial assignment”. Green noted in the same despatch the “execution of PKI cadres”, putting the figure at “several hundred of them” in “Djakarta
area alone” [sic]. “To date, army has performed far better than anticipated in attacking PKI and regrouping”

On 1 November, Green informed the State Department of the army’s “moving relentlessly to exterminate the PKI as far as that is possible to do”. Three days later he noted that “Embassy and USG generally sympathetic with and admiring of what army doing” [sic]. Four days after this the US Embassy reported that the Army and allied elements “has continued systematic drive to destroy PKI in northern Sumatra with wholesale killings reported”.

By 16 November, the US Consulate in Medan was reporting that “much indiscriminate killing is taking place”. “Something like a reign of terror against PKI is taking place. This terror is not discriminating very carefully between PKI leaders and ordinary PKI members with no ideological bond to the party”. A British official reported on 25 November that “PKI men and women are being executed in very large numbers”.

By mid December the State Department noted approvingly that “Indonesian military leaders’ campaign to destroy PKI is moving fairly swiftly and smoothly”. By 14 February 1966 Ambassador Green could note that “the PKI has been destroyed as an effective political force for some time to come” and that “the Communists….have been decimated by wholesale massacre”.

The British files reveal that by January the US estimated the number of dead at 150,000, although one Indonesian armed forces liaison officer told US attaches of a figure of 500,000. By March one British official wondered “how much of it [the PKI] is left, after six months of killing” and believed that over 200,000 had been killed in Sumatra alone. By April, the US Embassy stated that “we frankly do not know whether the real figure is closer to 100,000 or 1,000,000 but believe it wiser to err on the side of the lower estimates, especially when questioned by the press”.

Summarising the events of 1965 the British Consul in Medan referred to the army by noting that: “Posing as saviours of the nation from a communist terror, they unleashed a ruthless terror of their own, the scare of which will take many years to heal.” Another British memo referred to the “an operation carried out on a very large scale and often with appalling savagery”. Another simply referred to the “bloodbath”.

The US and British files reveal total support for these massacres. I could find no reference to any concern about the extent of killing at all - other than constant encouragement for the army to continue. And it was not only PKI activists who were the targets of this terror. As the British files show, many of the victims were the “merest rank and file “ of the PKI who were “often no more than bewildered peasants who give the wrong answer on a dark night to bloodthirsty hooligans bent on violence”, with the connivance of the army.

The second way in the US and Britain supported the slaughter concerned the “Confrontation” between Malaya and Indonesia. Here, Britain had deployed tens of thousands troops, mainly in Borneo, to defend Malaya against possible Indonesian encroachments following territorial claims. British policy “did not want to distract the Indonesian army by getting them engaged in fighting in Borneo and so discourage
them from the attempts which they now seem to be making to deal with the PKI”. British Ambassador Gilchrist proposed that “we should get word to the Generals that we shall not attack them whilst they are chasing the PKI”, described as a “necessary task”. In October the British passed to the Generals, through a US contact “a carefully phrased oral message about not biting the Generals in the back for the present”.

The US files confirm that the message from the US, conveyed on 14 October, read: “First, we wish to assure you that we have no intention of interfering Indonesian internal affairs directly or indirectly. Second, we have good reason to believe that none of our allies intend to initiate any offensive action against Indonesia” [sic]. The message was greatly welcomed by the army: One of the Indonesian Defence Minister’s aides noted that “this was just what was needed by way of assurances that we (the army) weren’t going to be hit from all angles as we moved to straighten things out here”.

Third is the “hit list” of targets supplied by the US to the Indonesian army. As the journalist Kathy Kadane has revealed, as many as 5,000 names of provincial, city and other local PKI committee members and leaders of the mass organisations of the PKI, such as the national labour federation, women’s and youth groups, were passed on the Generals, many of whom were subsequently killed. “It really was a big help to the army” noted Robert Martens, a former member of the US embassy. “They probably killed a lot of people and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that’s not all bad. There’s a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment”.

The declassified US files do not provide many further details about the provision of this hit list, although they do confirm it. One list of names, for example, was passed to the Indonesians in December 1965 and “is apparently being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership at the time”. It also notes that “lists of other officials in the PKI affiliates, Partindo and Baperki were also provided to GOI [Government of Indonesia] officials at their request”.

The fourth means of support was propaganda operations. On 5 October a “political adviser” at the British intelligence base in Singapore reported to the Foreign Office in London that: “we should not miss the present opportunity to use the situation to our advantage… I recommend that we should have no hesitation in doing what we can surreptitiously to blacken the PKI in the eyes of the army and the people of Indonesia”. The Foreign Office replied: “We certainly do not exclude any unattributable propaganda or psywar [psychological warfare] activities which would contribute to weakening the PKI permanently. We therefore agree with the [above] recommendation… Suitable propaganda themes might be… Chinese interference in particular arms shipments; PKI subverting Indonesia as agents of foreign communists”.

On 9 October the political adviser confirmed that “we have made arrangements for distribution of certain unattributable material based on the general guidance” in the Foreign Office memo. This involved “promoting and coordinating publicity” critical of the Sukarno government to “news agencies, newspapers and radio”. “The impact has been considerable”, one file notes.
The fifth means of support was provision of equipment - although this remains the murkiest area to uncover. Past US support to the military “should have established clearly in minds Army leaders that US stands behind them if they should need help”, the State Department noted. US strategy was to “avoid overt involvement in the power struggle but... indicate, clearly but covertly, to key Army officers our desire to assist where we can.”

The first US supplies to the Indonesian army were radio equipment “to help in internal security” and to help the Generals “in their task of overcoming the Communists”, as British Ambassador Gilchrist out it. The US historian Gabriel Kolko has shown that in early November 1965 the US received a request from the Generals to “arm Moslem and nationalist youths...for use against the PKI”. The recently published files confirm this approach from the Indonesians. On 1 November Ambassador Green cabled Washington that “as to the provision of small arms I would be leery about telling army we are in position to provide same, although we should act, not close our minds to this possibility... We could explore availability of small arms stocks, preferable of non-US origin, which could be obtained without any overt US government involvement. We might also examine channels through which we could, if necessary, provide covert assistance to army for purchase of weapons”.

A CIA memo of 9 November stated that the US should avoid being “too hesitant about the propriety of extending such assistance provided we can do so covertly, in a manner which will not embarrass them or embarrass our government”. It then noted that mechanisms exist or can be created to deliver “any of the types of the materiel requested to date in reasonable quantities”. One line of text is then not declassified before the memo notes: “The same can be said of purchasers and transfer agents for such items as small arms, medicine and other items requested.” The memo goes on to note that “we do not propose that the Indonesian army be furnished such equipment at this time”. However, “if the Army leaders justify their needs in detail...it is likely that at least will help ensure their success and provide the basis for future collaboration with the US”. “The means for covert implementation” for the delivery of arms “are within our capabilities”.

In response to the Indonesia request for arms, Kolko has shown that the US promised to provide such covert aid, and dubbed them “medicines”. The declassified files state that “the Army really needed the medicines” and that the US was keen to indicate “approval in a practical way of the actions of the Indonesian army”. The extent of arms provided is not revealed in the files but the amount “the medicines would cost was a mere pittance compared with the advantages that might accrue to the US as a result of ‘getting in on the ground floor’”, one file reads. A meeting in Washington of 4 December approved the provision of such “medicines”.

The British knew of these arms supplies and it is likely they also approved them. Britain was initially reluctant to see US equipment go to the Generals lest it be used in the “Confrontation”. Thus the British files show that the US State Department had “undertaken to consult with us before they do anything to support the Generals”. It is possible that the US reneged on this commitment; however, in earlier discussions about this possibility, a British official at the embassy in Washington noted that “I do not think that is very likely”.
The British files in particular show very close relations between the US and British embassies in Jakarta. They point to a somewhat coordinated joint US-UK operation to help install a Generals regime and bring about a government more favourable to Western economic and political interests. The Indonesia campaign is one of the most bloody in the postwar history of US-UK collaboration that includes the joint overthrow of the Musaddiq regime in Iran in 1953, the removal of the population of the British island of Diego Garcia to make way for a US military base in 1965, UK support for US aggression in Vietnam, Central America, Grenada, Panama and Libya and covert operations in Cambodia and Afghanistan. The current phase of the special relationship is witnessed in joint military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Basic US and British concerns and priorities regarding mid-1960s Indonesia are laid out in the files. For the British the importance of Southeast Asia was partly explained by the fact that “Southeast Asia is a major producer of some essential commodities” such as rubber, copra and chromium ore. “Economically, Southeast Asia is a major producer of raw materials… and the defence of the sources of these products and their denial to a possible enemy are major interests to the Western powers”. Indonesia also “occupies a key position in world communications”, straddling important sea and air routes. And Britain wanted, of course, to see a change in regime in Jakarta to bring an end to the “Confrontation” with Malaya.

British Foreign Secretary Michel Stewart wrote at the time that “it is only the economic chaos of Indonesia which prevents that country from offering great potential opportunities to British exporters. If there is going to be a deal in Indonesia… I think we ought to take an act and try to secure a slice of the cake ourselves”. The British feared “the resurgence of Communist and radical nationalism”.

For the US, Under Secretary of State George Ball had noted that Indonesia “may be more important to us than South V-N [Vietnam]” (251). “At stake”, one US memo read, “are 100 million people, vast potential resources and a strategically important chain of islands”. Basic US priorities were virtually identical in Vietnam and Indonesia: to prevent the consolidation of an independent nationalist regime, with communist components and sympathies, that threatened Western economic and political interests and that could act as a successful development model.

The US Ambassador in Malaysia cabled Washington a year before the October 1965 events in Indonesia saying that “our difficulties with Indonesia stem basically from deliberate, positive GOI [Government of Indonesia] strategy of seeking to push Britain and the US out of Southeast Asia”. Ball noted in March 1965 that “our relations with Indonesia are on the verge of falling apart”. “Not only has the management of the American rubber plants been taken over, but there are dangers of an imminent seizure of the American oil companies”.

The Sukarno regime clearly had the wrong priorities. According to one US report: “the government occupies a dominant position in basic industry, public utilities, internal transportation and communication”. “It is probable that private ownership will disappear and may be succeeded by some form of production-profit-sharing contract arrangements to be applied to all foreign in vestment”. Overall, “the avowed Indonesian objective is ‘to stand on their own feet’ in developing their economy, free
from foreign, especially Western, influence” – clearly all heretical priorities to basic US-UK strategy that – as today - needed to be defeated.

The problem with the PKI was not so much its communism but its nationalism: “it is likely that PKI foreign policy decisions, like those of Sukarno, would stress Indonesian national interests above those of Peking, Moscow or international communism in general”, one memo reads. The real danger of a Communist Indonesia was outlined in a Special National Intelligence Estimate of 1 September 1965. This referred to the PKI’s moving “to energize and unite the Indonesia nation” and stated that “if these efforts succeeded, Indonesia would provide a powerful example for the underdeveloped world and hence a credit to communism and a setback for Western prestige”. The problem was that Indonesia would be too successful, a fear in the minds of US planners well documented by Kolko and Noam Chomsky in policy towards numerous other countries.

The Army was by no means the perfect ally of the US in Indonesia – as the files note, it “was strongly nationalist in orientation and strongly favours the takeover of Western economic interests”. Nevertheless in the choice between Sukarno and the PKI on the one hand and the army on the other, “the army deserves our support”. And over time a combination of Western advice, aid and investment did transform the Indonesian economy into one that, although retaining an important nationalist element, provided substantial opportunities and profits for Western investors, aided by an increasingly corrupt President Suharto. The West supported Suharto throughout the three-decade long rule of repression, including in the regime’s murderous policies in East Timor after the invasion of 1975. The hundreds of thousands of deaths then were as irrelevant to US and British officials as those in 1965.


Note: The US files referred to were published last year in the Foreign Relations of the United States series by the US Government Printing Office. British files are in Public Record Office, London.

"Covert Operations: Indonesia 1965"

[October 1995 note from David Johnson: This is a paper I wrote in 1976. It is presented here in its original version. It was written to encourage Congressional investigation of the issue by the Church Committee at the time. This paper was circulated privately but never published. It may have some enduring merit. Comments and criticisms are welcome.]
As evidence that the subject matter is still relevant, please note this recently declassified quotation: "From our viewpoint, of course, an unsuccessful coup attempt by the PKI might be the most effective development to start a reversal of political trends in Indonesia."

Then-US Ambassador to Indonesia Howard Jones

March 10, 1965

Chiefs of Mission Conference, Baguio, Philippines


GESTAPU: The CIA's "Track Two" in Indonesia*

"Track Two" was the name given to a CIA covert operation undertaken in Chile in the fall of 1970 at the direction of President Nixon. Its purpose was to use all possible means to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency. Knowledge of Track Two was very tightly held. The State Department, the Defense Department, the American Ambassador in Chile, and the Forty Committee were not informed. Track Two was partially responsible for the murder of General Schneider, the Chilean Army Chief of Staff who opposed efforts of other military officers to stage a coup. Track Two failed in its objective in 1970. Other analogies to the Indonesian events are the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the Reichstag fire.

Introduction

This paper presents the preliminary outline of a new interpretation of the events in Indonesia in 1965 that climaxed in the "coup" attempt of October 1st and the actions of the September 30th Movement (GESTAPU). It is argued that the September 30th Movement was not an action by "progressive" or dissatisfied middle-level military officers, nor a creature of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), nor was it stimulated by President Sukarno. GESTAPU was an instrument directly in the hands of General Suharto (and probably General Nasution) [1995 note from David Johnson: today I would delete the reference to Nasution] and most likely a creation of the Central Intelligence Agency for the purpose of "saving Indonesia from Communism" in a desperate situation. GESTAPU served the crucial function of providing a legitimate pretext for the drastic extermination of the PKI. It was calculated to put the reins of power quickly into the hands of Suharto and to place Sukarno in a restricted position.
GESTAPU worked.

It is probably the most successful covert operation that the CIA has ever carried out. The participation of the CIA in GESTAPU--its "fingerprints on the gun"--cannot be proven unless the Congress digs hard to find the truth, as was done partly in the case of Chile. The CIA connection is hypothesized because it seems a logical outcome of U.S. policy toward Indonesia and because of the relative sophistication and complexity of the GESTAPU operation. Because of the close contact between the Indonesian Army and U.S. Defense Department advisers and attaches it is probable that certain of these personnel were also involved.

It is not maintained that the thesis of this paper is necessarily correct or proven. The author's hope is to demonstrate that it is sufficiently plausible that further research along these lines will be conducted by those more knowledgeable than he and that those in a position to do something about it will begin to look into the secret official record. The thesis is presented without a great deal of hedging but the author is aware that many of the facts he uses are open to a number of alternative explanations. Of course, many "facts" are in dispute. This first draft assumes some knowledge on the part of the reader of the basic events of the time and of the existing interpretive controversy. No special attempt is made here, however, to refute alternative theories. Only a portion of the supporting material is indicated.

The events of October 1, 1965, in Indonesia and their origin may truly be called "a riddle wrapped in an enigma. There is no consensus among students of Indonesia about the "correct" explanation. All existing theories have their articulate and plausible critics. Probably the majority of careful Indonesian scholars have abandoned the search for explanation. GESTAPU is an enormously complicated puzzle in which the pieces never fit together, their shape constantly changes, and new pieces keep appearing.

In an earlier age of innocence, the attributing to the CIA of a significant causal role in international affairs was a disreputable enterprise in which most professional analysts seldom engaged. With the revelations of recent years, however, the inhibitions on serious study of CIA activities have somewhat broken down. We also know far more than we did ten years ago about the extent of CIA operations and how the CIA works. In many cases, including Indonesia, we still know very little about what the CIA actually did over the years. But more than before we can feel on safe ground to think that the CIA was active. This is not CIA scapegoating, left-wing propaganda, conspiracy fascination, or a search for simple-minded solutions. It is a necessary and important research effort that must be undertaken before it can be seriously rejected. Of course, the great secrecy that envelops the subject places substantial restrictions on what normal academic research can accomplish.

This paper is based in the first instance on the author's reading of the recently released CIA Research Study "Indonesia-1965: The Coup That Backfired." The author has also read nearly everything available in English in the Library of Congress on the events of 1965. The major source material that has not been examined, except as described in secondary sources, is the large body of records of post-October 1 interrogations of prisoners held by the Indonesian Army and the records of the numerous trials that have been held. Undoubtedly new insights can be derived.
from these materials. The author's knowledge of Indonesia in general is relatively sparse, although he has visited the country and spent some time in previous years studying Indonesian political development. The present paper is the product of a month of very intensive research on the events of 1965 as well as some limited examination of studies on the CIA.

U.S. Assessment of Indonesia

At some point in 1964 or 1965 (probably late 1964) the deterioration of U.S. relations with Indonesia and the left-ward drift of Indonesia had gone so far that the U.S. faced the need to reassess its policy toward Indonesia with an eye toward adopting new policies. Howard Jones, the American ambassador at the time, has described the extremely pessimist official assessment of how bad things had gotten from the American point of view. Ewa Pauker and Guy Pauker at RAND have described the projection of near-term PKI takeover and the pessimism about the ability of the Indonesian Army to reverse the apparently inevitable flow of events.

Jones indicates that a number of important meetings were held in which U.S. policy toward Indonesia was reassessed, beginning at the State Department in August 1964 after Sukarno's Independence Day speech, his most anti-American statement up to that time. The March 1965 annual meeting of U.S. mission chiefs held in the Philippines with Averell Harriman and William Bundy, was also important. Ellsworth Bunker, personal representative of President Johnson, spent 15 days in Indonesia in April 1965 evaluating the situation. There were undoubtedly other secret and perhaps more important meetings in which U.S. policy was put together.

The U.S. seems to have faced essentially six options with regard to Indonesia:

1. A hands-off policy of continuing much the same as before, letting things drift. (Of course, the U.S. had never been passive toward Indonesia and this can only be characterized as a hands-off policy in contrast to the other options.) The probable result would be that Indonesia would go Communist. There seems to have been near unanimous official agreement on the inevitability of Communist takeover in Indonesia if existing trends continued. The most important country in Southeast Asia would be lost. The U.S. effort to save Vietnam (bombing of North Vietnam began in February 1965) would probably be frustrated and all of Southeast Asia would be threatened. Clearly, this was an unacceptable option.

2. Try to get Sukarno to change his apparent policy of leading Indonesia toward Communist rule. The Embassy under Ambassador Jones had been pursuing this course for years, with little success (in American eyes). Sukarno had made more than clear his determination to continue his left-ward drive, both domestically and in foreign policy. Most Washington officials had given up on Sukarno and many agreed that "Sukarno has to go." Some identified him as a "crypto- Communist." This option was simply unworkable.

3. Eliminate Sukarno. Apparently this was considered, but rejected. The consequences would be too unpredictable. The Communist Party and its affiliates were so large and so extensively embedded in Indonesian society and political life that even in the absence of Sukarno's protection they might be able to hang on and prosper. An effort
to go after the PKI in such circumstances would probably result in a very unpredictable and dangerous civil war which the United States, preoccupied with Vietnam, was not in a position to handle. A danger of killing Sukarno was that those who might be identified with it would be discredited because of Sukarno's enormous popularity in Indonesia, which efforts to undermine over the years had been unable to shake. Blaming an assassination on the left would not be credible because of the close alliance between Sukarno and the Communists. The PKI would have no plausible motive for such an action. An arranged "natural" death for Sukarno would leave the PKI as a very important force in Indonesia, and perhaps as the logical successor.

4. Encourage the Indonesian Army to take over the government. The Embassy had been pushing this option for years with some success but without achieving the final objective. Disunity within the Army had prevented any such explicit step to date and there seemed to be other inhibitions on a direct military takeover. The Army as a whole was still unwilling to move directly against Sukarno. Sukarno's determination to resist any further expansion of the Army's role was clear. In fact, he was doing much to try to "domesticate" and undermine the Army as an independent, anti-Communist force. Even in the event of an Army coup, without a solid pretext for quickly eliminating the PKI and a means of controlling Sukarno, the prospect of civil war would arise for the same reasons indicated in Option 3. While the U.S. could continue to cultivate military officials and try to stiffen their "backbone," Army takeover via some sort of coup would not resolve the problem in Indonesia.

5. Try to undermine the PKI and get the Communists to take actions that would discredit themselves and legitimize their elimination. (Option 6, the fabrication of such a discrediting, is a variant of this option.) Such a step would also necessitate moving against Sukarno as he probably would never permit the Army to act forcefully against the PKI no matter how objectionable the PKI might appear to be. A variety of covert efforts were mounted to try to damage the PKI's reputation and provoke it to misbehavior. These included linking the PKI with China, trying to show that the PKI did not really support "Sukarnoism" (the BPS episode), and the fabrication of documents and the attributing of provocative statements to PKI spokesmen (printed in non-Communist papers). But Sukarno helped to frustrate these efforts by banning almost all non-Communist political and press activity. The PKI was careful not to go too far and not to provide the excuse for its elimination. As PKI Chairman Aidit said, "We are prepared to tolerate insults and threats. We will not be provoked. If the army spits in our faces we will wipe it off and smile. We will not retaliate." Option 5 was continually tried but it did not seem to be working.

6. If the PKI would not provide its own death warrant, the pretext for extermination had to be fabricated for it. The optimum implementation of this option would serve to eliminate both the PKI and Sukarno as dominant forces in Indonesian political life. This option appears to have been the one finally chosen, although the point at which commitment to it was irrevocable is very uncertain. Parts of the other options, other "tracks" continued at the same time.
Background to October 1st

Undoubtedly, elements of the Indonesian military (and other anti-Communist groups) were also considering what to do about the drift of Indonesia toward Communist rule. It was highly unlikely, however, that the U.S. could sit passively and expect that Indonesians on their own would do what had to be done. American analysts seemed to have concluded that no Indonesian group on its own had the capability and will to do what was necessary to prevent Communist takeover. American initiative and cooperation were necessary.

The U.S. over the years had built up close relationships with many Indonesians, particularly in the Army. In fact, this was the essence of U.S. policy toward Indonesia over the previous five or more years. The coincidence of U.S. and anti-PKI Army interest would make natural, and simply a continuation of patterns already established, a collaboration and pooling of resources to carry out the best means available for stopping the PKI and "saving" Indonesia. The CIA provided a pool of expertise and technical capability for devising and implementing a relatively sophisticated and delicate maneuver.

The problem of lack of Army internal cohesion, as indicated in Option 4, remained a stumbling block. Efforts were made to achieve unity in moving against the PKI (and necessarily Sukarno) but although most generals agreed that the PKI had to go, some very important officers--notably the Army Chief of Staff General Yani-- were apparently unwilling to take steps that would severely damage Sukarno. After the failure of attempts to secure Army unity, the U.S. and the collaborating generals (principally Suharto and Nasution) [1995 note: again, I would today delete Nasution] decided that the urgency of the threat and the need for quick action required working with those who were willing. It was necessary to move in spite of the absence of Army unity.

Actions were undertaken to try to polarize Indonesian politics between the Communists and others, an effort that it was hoped might move the reluctant generals to the "right" side. The Gilchrist letter seems to have been part of a covert effort to stimulate distrust and antagonism between Sukarno and General Yani. It appears, however, that General Yani remained something of a Sukarno-loyalist. General Yani had become dispensable and probably he stood in the way of what had to be done.

The "Generals' Council" rumor, frequently considered the product of PKI work, was probably an important element of the CIA-Suharto covert operation in preparing the ground for GESTAPU. The rumor served a number of useful purposes. It helped to further the heightening of tension and uncertainty in Indonesian political life. It served to stimulate mistrust between Sukarno and certain generals that the CIA wanted to break with Sukarno. It alarmed the PKI and might even make it take the provocative step that was hoped for. It provided a focus for debate and rumor that distracted attention from the real "conspiracy." It bore a resemblance to something that actually existed, General Yani's "braintrust," and thus provided a ready target group for the GESTAPU operation, plausible victims for the "PKI's" atrocities. The rumor helped to create a climate in which people would find GESTAPU at least superficially plausible, especially immediately on October 1st. There would be widespread belief in the
imminent threat of a Generals' Council coup and "unwitting" people (notably the soldiers used by GESTAPU on October 1st) would be willing to take actions that they might otherwise question. The General's Council rumor helped to create something of a "controlled environment" in which certain planned stimuli would produce a relatively predictable response. Finally, the rumor was an important part of the cover story for why the PKI might be believed to have taken the action to be attributed to it.

The exploitation of the Sukarno's health rumor mill was another important part of the cover for GESTAPU. Unfortunately for the cover story, however, it turns out to have been one of the weak links. The post-1965 explanation of why the PKI allegedly carried out GESTAPU attributes a major role to the presumed fear on the part of the PKI that Sukarno was about to die. Chinese doctors are alleged to have convinced Aidit of this. The problem is that Sukarno recovered rapidly from his illness in August 1965 and Aidit, who was in constant contact with Sukarno, had more than sufficient time to find out about Sukarno's health for himself and to turn off any plans that were based on Sukarno's imminent demise. (The implausibility of this story may in part account for the growth of theories that attribute the authorship of GESTAPU to Sukarno and place the PKI in a subordinate role. Even the Suharto government seems to have adopted this "explanation." In 1965, however, the circulation of rumors by the CIA-Suharto group served to create a climate that would make GESTAPU plausible as well as the PKI's complicity in it.

It does seem clear that the PKI Politburo held meetings in August 1965 at which the health of Sukarno was discussed, as well as the Generals' Council rumors, and probably the existence of "progressive" officers. What was actually said about these subjects, however, is far from clear. The official Army version, presented through "confessions," probably took real events, kernels of truth, and spun them into the required pattern.

A very interesting question is whether the Untung group made contact with the PKI, perhaps to get the PKI to directly implicate itself or at least to take actions that could later be interpreted as "participation in GESTAPU." It seems likely that the GESTAPU conspirators would have considered it risky to acquaint anyone not "in the know" with what was going on. The danger would have been very great that the PKI would be suspicious and pass the information to Sukarno who would investigate. The PKI was constantly on the alert for "provocations." There is a possibility, however, that some vague intimiation of GESTAPU was passed to Aidit via a source that Aidit would have found credible. If so, it appears that Aidit rejected PKI participation, despite later trial evidence.

An overlooked source of information on the relationship, if any, between the PKI and a "progressive" officers GESTAPU group is an article by the leftist journalist Wilfred Burchett that was originally published in November 1965. Burchett, relying on "an Indonesian whom I know as having close contact with the PKI leadership and who escaped the army dragnet in Jakarta," states that the PKI received "documentary" evidence of the existence of a Generals' Council in August and informed Sukarno about it. Burchett continues:

"In late September, Colonel Untung, head of the presidential guard, learned of the planned coup from independent sources. He approached leaders of the PKI, among
others, revealing what they had known for some time, and urged joint action to thwart the coup. The PKI leaders reportedly refused on the ground that such an action would be "premature" and that as long as Sukarno remained at the helm everything possible should be done to maintain unity, while all patriotic elements within the armed forces should remain vigilant to deal with any coup from above."

Of course, we have no way of knowing if this is what happened but it is possible.

The backgrounds of Lt. Col. Untung, the alleged leader of the September 30th Movement, and his colleagues have been examined by a number of independent scholars. The picture that emerges is not that of a group of "progressive" or disgruntled officers, but rather of a group of successful and professional military officers who had exhibited signs of anti-PKI views, had been given sensitive positions in which their past and present political affiliations and views would have been subjected to careful examination, and some of whom--perhaps the most important ones--had recently been trained in the U.S. (General Supardjo and Col. Suherman) and undoubtedly exhaustively "vetted" by the CIA and U.S. defense intelligence.

What seems to link most of the GESTAPU officers together is not their "progressiveness" but their association, both past and present, with General Suharto. Those participants, particularly in the Air Force, not overtly linked with Suharto may be considered CIA-Suharto "assets" activated to play their role in the GESTAPU scenario. The penetration of the Air Force and the Palace Guard by anti-PKI Army forces (and the CIA) is at least as plausible as the degree of penetration attributed to the PKI. The vigilance of the anti-PKI generals in keeping PKI influence out of their officer corps is well known, as is the effort to keep track of and penetrate the more leftist branches of the military services.

Before examining what took place on October 1st it is important to recognize that (if the thesis of this paper is correct) we are looking at a collection of actors and a sequence of events that were put together primarily to accomplish a very immediate and urgent task: the discrediting of the PKI (and its allies) in as dramatic and quick a fashion as possible, and the immobilization of factors that might complicate the situation. While some thought had obviously been given to cover, it is doubtful that extensive effort was put into constructing a cover story that would withstand close, dispassionate scrutiny. The ability of the Cornell researchers, after only a few months of research using primarily written materials, to reveal the weaknesses of the immediate cover story is testimony to its inherent crudeness. The CIA-Suharto group probably felt that, if they moved quickly and drastically enough, there was little likelihood that much foreign effort would be put into examining GESTAPU in detail. Certainly no Indonesian would he disposed to raise doubts.

A certain refinement of cover and justification for actions that, for the most part, had already been taken (the murder of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians) was provided by the obviously spurious Aidit "confession" and the fabricated confession and show trial of Njono. Untung was also put on trial early in 1966. Even sympathetic foreign journalists have raised questions about these early trials (no foreign journalists were permitted to attend and only selected Indonesians). We do not know at what point the Indonesian authorities found out about the Cornell study and other evidence that apparently their story was not going over abroad as well as they had
hoped. It seems probable that the trials of Dani and Subandrio were primarily milestones in the campaign to remove Sukarno and less parts of the GESTAPU cover story. It was the trial of Sudisman in 1967 and that of Sjam in 1968 that were explicitly calculated for their effect on the foreign skeptics. Of course, Suharto has had other reasons as well for continuing the show trials.

The Events of October 1st

The major military units involved on the side of the September 30th movement were officially under the command of General Suharto's KOSTRAD, the Army's Strategic Reserve. The semi-official Indonesian Army history of GESTAPU states: "Both the 454th and 530th Battalions together with the 328th Kudjong Battalion of the Siliwangi Division were under the operations command of the 3d Paratroop Brigade of the Army's Strategic Reserve." The Army book observes further that "KOSTRAD troops were scattered all over Indonesia, as [sic] that at the time of the coup General Soeharto had only the dc Kudjava and dc Parakomando battalion around Djakarta. Other KOSTRAD troops were at 'the other side.'

The major mission of these KOSTRAD "coup" units was to take up positions around the crucial Merdeka Square, controlling Sukarno's Palace, the Indonesian Radio station, and the central telecommunications facilities.

One company of soldiers from the Palace Guard, the Tjakrabirawa, are said to have participated, together with KOSTRAD elements, in the kidnapping-murder of the six army generals. Lt. Col. Untung had been since May 1965 commander of one of the three Tjakrabirawa battalions. Considering Untung's position, this participation is quite possible, although it could have introduced a perhaps unnecessary complication into the proceedings. General Sabur, the commander of the Palace Guard, played a very unclear role in the GESTAPU and its aftermath. Although jailed for a period after 1965, he has been released and no charges have been brought against him. Whether Untung could have acted without Sabur's knowledge is uncertain. Only a few Tjakrabirawa troops were really necessary on October 1st, and they could have been KOSTRAD soldiers in Palace Guard uniforms. The extraordinary lack of professionalism in the execution of the "kidnappings" makes it unlikely that "unwitting" Tjakrabirawa troops played a significant role. Their role seems to have been that of making the first contact at each of the victim's home.

In the early morning hours of October 1st GESTAPU troops went to the homes of seven generals. Three of the generals, including Army head General Yani, were killed immediately and their bodies and three other generals were taken to a place called Lubang Buaja (Crocodile's Hole) on the outskirts of Halim Air Force Base. More than 100 troops surrounded the house of General Nasution but in a "near miraculous" escape, Nasution got away by climbing over a wall and hiding in the bushes. The fiction that one of his aides was captured and successfully impersonated one of the best known men in Indonesia for some hours afterwards (a crucial element in the CIA Research Study version of events), need not puzzle us. No such thing happened and General Nasution was meant to "escape," (The shooting of his daughter, apparently by accident through a door, seems too ghastly to have been part of the GESTAPU plan, although her death and funeral were very important in
whipping up the subsequent fury against the PKI. Nasution's much commented upon "moodiness" after October 1st may in part be accounted for by his remorse about not taking better precautions to protect his family.)

General Nasution, the leading anti-Communist military figure in Indonesia, had to be on the list of victims of GESTAPU. His absence would have been incredible. He was not, however, a member of General Yani's "Generals' Council." The fact that it was General Suharto, rather than the more well known Nasution, who took the leadership of the counter-GESTAPU forces may have a complicated explanation. We do not know the subtleties of the Suharto-Nasution relationship. The most probable explanation is that the immediate appearance of Nasution as the head of the anti-PKI effort would have aroused suspicions. Some stories have Nasution being kept "protected" in a hidden place on October 1st from 6 AM until 7 PM when he finally appeared at KOSTRAD headquarters. Other reports have him at KOSTRAD headquarters on the morning of October 1st. Nasution is alleged to have broken his ankle in climbing over the wall, probably part of the cover story for why it had to be Suharto who took the lead.

Among the more incredible "mistakes" of the GESTAPU movement was the failure to try to kill or kidnap the two generals in Djakarta who had operational command of military forces in the area, General Suharto and General Umar. Ruth McVey has commented on how extraordinary this omission was, in view of the fact that Col. Latief was one of the major GESTAPU conspirators: "Col. A. Latief headed the mobile force of the Djaya (Djakarta) Division and had commanded a series of interservice capital defense maneuvers; he must have known the basic provisions for an emergency in the capital." In fact, Col. Latief seems to have been one of Suharto's men. McVey states: "Latief, also a Diponegoro Division officer (Suharto's former division), had fought under Suharto during the revolution; at the time of the Irian campaign he was at the Mandala Command headquarters in Ambone...He was assigned to KOSTRAD; his command at the time of the coup, Brigade I, was one of the KOSTRAD infantry brigades." Latief, according to Suharto himself, visited him on the night of September 30th at the hospital where Suharto was seeing his ill son. Another account has Col. Latief paying a visit to the military hospital on the morning of October 1st where Nasution's injured daughter had been brought. General Suharto and General Umar worked closely together almost immediately from the beginning on October 1st in "defeating" GESTAPU.

One general who was supposed to have originally been on the list of GESTAPU victims because of his position on General Yani's staff was General Sukendro. He was in Peking on October 1st. In fact, Sukendro was a close associate of Nasution and had the reputation of a man with intimate associations with the American military and the CIA. Sukendro came back from Peking with the story that on October 1st Chinese officials had shown Indonesians a list of the murdered generals before it had been announced. (Intimations of Chinese involvement in GESTAPU were rampant in the early months after October 1st but faded to nothing after their purpose had been served.) What exactly occurred at Lubang Buaja where the six murdered and captured generals were taken and eventually dumped into a well is uncertain. Why they were taken there seems clear. Lubang Buaja, despite stories that "secret" military training of PKI people was occurring there, was well known as a place where
Air Force officers since July had been conducting training of volunteers for the Malaysian Confrontation. Those trained included youths from both PKI and other organizations. The quick murder of the generals and their alleged mutilation by Communists was the core of the GESTAPU scenario. Whether there were people from Communist organizations present at Lubang Buaja is uncertain. It is possible that unwitting volunteers had been brought there to lend their presence to the proceedings. This could have been complicating however. It was sufficient that the dastardly deed be done at a place that was known as a gathering spot for the training of PKI volunteers. "Confessions" could be produced later.

There are a few indications that if, in fact, there were "volunteers" present at Lubang Buaja on the morning of October 1st they were not necessarily from PKI organizations. The eye-witness account used in the CIA Research Study states that there were civilians crowding around the prisoners yelling "kill the unbelievers," rather extraordinary words for Communists to be uttering. Accounts seem to agree that the generals were almost unidentifiable, bloodied and beaten up, wearing pajamas, and blindfolded. Mortimer states that, among other non-Communist youths, people from the Moslem Ansor youth organization were expected at Lubang Buaja for training on October 1st. We may speculate that the GESTAPU officers present may have told anti-PKI youths that they had captured the killers of the generals.

Whoever killed and "mutilated" the generals, their murder served several important purposes for GESTAPU. Most importantly, it could be blamed on the PKI. The murder of General Yani opened the way for Suharto to take over control of the Army and implement the wrap-up of GESTAPU. It was standing procedure for Suharto to become acting Army head whenever Yani was not available. Suharto's behavior on October 1st seems to be that of someone who is immediately aware that Yani is dead. We find no discussion in accounts of October 1st of efforts by Suharto to locate and rescue captured generals until late in the day. He acted very quickly to take charge. He exhibited none of the uncertainty and hesitancy that characterized nearly everyone else on October 1st.

The killing of the generals was also important in inhibiting Sukarno from declaring in favor of the September 30th Movement, a danger that could have upset the scenario but which had been taken into account. The fact that Lubang Buaja could also be associated with the Air Force (although, contrary to general impression, it was not in fact located on Halim Air Force Base) was also useful in assuring that General Dani and the Air Force would not be tempted to throw their military forces behind the September 30th Movement. Once it became known what an enormous crime had been committed by the "progressive" GESTAPU--political murder was very rare in Indonesia--no one was likely to jump on the band-wagon and complicate the planned failure of GESTAPU. Of course, the discrediting of the leftist Air Force and General Dani was part of the purpose of GESTAPU.

It is probable that the killing of the generals was communicated as rapidly as possible to Sukarno so that he would not think of backing GESTAPU. Accounts have a helicopter flying over Lubang Buaja, perhaps part of Sukarno's (or Suharto~s?) efforts to verify absolutely that it was true. Sukarno was also probably told how the
PKI was linked to the murders. His early knowledge that Nasution had probably "escaped" also served to inhibit any impulse to support GESTAPU.

When the first message of the September 30th Movement was broadcast over Radio Indonesia around 7 AM it was announced that Sukarno was being protected and that certain prominent persons who were to be targets of the Generals' Council action had also been taken under "protection." This was actually part of a deliberate action to control the behavior of and information available to leading non-GESTAPU political figures whom, if at large, could interfere with the GESTAPU scenario. PKI Chairman Aidit was brought to Halim very early on October 1st. (His wife states that he was kidnapped from his home.) Dani was brought to Halim. (Accounts differ on this.) Sukarno was brought to Halim. Most of Sukarno's advisors, such as Subandrio, Njoto, and Ali Sastroamidjojo, were not in Djakarta. Reports have it at if they had been in Djakarta they were on the list of persons to be "protected." Although there was some contact between these individuals at Halim, much of the time they were kept separated from each other in different houses with GESTAPU messengers going back and forth. (The phones had been cut in Djakarta. Only the Army had an emergency communication system functioning.) Aidit in particular was kept "protected" from any contact with Sukarno. From the CIA Research Study account we learn that "Aidit definitely was accompanied by two bodyguards, who stayed with him the whole day of the 1st while he was at Halim and who accompanied him on the plane on his flight from Halim to Jogjakarta on the morning of the 2nd." The actual function of these "bodyguards" seems obvious. (It is remarkable how little role, even in the official accounts, Aidit seems to have played at Halim in guiding the movement that he is alleged to have been responsible for.)

Back at Merdeka Square, the GESTAPU-KOSTRAD troops had occupied the radio station at about the same time that the generals were being kidnapped. The use of the radio to broadcast a carefully prepared series of messages was a crucial part of the GESTAPU operation. The fact that Suharto, located just across the square in KOSTRAD headquarters, took no action until the evening to put the radio off the air--although he says that he very quickly decided that something was wrong--was suspicious and "explained" in the official version in terms of Suharto's desire to avoid violence. (His tolerance toward troops who had apparently killed or abducted six leading Army generals is remarkable.) In fact, Suharto deliberately waited to "retake" the radio station until the planned messages were completed. This he accomplished without firing a shot. (In the whole GESTAPU affair, including outside of Djakarta, only a handful of people were killed other than the generals.)

The most important characteristic of the first 7 AM GESTAPU radio broadcast in which the existence of the September 30th Movement was announced was that it was unclear whether GESTAPU was pro- or anti-Sukarno. The deliberate creation of uncertainty was necessary in part so as to prevent anyone "unexpected" from involving themselves. The fact that the name of Sukarno was not invoked in support of GESTAPU, which any genuine leftist coup attempt would probably have faked if necessary in order to increase the chances for success, probably made GESTAPU seem somewhat anti-Sukarno. The emphasis on its being "inside the military" was calculated to prevent anyone, especially the PKI, from taking to the streets and getting in the way. Basically, the impact of the 7 AM message was to confuse people
and keep them sitting still waiting for the next message. In any event, given the climate of rumor in Djakarta, GESTAPU was not an implausible event, although who was behind it and what it was to accomplish was uncertain.

Another apparently calculated aspect of the first radio broadcast was the statement that a Revolutionary Council was going to be set up, with the implication--later made very clear--that it would be the new government. It was not until the afternoon that the "rather peculiar assortment of names" on the Revolutionary Council was announced. The indication of the abolition of the existing cabinet, however, was apparently partially intended to provide a rationale and gloss of legality for General Suharto to take quick command of the Army without consultation with Sukarno. In justifying his behavior afterwards, Suharto has cited the fact that GESTAPU had overthrown the existing government and therefore he was free to act on his own. (One of the contradictions in the post-1965 explanation of GESTAPU is that if the Untung group was primarily concerned to execute a limited operation to purge the Army of leading anti-PKI generals, why was it necessary to set aside the existing government, giving the operation the clear flavor of a political coup?)

Even the term "Revolutionary Council" may have been devised as another bit of dust thrown in the eyes of the confused public. Apparently the last time that "Revolutionary Councils" had been established in Indonesia was in 1956 and 1957 when some of the dissident anti-PKI regional military commanders had done so. Although the radio announcement of the membership of the new Revolutionary Council, "the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia," was not broadcast until about 2 PM, we will discuss it here. It seems possible to discern several functions for this message. The rather heterogeneous and lack-luster membership seems calculated to discourage anyone from rallying to support. (Clearly, few, if any, of the non-military members of the Council had been informed beforehand. A better selection could have been faked if assuring the success of the "coup" had really been important.) The unknown middle-ranking officers took the top positions for themselves. The heads of the non-Army military services were prominently displayed as members of the Council, perhaps part of the overall plan to prevent uncontrolled military forces from involving themselves in the GESTAPU events. Linking the heads of the Air Force, Navy, and Police with GESTAPU would make it possible to label any unwanted military action by these forces as part of the GESTAPU revolt.

It is uncertain how much additional calculation was put into the membership list. A handful of PKI officials from affiliated organizations were included, but none of the top PKI leaders. This again would discourage unplanned PKI involvement. Later analyses of the membership indicate the possibility that the CIA's "experts" on communism may have devised the list according to their calculation of a plausible "stage" which the "revolution" in Indonesia had reached. In October 1965 The Washington Post published a story by Chalmers Roberts, apparently based on CIA briefings, that said U.S. officials reported to have evidence that Sukarno, through a coup, had intended to turn his country into an Indonesian version of a Communist "People's Democracy." We may guess that as part of the devising of a cover story for GESTAPU the CIA experts tried to simulate the kind of government that the PKI and Sukarno
(apparently little distinction was made) might plausibly have been expected to set up if a pro-Communist coup occurred in Indonesia in the fall of 1965.

The 1968 CIA Research Study states that "the Revolutionary Council was the perfect Communist front organization." Justus van der Kroef has provided the most extensive exposition of the "People's Democracy" thesis, along the lines of Eastern European experience. Actually, judging by a more careful study of Soviet and Chinese examples, the PKI membership on the Revolutionary Council was too limited and the composition of the Council was far from being a "perfect" simulation. (The eight year old CIA Research Study contains several rather amateurish efforts to show the traces of Chinese Communist ideology or practice in the GESTAPU events, reflective of the spirit of the times.)

The behavior of Sukarno on October 1st, the subject of much speculation later on, seems to be that of someone who is unsure of what is going on, but wary and trying desperately to get a handle on the situation. The GESTAPU officers did not actually keep him prisoner at Halim Air Force Base--General Supardjo's role seems to have been that of a rather skilled handler of Sukarno, keeping up the GESTAPU pretense--and permitted him to send and receive messages and selected visitors. To the extent possible, however, information and advice available to Sukarno was controlled. (Sukarno's later emphasis on his being at Halim of his own free will was in the context of the rising anti-PKI hysteria. Sukarno struggled to keep it under control and did not want people to think that the "PKI-GESTAPU" had kidnapped him.)

We must assume that the CIA had prepared a psychological assessment of Sukarno which was an ingredient in planning the GESTAPU operation. How accurate and insightful the CIA's profile may have been we do not know. Considering the obsession of Westerners with Sukarno's sex life and the image of irresponsibility and irrationality that had been built up about him, we may suspect that the assessment was not highly useful. Some Americans seem to have considered Sukarno a coward and Howard Jones cites a Washington view, circa 1958, that Sukarno "did not have the intestinal fortitude to order the Indonesian military into action since it would split the country. Sukarno had worked all his life to unite his country; he was the last man to take an action that would result in a division that might be irrevocable." The view of Sukarno as unwilling to take decisive and divisive military action against other Indonesians could have been a factor in the planning of GESTAPU. Sukarno's lack of ruthlessness would be exploited.

One of the clearer indications of the absence of collusion between Sukarno and the GESTAPU officers, and of their willingness to ignore him when necessary, is the fact that (according to the CIA Research Study) at about noon on October 1st Sukarno told General Supardjo to stop the September 30th Movement. However, some important radio broadcasts had yet to be made, and the rationale for the apparently fabricated incriminating October 2 Harian Rakjat editorial would have been destroyed if General Supardjo had immediately stopped GESTAPU. The GESTAPU actions continued in Djakarta until the evening.

At about 1 PM an announcement, over General Sabur's name, was broadcast that "President Sukarno is safe and well and continues to execute the leadership of the State." This seems to have been a genuine statement from Sukarno, and implied his
rejection of the September 30th Movement. Sukarno did not leave Halim until about
8:30 PM when he went to Bogor, having failed to prevent Suharto from taking over
the Army.

In addition to the GESTAPU radio broadcasts containing the details of the
Revolutionary Council, the other important afternoon message was a statement
attributed to General Dani, the leftist Air Force Chief of Staff, expressing support for
the September 30th Movement. This was broadcast at 3:30 PM. The means by which
this "Order of the Day" was elicited from Dani, or whether it was fabricated, is
uncertain. The statement carried a dating of 9:30 AM, before Sukarno's radio
message, although it was not actually broadcast until six hours later.

The CIA Research Study comments on this "incredibly poorly timed" message of
General Dani: "Two hours after Sukarno had studiously avoided committing himself
over the radio the Air Force Chief Dani had pledged support of the Air Force to the
coup." The peculiarity of this was accentuated by the fact that Dani was considered
to be a man who carefully calculated his steps to fall in line with Sukarno. It seemed
impossible that Dani could take such an action without Sukarno's endorsement.
Perhaps in the confused and controlled circumstances at Halim the GESTAPU
officers had managed to convince Dani earlier in the day that Sukarno wanted him to
prepare a pro-GESTAPU Order of the Day to have on hand in case of need. (The
possibility of straight fabrication exists, although the author has found no emphatic
assertion to this effect by Dani.)

Assuming that the Dani message was a planned part of the GESTAPU scenario, it's
purpose, of course, was to incriminate the leftist Dani and the Air Force in the
GESTAPU coup attempt and the murder of the generals. (In the early days after
October 1st Suharto seems to have been even more interested in defaming the Air
Force than the PKI. After all, the Air Force had weapons and the PKI did not.) The
Dani message also helped to enhance the plausibility of a PKI newspaper editorial
expressing similar views on the next day. Early and unambiguous identification of
Dani with GESTAPU would also inhibit him from taking unwanted military action.

Following the broadcast of the Dani statement, there were only a few steps left for
GESTAPU, except for the action in Central Java to be examined later. Another
incident of incriminating PKI involvement in GESTAPU was the alleged appearance
late in the day near Merdeka Square of Pemuda Rakjat (the PKI youth organization)
youths armed with Chinese weapons supposedly given to them by the Air Force.
They were quickly disarmed by units of the KOSTRAD-GESTAPU 530th Battalion
which had already "rejoined" the loyal forces. (Perhaps the incident was arranged in
part to demonstrate that the KOSTRAD-GESTAPU units were not really bad.)

This futile arming of "PKI" youths with marked Chinese weapons that were never
used is another of the almost endless string of GESTAPU "mistakes." The CIA
Research Study comments: "The weapons were all small arms of Chinese origin,
with the 'Chung' trademark stamped on them. The Indonesian army was known not to
have any weapons of that type. There is absolutely no doubt that the arms were the
property of the Indonesian Air Force." (Suharto is later said to have thrust one of
these "Chung" guns before Sukarno as proof of GESTAPU's evil.)
While the CIA analyst may have "no doubt," another explanation seems more probable. (Stories of Chinese arms shipments to Indonesia were rife after October 1st but even the CIA Study, in other places, questions their accuracy.) The CIA is known to have had a large store of Chinese weapons at this time, which were used for a variety of purposes, including such "incriminating" schemes. This incident was simply another planned part of the GESTAPU effort to incriminate the PKI in GESTAPU in dramatic fashion. The youths might have been unwitting Pemuda Rakjat but that could have been too dangerous and it seems more probable that they were other youths, or possibly it did not even happen at all.

Apparently there were armed anti-PKI youths in Djakarta already on October 1st who had some idea of what was going on. Donald Hindley has written the following:

"October 1 was an even more confusing day for the civilians of Djakarta....And yet, while the situation was still in doubt, a few civilians did take action to use the September 30 Movement as the excuse for a public attack on the Communist Party.

"By the evening of 1 October, several Moslems had met and agreed to form a Moslem Action Command Against Communism. These initial, and very few, activists were members of HMI (Moslem University Student's Association), PII (Moslem High School Students), Gasbiindo (Indonesian Moslem Trade Union Association), and the Muhammadijah, all of them organizations formerly affiliated with Masjumi. The only politician willing to be involved on that first day was Subchan, a vice-chairman of the NU and, in many ways, atypical of his party's leadership. That evening the group made contact with the army leadership, in the person of Djakarta commander Major General Umar Wirahadikusuma, who agreed to give them a few weapons. More important, Umar approved the formation of KAP-Gestapu (Action Front for the Crushing of Gestapu: Gestapu being an abbreviation of the Indonesian for 'September 30 Movement'). The plans for the more narrowly based, specifically Moslem Action Command were quietly dropped. Already, then, the army leadership had proffered its encouragement and (as yet less clearly apparent) protection for those who would spearhead a civilian campaign against the PKI."

If this is true, it indicates either remarkable prescience (it occurred before any evidence of PKI connection to GESTAPU had been announced) or, in our interpretation, that the GESTAPU action was a CIA-Suharto creation. The list of organizations involved on October 1st reads like a list of those civilian groups who would most likely have been working under CIA guidance. The use of anti-PKI students by the Army after October 1st is well known. The use of similar groups in many countries is also standard CIA practice. The extraordinarily early creation of KAP-GESTAPU with Army support is evidence of how the groundwork for the subsequent exploitation of the GESTAPU events was laid right from the beginning, if not before.

By about 7 PM on October 1st the Army had retaken the Indonesian Radio station and at 8:45 PM an announcement was broadcast that the "counter-revolutionary" September 30th Movement had kidnapped a number of generals but that Sukarno and Nasution were now safe and "the general situation is again under control."
Then occurred what subsequent observers have considered one of the most puzzling GESTAPU "mistakes," the appearance on October 2nd (after almost all other papers had ceased publication) of an issue of the PKI newspaper Harian Rakjat containing an editorial and cartoon endorsing the September 30th Movement. There is a remote possibility that the PKI editors were taken in by the messages they heard over the radio and had thrown caution overboard and in fact wrote such an editorial, but it is more probable that it was a fabrication. The Cornell study examined the October 2nd issue of Harian Rakjat at length and raised some doubts about the authenticity of the editorial and cartoon. The Cornell researchers, however, did not go so far as to declare them phony. The Cornell study does state that "the Djakarta garrison commander, Maj. Gen. Umar Wirahadikusumae, issued an order dated 6:00 p.m. on the 1st to the effect that no publications of any kind were to appear without permission of the Djakarta war authority, save for the Army newspapers Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersendjata, whose buildings were to be guarded to ensure that they did come out." The Cornell study states that it is "quite likely that the Harian Rakjat office and plant...was occupied by government troops at or not long after the time that Gen. Umar gave this order."

The Cornell researchers rejected "the most obvious explanation, that of an Army falsification" for the appearance of the October 2nd issue on rather weak grounds: "Everything is written in the normal Harian Rakjat jargon, and the competence of the PKI's enemies at falsifying party documents has always been abysmally low." The Cornell study had already pointed out that the editorial, and the cartoon, were not in typical Harian Rakjat style; the mere appearance of "authentic" jargon does not exclude the falsification hypothesis. The clumsiness of some earlier falsifications might lead one to suspect that the Army had help on this one, from the falsification experts in the CIA

The CIA Research Study finds the October 2nd editorial "mystifying," "an act of political suicide." The Study's explanation for how it happened is that Aidit was too busy doing other things to contact the Harian Rakjat editors and tell them to stop: "They could certainly have prevented its circulation....In the confusion of the moment, Aidit obviously did not have the time or the opportunity to contact the editors of Harian Rakjat if the matter of the editorial even occurred to him. He was totally occupied at the time with more important matters." With Sukarno having not endorsed the September 30th Movement, it is highly unlikely that Aidit, if he had been able to act, would have permitted the PKI to come out in public so quickly in favor of it. The Suharto-CIA thesis seems a more plausible explanation than "oversight."

The activities of the September 30th Movement outside of Djakarta were restricted almost completely to Central Java and officers of the Diponegoro Division, General Suharto's former command. The CIA Research Study states: "In the three key cities of Central Java, there occurred the same basic pattern of military action followed by a public statement of support for Untung's movement and an announcement of the formation of a Revolutionary Council." Officers of the Diponegoro Division, led by Col Suherman, the Chief of Army Intelligence for Central Java (who had returned from training in the U.S. a month before), carried out these actions. (A number of analysts, including the semi-official Army historians, have noted that apparently the PKI had
infiltrated the intelligence and civic action branches of the Army most successfully. It would seem more probable that the Suharto-CIA group had infiltrated those branches where American influence, guidance, and training were strong.)

The Djakarta pattern was followed even to the extent of having another remarkable "escape" of the leading military figure, General Sujosumeno, the Division Commander, who then put down the coup with ease. Only two officers were killed by GESTAPU, Col. Katamso, the commanding officer in Jogjakarta, and his deputy. The subsequent discovery of their bodies was again used to whip up anti-PKI emotions. The interesting wrinkle in this case is that Col. Katamso was a most unlikely victim of the "progressive" GESTAPU. According to Ruth McVey's research, Katamso was a relatively pro-PKI military officer and, in Rex Mortimer's words, "the singling out of Colonel Katamso for destruction seems decidedly perverse." (We may speculate that as no further victims of the Yani-type were needed, the CIA-GESTAPU group decided that they might as well make a pro-PKI officer the sacrificial lamb in Central Java.)

There were a few alleged PKI demonstrations of support for GESTAPU in Central Java but it appears that, as in Djakarta, most, if not all, were fabricated. The "PKI" action that received most attention was a demonstration in Jogjakarta on October 2nd. Major Muljono, a civic action officer in the Diponegoro Division, was the GESTAPU leader in Jogjakarta. He seems to have been the one that put together the demonstration and other pro-GESTAPU actions. The CIA Research Study states that "The major PKI mass organizations were restrained from action....Apparently Muljono was able to influence the Communist youth more than the PKI leadership." The Cornell study states that the demonstration in Jogjakarta "appears to have been chiefly a function of connections between the local coup leader, Major Muljono, and civilian youth groups. The demonstration was notable for the absence of PKI, SOBSI, Gerwani, and BTI participants." Major Muljono was the only important officer in Central Java who was later put on trial. He "confessed" everything.

The wrap up of GESTAPU in Central Java took slightly longer than in Djakarta but followed the same pattern of "Suharto-style" negotiations and immediate, cooperative surrender.

Our analysis is that the basic reason why the CIA-Suharto group decided to extend GESTAPU outside of Djakarta is that they wanted to show that the PKI-GESTAPU was a nation-wide threat so as to justify a nation-wide repression of the PKI. Central Java was the easiest place for Suharto to arrange the necessary GESTAPU actions and PKI "implication." GESTAPU was limited to a few cities where the Diponegoro Division was concentrated. As the CIA Research Study states, "Nothing of the sort that happened in Semarang, Jogjakarta, and Solo happened anywhere else in Java, not even in East Java, where there were many powerful centers of Communist strength." The Cornell study comments on the Central Java coup efforts that "what is extraordinary is not the amount of Communist participation in the initial phase of the affair but the lack of it."

Before concluding, let us consider the fate of the leading GESTAPU conspirators. Some of them were tried and sentenced to death (Lt. Col. Untung, General Supardjo), others were said to have been killed in military clashes (Col. Suherman),
and others (Col. Latief) have never been brought to trial or had their execution announced. It is our assumption that all of the leading military officers involved in GESTAPU on October 1st were "witting" actors in the CIA-Suharto plan. There is a remote chance that someone like Untung could have been unwitting but considerations of security would seem to have excluded the possibility of using someone who might easily have informed higher authorities of GESTAPU's existence or plans. We believe, particularly if the CIA connection is accurate, that these conspirators have subsequently been provided with new identities by the CIA and resettled outside of Indonesia. This kind of resettlement and looking after one's assets is relatively standard CIA procedure. The temptation to tie up loose ends and prevent any possibility of leaks raises the suggestion that the GESTAPU officers have been eliminated after serving their purpose but, not to be ironic, the honorable men at the CIA would probably consider this to be in violation of their code of conduct.

The official announcements of executions of GESTAPU officers, such as there have been, have been rather vague. For example, although Untung was tried and convicted in early 1966, it was not until September 1968 that Suharto stated for the first time that Untung and three other military leaders of the coup had been executed in December 1967. The 1968 CIA Research Study speculated that Latief was one of those executed in 1967 but in 1972 Latief made his first public appearance as a witness in the trial of Pono, an alleged PKI coup organizer. General Supardjo remained at large after October 1965 and was not arrested until early 1967. Apparently the Army knew where he was and his arrest was timed to serve a purpose in the ouster of Sukarno. In December 1965 it was announced that Col. Suherman and the other important GESTAPU officers from the Diponegoro Division headquarters had been shot dead in a clash with government troops in Central Java. Other Army sources have said that they were actually captured before they were shot. The evidence available to the author indicates that there have been no public or independently verified executions of any of the GESTAPU officers.

Conclusion

Discounting the dubious confessions displayed at the post-1965 show trials, the CIA-Suharto hypothesis seems to have the following advantages over other explanations of GESTAPU:

1. It is consistent with PKI policy and behavior before, during, and after the October 1st events. It explains PKI unpreparedness.

2. It is consistent with President Sukarno's behavior before, during, and after the events of October 1st. Sukarno had never resorted to political murder.

3. It explains why the coup was launched in such a disadvantageous military situation, why it was carried out with such incompetence, and why it failed so easily. GESTAPU was meant to fail, and quickly.

4. It is consistent with expected U.S. activism. It is highly implausible that the U.S. would have passively permitted Indonesia to "go Communist."
Something had to be done. A desperate situation required desperate measures.

5. It relates the GESTAPU action to those who benefited from it.

6. It is consistent with what we know of the backgrounds of the GESTAPU officers. They were, for the most part, Suharto's men and there is no evidence, except for that obtained through "confessions," that they had any pro-PKI inclinations.

7. It explains why General Yani and his associates were killed (and not merely kidnapped or put on trial). There were several strong motives for the CIA and Suharto to get rid of Yani. Victims of the "PKI" were required and in the Indonesian context, Yani was a "constitutionalist," loyal to the existing regime, as General Schneider was later in Chile.

8. It is inconsistent (a positive value) with a series of highly suspicious trials that were stage-managed by the Indonesian Army for obvious political purposes. As Justus van der Kroef wrote in 1970, "What Indonesians have been reading about Gestapu thus far is likely, in retrospect, to be more valuable as an index to the manipulation of the opinion and feelings concerning the September 30 events than as a contribution to an understanding of the coup itself." That a few trials, those of Sudisman and Sjam, impressed some foreign observers is only indicative of the fact that the state of the art has advanced since the 1930's in the Soviet Union.

The Cornell study in 1966 perceived the absence of links between GESTAPU on the one side and the PKI and Sukarno on the other and the essentially reactive behavior of the latter. The Cornell researchers concluded that the GESTAPU actors were entirely within the military establishment. A number of analysts noted the many associations between the GESTAPU officers and General Suharto. In the climate of 10 years ago, however, prior to the revelations of CIA operations, few were willing to take the next step and draw the logical connections that most adequately explain GESTAPU and its origins.

http://www.serve.com/inside/edit57/poulg.htm

Who plotted the 1965 coup?

Suharto always said it was the communists. Yet from the start, says Colonel Latief, Suharto himself was involved.

Greg Poulgrain

Indonesian President BJ Habibie has refused to release Colonel Latief, whose arrest in 1965 for involvement in a military coup was followed by Major-General Suharto's rise to the presidency.
Habibie has granted amnesty to 73 other political prisoners, even to members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) accused of involvement in the 1965 coup attempt. Refusing amnesty to Latief now shows how Suharto overshadows Habibie.

Interviewed in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, three days after Suharto resigned, Latief told me that he expected never to be released. Despite various kidney operations and the stroke he suffered last year, Latief is still very alert. His explanation for his involvement in 1965 directly implicates Suharto.

By late 1965, President Sukarno was ailing and without a successor. Tension between the PKI and the armed forces was growing. Conspiracies rumours were rife. Who would make the first move?

On the night of 30 September 1965, six hours before the military coup, Latief confirmed with Suharto that the plan to kidnap seven army generals would soon start. Latief was an officer attached to the Jakarta military command. As head of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), Suharto held the optimum position to crush the operation, so his name should have been at the top of the list. When troops who conducted the kidnappings asked why Suharto was not on the list, they were told: 'Because he is one of us'.

There was a rumour the seven generals were intending to seize power from Sukarno. Latief and two other army officers in the operation, Lieutenant-Colonel Untung (in charge of some of the troops guarding Sukarno's palace) and General Supardjo (a commander from Kalimantan), planned to kidnap the generals and bring them before President Sukarno to explain themselves.

The 30th September Movement was thus a limited pre-emptive strike by pro-Sukarno officers against anti-Sukarno officers. They kidnapped the generals and occupied strategic centres in Jakarta's main square, without touching Suharto's headquarters. The plan involved no killing, but it went terribly wrong and six of the seven died.

Although Untung was assigned responsibility for collecting the generals, this crucial task was then taken over by a certain Kamaruzzaman alias Sjam, evidently a 'double agent' with contacts in the Jakarta military command as well as the PKI. At his trial, Sjam admitted responsibility for killing the generals but blamed the PKI under Aidit. In 1965 when Suharto accused the PKI of responsibility for killing the generals, the Sjam-Aidit link gave Suharto enough leverage to convince his contemporaries.

Between Sjam and Suharto there was a twenty-year friendship going back to the fight against the Dutch in Central Java in 1948-49. This strengthened in the late 1950s when both attended the Bandung Staff College.

Suharto was also on close terms with Untung, who served under him during the campaign to reclaim Netherlands New Guinea in 1962 and who became a family friend.

During his trial in 1978, not only did Latief explain that he met Suharto on the night of the coup, but also that several days before he met both Suharto and his wife in the privacy of Suharto's home to discuss the overall plan. The court declared that this information was 'not relevant'.
Suharto, more than anybody, described the events that night as 'communist inspired'. Suharto's claim that he saw the slain generals' bodies had been sexually mutilated was shown to be deliberately false by post-mortem documents, not revealed till decades later. This false claim provoked months of killings against communists, particularly in Bali and Central and East Java.

The PKI, numbering 20 million, were mostly rice farmers. Accused en masse they became victims in one of the worst massacres this century. In the opinion of the author, many writers underestimated the death toll, which may be around one million persons. Another 700,000 were imprisoned without trial. The most notorious general involved, Sarwo Edhie, claimed not one but two million were killed. 'And we did a good job', he added. Traumatised by violence, the nation became politically malleable.

Using Suharto's own categorisation of crimes related to 1965, his prior knowledge of the alleged coup places him in 'Category A' involvement - the same as those who faced execution or life imprisonment.

The release of Colonel Latief is a litmus test of Habibie's willingness to promote genuine reform. Fewer than ten long term prisoners remain. Latief has pleaded: 'Most of them are already 70 years old and fragile. For the sake of humanity, please take notice of us.'

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http://www.lossless-audio.com/usa/index0.php?page=1137134801.htm

US orchestrated Suharto's 1965-66 slaughter in Indonesia

Part 1:

New evidence on how the October 1 coup was triggered

By Mike Head

19 July 1999

Damning new evidence has come to light pointing to the extent of the involvement of the United States government, closely supported by the Australian and British administrations, in the military coup staged in Indonesia by General Suharto on October 1, 1965 and the subsequent massacre of up to one million workers, peasants, students and political activists.

Last week, the Sydney Morning Herald published a three-part series that included interviews with former Indonesian political prisoners and extracts from documents obtained from US and Australian archives. The material shows that the Western powers urged the Indonesian military commanders to seize upon false claims of a coup attempt instigated by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), in order to carry out one of the greatest civilian massacres of the 20th century and establish a military dictatorship.
By most estimates, between 500,000 and a million PKI members and supporters, as well as people of ethnic Chinese origin, were murdered, and tens of thousands were detained in prisons and concentration camps, without any visible resistance. The documents show that throughout late 1965 and early 1966 US and Australian officials approvingly reported to their respective governments that army units and Muslim groups were working hand-in-hand to shoot, hack or club to death at least 1,500 suspected PKI sympathisers per day, sometimes parading their heads on sticks.

This enthusiasm in the Western embassies for the bloodbath reflected deep strategic and political interests. In the decade before the coup, the major powers had come into increasing conflict with the unstable nationalist regime of Indonesian President Sukarno. In late 1957 and again in 1964-65 he had barely contained mass movements of workers and peasants, whose strikes and occupations threatened first Dutch and then US and British banks, companies and plantations. By 1965 Sukarno was precariously balancing between the military commanders, the Muslim organisations and the PKI, which had some three million members and supporters, making it the third largest Communist Party in the world, after China and the Soviet Union.

The US had cut off foreign aid to Sukarno while building up relations with sections of the military. From the mid-1950s it began training and equipping Indonesian officers and troops, in preparation for a move to topple or sideline Sukarno. The first coup attempt came in November 1956 when Indonesian army Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Zulkifli Lubis sought to take control of Jakarta and overthrow the government. Regional military takeovers followed the next month in Central and North Sumatra. Throughout 1957 and 1958 the CIA inspired a series of secessionist and right-wing revolts in the oil-rich regions of Sumatra and Sulawesi, where Caltex and other US oil firms had large investments. Then between 1959 and 1965, the US supplied $64 million in military aid to the Indonesian generals.

A huge amount was at stake for the US and its allies. Indonesia had immense natural resources, including some of the largest oil and rubber operations in the world, a teeming population and its 3,000 islands sat astride the sea routes from Asia to Europe. The US and the other capitalist powers regarded the archipelago as an absolutely crucial prize in the war against the anti-imperialist struggles that erupted across Asia after World War II. The 1949 victory of Mao Zedong's forces in China had been followed by that of Ho Chi Minh's in northern Vietnam. Insurgencies arose in Indochina, Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines from the late 1940s.

In the months prior to the Indonesian coup, the US administration of Democratic Party President Lyndon Johnson had dramatically escalated its intervention in Vietnam, sending in hundreds of thousands of troops and beginning its saturation bombing of the north. And the British and Australian governments were engaged in military conflict with Sukarno's regime over Indonesia's opposition to the British-backed formation of Malaysia, which encompassed key portions of the large mainly Indonesian island of Borneo.

The September 30 affair
The first part of the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s series is substantially based on an interview with former Sergeant Major Bungkus and earlier statements by former Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Latief. Both were jailed in 1965 for their involvement in a supposed military putsch instigated by the PKI on September 30, 1965. They were only released from prison in March this year—apparently the only survivors of the participants in the September 30 affair. Hundreds of others were tortured and executed.

Their testimony completely undermines the official version of Suharto's coup—that he and his fellow generals were responding to a takeover bid instigated by the PKI through its supporters in the military. By this official account—presented in "documentary" form annually on all Indonesian TV stations until last year—PKI-inspired officers rounded up six of the country's highest-ranking generals on the night of September 30 and brutally killed them, leaving their bodies horribly mutilated. The plot was only thwarted, the authorised story insists, and the nation saved from the "evil" of communism, when General Suharto heroically intervened and took control of Jakarta the next day.

According to the statements given by Bungkus and Latief, the alleged "PKI coup" was an internal military power struggle, engineered by Suharto as a pretext to destroy the PKI.

Bungkus, as a member of the Indonesian presidential guard, was ordered on the night of September 30 to participate in one of seven teams dispatched to kill or capture senior generals. At a briefing, Bungkus and other NCOs were told by their commanding officer, Lieutenant Dul Arief, that seven top generals had set up a "Dewan Jenderal" or Council of Generals, and were planning to stage a coup against the then president, Sukarno.

By September 1965, the situation in Indonesia was extremely tense. Rumours abounded that the army was going to once more move against Sukarno and the PKI through the establishment of such a Council of Generals.

Yet, the operation against the generals on September 30 had two obvious flaws. In the first place, the squad sent to the home of the Indonesian Defence Minister General A. H. Nasution—the officer with the closest links to the US Embassy and the CIA—somehow failed its assignment, allowing Nasution to escape. Secondly, no-one was sent to deal with General Suharto, then the commander of the Army Strategic Reserve. On October 1, Suharto, backed by Nasution, was able to quickly mobilise the necessary units to take control of Jakarta and then extend his rule across the country.

Bungkus was only a junior figure in the events but he insists that the officers from whom he took his instructions were not linked to the PKI. And he and other members of the presidential guard who took part in the assassinations were simply following orders. In his view, Suharto carefully orchestrated the September 30 affair as a means of moving against the entire left-wing movement in Indonesia.

This is corroborated by Latief, who revealed a number of critical facts upon his release from prison. He said that he had personally reported the coup plan to...
Suharto before the killings. “Pak Harto [Suharto] knew for sure that on September 30, the seven generals were to be brought to Bung Karno [Sukarno],” Latief said.

Latief said he went to the military hospital where Suharto was with his ill baby Tommy, to alert him to the intended move against the seven generals, but Suharto took no action. “I think it is clear Pak Harto used the opportunity of the arrest of the generals to blame the PKI and reach power.”

Latief also referred to a document proving British and American involvement in a plot by the seven generals to effectively seize power from Sukarno. “The plan to arrest the generals was related to the existence of a ‘Council of Generals' which was first revealed through the leaking of a British Embassy document, which said the council was to supervise Sukarno's policies. The document, a letter from the British Ambassador, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, also revealed the British were working with the CIA.”

Unanswered questions remain about the events of September 30-October 1. It is not certain whether Suharto merely allowed the murder of the generals, or helped organise them. The involvement of the CIA and the British in Suharto's actions requires further investigation. Noticeably, none of the archives dealing with the lead up to the coup have yet been opened. But the speed with which Suharto moved on October 1 supports the conclusion that, acting in concert with the US agencies, he engineered the whole operation to eliminate his rivals and provide a pretext for moving against Sukarno and the PKI.

Finally, it is highly unlikely that the PKI planned to overthrow Sukarno's government, in which the party participated as coalition partners with the military and Muslim leaders. In line with the Stalinist doctrine of maintaining an alliance with Sukarno and the national capitalist class, the PKI leaders had repeatedly helped quell the struggles of workers and peasants. Under the “two-stage” theory, they had insisted that socialism would only arise peacefully and gradually after a prolonged capitalist stage of development in Indonesia. Even as signs grew of preparations for a generals' coup, they had urged their followers to have faith in the so-called pro-people's aspect of the military apparatus. [See Lessons of the 1965 Indonesian Coup]

Moreover, there was no mobilisation of the vast membership of the PKI and its associated trade unions, student organisations, women's movements and peasant organisations. In the subsequent holocaust there was no sign of PKI-led resistance. In fact, even as the death squads were set loose, the surviving PKI leaders and their patrons in Moscow and Beijing urged PKI followers to offer no opposition but to continue to subordinate themselves to Sukarno, who collaborated with Suharto and was retained as titular president until 1967.

The new evidence of direct US, British and Australian involvement in triggering and exploiting the 1965-66 events provides a critical lesson in the so-called democratic and humanitarian concerns of the major capitalist powers. They stand ready to orchestrate and sanction mass killings and repression to pursue their economic and strategic requirements in Indonesia and elsewhere.
Part 2: Washington called for military government

Documents from the US State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicate that, having seized power on October 1, 1965, Indonesia's General Suharto and other army generals—acting on the urgings of US leaders—used military and Muslim death squads to massacre of hundreds of thousands of workers, students and peasants.

In its introduction to the documents, the Sydney Morning Herald on July 10 said the secret records show “the US and Australia knew what was happening—but continued to back the army in its bloody takeover”. In fact, the archives show that the role of the US administration and its junior partners in the Australian government was far from passive.

To begin with, the material demonstrates that US officials had longstanding and intimate ties with the military commanders; insisted that Suharto's junta exterminate the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI); and called for the establishment of a military dictatorship.

Many of the cables—sent from Jakarta to Washington between October 1965 and February 1966—were written by the US Ambassador Marshall Green and were addressed to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his aides. Green had arrived in Jakarta just before the coup, selected for the post by the Democratic Party administration of President Lyndon Johnson on the basis of definite experience. During Green's earlier term as charge d'affaires in South Korea, General Park Chung Hee had carried out a coup, initiating nearly three decades of US-backed military rule. Green was later posted to Australia in the lead-up to the dismissal of the Whitlam Labor government in November 1975.

The involvement of Green and fellow senior US officials in the 1965-66 slaughter has already been partially documented. Indeed, in 1990 Green and other retired US diplomats and CIA officers admitted that they had provided the Indonesian generals with execution lists of the names of thousands of national, regional and local leaders of the PKI. A report by States News Service, published in the Washington Post of May 21, 1990, quoted Green confirming his role, saying: “I know we had a lot more information [about the PKI] than the Indonesians themselves... The US-supplied information was superior to anything they had.”

The death lists had been drawn up after 1962 at the instigation of the CIA's then Far East division chief, William Colby, who later became CIA director. It was a practice that was not confined to Indonesia. Colby gave an interview in 1990 comparing the intelligence-gathering on the PKI to the infamous Phoenix Program that he directed in Vietnam, in which 20,000 members and supporters of the National Liberation Front were targetted for assassination.

According to Marian Wilkinson, the author of the Sydney Morning Herald report, the latest documents include former “Top Secret” and “Secret” US records on the massacres, collected by a Washington researcher, John Kelly, for a lapsed documentary project. These have been added to recently declassified documents, as
well as records on the US killing lists obtained in 1990 by a US lawyer, Kathy Kadane.

None of the new material covers the period of preparations for Suharto's coup, but it shows that just four days after the coup, Green was already expressing the wish that the military should exploit the killing of six generals on September 30, 1965 to accuse the PKI of plotting a takeover and to seize control of Indonesia.

Despite describing the involvement of the PKI leadership as “not certain,” Green sent a message to Washington on October 5, 1965 emphasising that the army had to move decisively: “Whatever the background ... army in control, and it has important instruments of power such as press, radio and TV. It also has a cause in murder of six top leaders if army chooses to use it and it has already begun to do so ... Muslim groups and others (except communists and their stooges) are lined up behind army...

“Army now has opportunity to move against PKI if it acts quickly ... Momentum is now at peak with discovery of bodies of murdered army leaders. In short, it's now or never ...

Green indicated that Washington's long-held hopes that the military would remove Indonesian President Sukarno were finally coming to fruition: “Despite all its shortcomings, we believe odds are that army will act to pin blame for recent events on PKI and its allies. Much remains in doubt, but it seems almost certain that agony of ridding Indonesia of effects of Sukarno ... has begun.”

He advised Washington to: “Avoid overt involvement as power struggle unfolds ... However, indicate clearly to key people in army such as Nasution and Suharto our desire to be of assistance where we can ... Maintain and if possible extend our contact with military ... Spread the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality (this priority effort is perhaps most-needed immediate assistance we can give army if we can find way to do it without identifying it as solely or largely US effort).”

**Army urged to go further**

Two days later, Green warned Washington that he was worried that the military might not go far enough. “Extent army determination to stand up to Sukarno still not (repeat) not clear,” he wrote. However, he reported encouraging signs of military action specifically targeted against the working class: “Army has begun extensive sweeps in Jakarta lower-class suburbs to round up communist para-military elements active in Sept 30 violence.”

The next day, October 8, Green was more optimistic. “Communists are now on the run for the first time in many years in Indonesia,” he cabled. He was most of all encouraged that: “PKI organisational apparatus has been disrupted and party documents dispersed. This capped today with burning of PKI headquarters in Jakarta.”

By October 13, Green was able to report that the purge was progressing: “Anti-communists continue [to] make most of their present ascendancy. Today's tally included closing of communist universities, banning of leftist student organisations
and still more attacks on PKI premises... Youth groups sacked second PKI bookstore.”

Two days later, Green reported on discussions with military commanders and Muslim political leaders: “Army and Muslim sources have discussed with [embassy officers] strategy they hope army will follow. They hope army will proceed in step-by-step campaign not only against PKI but against whole communist/Sukarno clique.”

On the same day, he was eager to pass on confidential reports that mass executions had begun. “Army has already executed 74 communists seized in connection with coup attempt, despite efforts by Subandrio [Sukarno's foreign minister] to stop executions.”

Green was determined to ensure that the anti-communist killings intensified. He asked for a cable to be relayed to the US Information Agency, stressing the need for more anti-PKI agitation. “In all media, by implication as well as by repetition of bald facts, link this horror and tragedy with Peking and its brand of communism; associate diabolical murder and mutilation of the generals with similar methods used against village headmen in Vietnam.”

On October 18, Green gave a graphic report of army-backed Muslim youth groups carrying out anti-communist and anti-Chinese pogroms in Sumatra, where many industrial and oil projects were located. “Muslims have begun attacking Chinese-communist elements in Medan and other North Sumatran cities. Merchandise burned, homes sacked and Chinese beaten. [US] Consulate has noted many fires in Medan and Belawan Chinese districts. Muslims apparently not distinguishing between Chicom [Chinese communists] and Indonesian citizens.”

Two days later Green cabled with approval that: “Some thousands of PKI cadres have reportedly been arrested in Jakarta ... several hundred of them have been executed.” But he insisted that the military had to go further to fulfill what he described as “this crucial assignment”: “Thus far, however, basic PKI organisational potential would appear to be largely intact and capable of recovering quickly in a purely organisational sense if its status were recognised by the government and army attacks were stopped...”

“Army has nevertheless been working hard at destroying PKI and I, for one, have increasing respect for its determination and organisation in carrying out this crucial assignment.”

In another cable on the same day, October 20, Green detailed the activities of joint army-Muslim death squads in the working class districts of Jakarta. In a secret visit to the US Embassy, a Muslim youth leader told of: “... army sweeps continuing in kampongs and other locations Jakarta area ... Muslim youth ‘assistants’ are accompanying troops. Source said 'some' killings had resulted from these sweeps.”

On October 23 Green again expressed concern that the army was weakening its drive. But four days later he said he was encouraged by what senior army officers had told the US defence attaché, Colonel Willis Ethel, during a game of golf. “We are soon likely to hear reports about executions, including executions of public figures on whose behalf Sukarno is likely to make pleas for leniency.”
The Embassy's close links to the military were confirmed by a CIA cable the same day with information from the commander of the East Java Military reporting that “he will begin a mass suppression and round-up of the PKI ...”

**Washington proposes formation of military regime**

Few of the documents appear to relate to instructions sent from Washington to Green and his team—orders that may be even more revealing than the telegraphic traffic the other way. On October 29, however, one cable from the State Department—marked “Action”—made it clear that the Johnson administration wanted a military dictatorship established, and was ready to support it financially and militarily.

The message noted that Washington was developing its policy on Indonesia and wanted a military-run government: “Sooner or later ... it will become increasingly clear to army leaders that they are only force capable of creating order in Indonesia, and that they must take initiative to form a military or civilian-military provisional government, with or without Sukarno.”

It urged the Embassy to make this known to the army: “The next few days, weeks or months may offer unprecedented opportunities for us to begin to influence people and events ... Small arms and equipment may be needed to deal with the PKI ... As events develop, the army may find itself in major military campaigns against PKI, and we must be ready for that contingency ... We shall, of course, want to consult with the British, Australians, and others as well.”

On the same day, Green dispatched a favourable report of military officers and Muslim extremists taking matters into their own hands. “Muslim fervour in Atjeh [province] has apparently put all but few PKI out of action. Atjehese has decapacitated [sic] PKI and placed their heads on stakes along the road.”

From another Sumatran province, Riau, a US Embassy official highlighted army-Muslim terror directed against trade union members in the vital Caltex oil operations: “Muslims with army consent have sacked communist premises in city and closed their buildings in countryside. Army has raided PKI leaders' houses and informed Caltex management it plans on Oct 29 to arrest key leaders of communist oil workers' union Perbum, which forms core of PKI structure that province.”

By November 4, after a month of bloodletting, Green expressed satisfaction with the army's role. “Army is doing a first-class job here of moving against communists, and by all current indications is the emerging authority in Indonesia ... In the immediate offing there is the problem of pacifying and establishing a firm control over communist redoubt areas, particularly in Central Java, and of combating PKI sabotage and terror. There is likely to be bloodshed involving Muslims and Christian youth groups, as well as military and others. Need for medical and other assistance likely to be very real and urgent.”

Eyewitness accounts indicate that in Java most of the killing was carried out by Muslim groups, in particular, Ansor, the youth wing of the Nahdlatul Ulama (Muslim Scholars League).
On November 12, Green reported confidential news from Jakarta's police information chief that: “from 50 to 100 PKI members are being killed every night in East and Central Java by civilian anti-communist groups with blessing of army”. A similar report came from Ted Heavner, the US Consul in the port city of Surabaya, who wrote of the army making use of its “Muslim manpower”.

Four days later the US Consul in Medan reported that Muslim leaders had informed his officers of planned massacres. He described their killing as “indiscriminate” and their attitude as “bloodthirsty”. “This terror is not (repeat) not discriminating very carefully between PKI leaders and ordinary PKI members with no ideological bond to the party. [Source] suggests that army itself is officially adopting extreme measures against PKI with plans to put many thousands in concentration camps.”

By the new year, both the CIA and Green's staff were assembling casualty estimates. The CIA reported: “The slaughter of PKI members and sympathisers in North Sumatra, East and Central Java and Bali is continuing.” Green's deputy noted intelligence from a friendly power that: “As a result of ... calculations by his embassy as well as [confidential], a total of about 400,000 killed as a result of the Sept 30 affair had been agreed.” Nevertheless, the cable said there could be many more dead.

Another year of killings and repression ensued, before the efforts of the US and its allies in London and Canberra were fully rewarded when Sukarno, in March 1967, formally relinquished the presidency to Suharto, paving the way for the latter to declare a “New Order” regime.

Part 3: New light on Australia's active involvement

Previously-secret documents at the Australian Archives in Canberra indicate that the Australian government—then led by Liberal Party Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies—and the Australian military, intelligence and diplomatic services were closely involved in the 1965-66 Indonesian coup carried out by General Suharto.

In publishing some of the records on July 12, the Sydney Morning Herald chose the headline, “The silent watchers”. Its introduction said the documents showed that the federal government had “turned a blind eye” to the “indiscriminate slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians”.

But the documents themselves confirm that the Australian role was as active as that of the US government, if only on a smaller scale. Its military had trained some of the officers taking part in the massacre, and during 1965-66 the Menzies government and its officials shared intelligence sources, reports and assessments on the most intimate basis with their American, Canadian and British counterparts.

Moreover, the records demonstrate that the cables sent to and from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta mirrored, at times word for word, those from the US Embassy in their insistence that the Indonesian generals led by Suharto had to act ruthlessly to crush all support for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), especially among industrial workers.
Nor was this an “indiscriminate slaughter”. The documents point to a common view, shared by the American, British and Australian governments, that the establishment of a military dictatorship in Indonesia was an essential contribution toward the wider war against the anti-imperialist struggles that had erupted in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia.

Earlier in 1965 the Menzies government had committed troops to both Borneo and South Vietnam. In January, it had agreed to the deployment of a combat battalion and a 100-strong SAS unit to Borneo to combat Indonesian forces mobilised by the Sukarno government as part of its campaign against the British-sponsored formation of Malaysia, which included the resource-rich former British colonies of Sabah and Sarawak. In April, the Menzies cabinet had committed the first battalion of infantry to the US intervention in Vietnam.

The documents published by the *Sydney Morning Herald* relate to the period after Suharto’s seizure of power on October 1, 1965. Thus, they only indirectly shed light on the Australian involvement in the US preparations for the coup. In addition, the present Howard government continues to block access to hundreds of pages of material held in the Archives on the 1965-66 events in Indonesia. No doubt, the documents that have been released are the least incriminating.

Yet they are damning enough. They show that on October 5, 1965—just four days after Suharto’s takeover—the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta, K. C. O. “Mick” Shann used identical language to that of the US Ambassador, Marshall Green, in welcoming Suharto’s coup. It was “now or never” for the Indonesian army to deal with the PKI, Shann advised Canberra. On the same day, Green had told Washington that: “Army now has opportunity to move against PKI if it acts quickly ... In short, it's now or never.”

If anything, Shann was more vitriolic than his American colleague in demanding decisive action by the Indonesian generals. “Change there will be,” he said in a dispatch to Canberra the next day. “We will never get back to the status quo ante. But if Sukarno and his greasy civilian cohorts get back into the saddle it will be a change for the worse.”

By October 12, External Affairs Department officials in Canberra were encouraged by the developments. Arrests, murders and executions had begun, and mobs had ransacked the houses of PKI members of Sukarno’s cabinet.

In a memo to External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck, a first assistant secretary in the department, Gordon Jockel, said: “Since our last note to you the army has been more vigorous and independent. Despite the president's call for unity, the army and the Muslim groups are taking strong practical action to disarm the PKI and disrupt its organisation.” Jockel described these trends as “favourable,” although there were “still great uncertainties”.

Three days later, the Embassy informed Canberra that: “Almost daily, offices, houses and bookshops have been ransacked or burned and the momentum does not seem to be faltering.” On the same day, Shann sent a report in which he noted that mass killings of PKI supporters were underway. “At least a few ‘suspects' have been
brutally murdered. We will never know how many people have lost their lives. We think it is a lot.”

Shann indicated that the Western powers were still not fully confident in the military’s role. There was likely to be no great joy for the West if the army came to power, he thought. It would remain “implacably anti-imperialist and therefore ... anti-American, anti-British and, to the extent that we bother them, anti-Australian.”

Two days later, on October 17, according to US documents, US and Australian officials met in Washington to discuss Indonesia and the army’s strategy. A US State Department memo indicates that the US Assistant Secretary of State, McGeorge Bundy, met the head of Australia’s External Affairs Department, Sir James Plimsoll, and Australia’s Ambassador to the US, Keith Waller and exchanged views on the army’s intentions.

By October 22, Shann, like Marshall Green, was more optimistic. The Embassy reported that Indonesia was experiencing “a mounting wave of anti-communist demonstrations and sentiment and a general army-condoned, or perhaps army-inspired, blackening of the communist image.”

It referred to a “cleansing operation” that included “nocturnal army operations” at all levels of society. Shann himself had witnessed about 250 prisoners being “whisked off” by military police. “It is impossible to make any estimate of the number of people killed or detained,” the Embassy said. “It cannot be small.”

The Embassy report concluded, enthusiastically: “He would be a very cautious man who did not derive some encouragement from events in Indonesia over the past week.”

American documents also show that when, at the end of October, the Johnson administration determined that Suharto should establish a military government, it consulted the Menzies government, together with the British.

**Workers and peasants massacred**

The Australian authorities were aware that workers and villagers were among the main targets of the military repression.

In the month of November, the Embassy noted that the wave of terror had been extended down to the factory floor. According to its report of November 17, it had apparently become the practice in factories and other workplaces “for the army to assemble the labour force and ask them whether they wish to continue work as usual. Those who decline are asked again and, unless they change their mind, summarily shot.”

Two days later, the Embassy proudly reported on an “action”—a massacre—led by an Australian-trained officer. Colonel Sarwo Edhie was a 1964 graduate from an 18-month course at the Australian Army Staff College at Queenscliff, near Melbourne. On November 10, 1965, just a year after graduating, he commanded 400 soldiers of the feared RPKAD (Special Forces, now known as Kopassus) on a sweep through Central Java, hunting for opponents of the military junta.
At 6.30 am the troops approached a village at the foot of Mount Merapi, in the Boyolali district, 40 km north-east of Jogjakarta, firing “test shots” into the air. Between 100 and 200 people, many of them women and children, appeared at the side of the road. According to the report sent to Canberra, the villagers advanced on the troops with cries of “Nekolim,” meaning “neo-colonialists and imperialists” and were armed with bamboo spears, knives and “one or two guns”. “Shots fired over their heads by the patrol failed to deter them and the army was obliged to shoot at them, killing seven and wounding 17.”

That report was derived from a first-hand account supplied by an Indian journalist, B. K. Tiwari, who had spent 11 days in Central Java as Sarwo Edhie’s guest. Tiwari’s account also confirmed that the military was training Muslim militia groups. In an interview with Tiwari, the Colonel had “spoken of the training he was giving Muslim groups (as yet no arms had been issued)”. Muslim youth were acting “as the ears and eyes of the army, guiding patrols and generally informing”.

Two days before Christmas 1965, the Australian Embassy estimated that, on average, 1,500 people had been murdered every day since September 30. “Estimates of the number of people killed vary between 100,000 and 200,000, the latter being the figure accepted by the American and West German embassies. The West Germans have heard that 70,000 people have been killed in East Java alone. Without having any firm basis for making an estimate we would if we had to name a figure put it at between 100,000 and 150,000. This works out at about 1,500 assassinations per day since September 30th.”

**Media manipulation**

While the bloodbath was taking place in Indonesia, the Menzies government and the External Affairs Department sought to control and censor the news broadcast to Indonesia by Radio Australia. On October 10, 1965 Ambassador Shann advised Canberra that Radio Australia should “do nothing to engender sympathy for President Sukarno”.

Two days later, the External Affairs Department's public information officer, Richard Woolcott noted in a memo that he and a colleague had told contacts at Radio Australia that it should “by careful selection of its news items, not do anything which would be helpful to the PKI and should highlight reports tending to discredit the PKI and show its involvement in the losing cause of the September 30 movement.”

The Department's Gordon Jockel wrote to Shann on October 15, asking to be advised “whether there are any problems with the ABC representatives in Jakarta”. In a memo to his Minister, Paul Hasluck, on October 18, David Hay, another first assistant secretary, said: “Radio Australia should be on guard against giving information to the Indonesian people that would be withheld by the army-controlled internal media, e.g. disavowals [of coup involvement] by the PKI ...”

On October 21, Woolcott reported that he had insisted that Radio Australia refer to Suharto and other key generals as “non-communist” rather than “anti-communist” and “rightist”. “I stressed again to [Radio Australia news editor John] Hall that the danger of inaccurate reporting could have an adverse effect on the army ...”
By November 5, the Indonesian army was so confident that the Menzies government would do its bidding that it relayed a message to Canberra, via Shann, that news items critical of Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio “should be used” by Radio Australia.

It also said “reports should never imply that the army or its supporters” were in any way “pro-Western or right wing”. At that stage in the coup, given the strength of anti-colonial feeling among the Indonesian masses, it was still unwise for the generals to openly identify themselves with their Western patrons.

The events of 1965-66 reveal the essential outlook of the Australian political and military establishment. For public consumption, government leaders extol “democratic values,” but the actual record is one of demanding and supporting, whenever it is deemed necessary, military violence ... and media manipulation.

This participation in the Indonesian holocaust was not a passing phase, nor an aberration. The figures who led the Australian involvement in the 1965-66 coup were all well rewarded for many years to come. Paul Hasluck, the Minister, was later knighted and became Governor-General of Australia. David Hay, a key official, was also knighted and then appointed Administrator of Papua New Guinea from 1967 to 1970. Gordon Jockel, also from External Affairs, went on to serve as Ambassador in Indonesia from 1969 to 1972. Richard Woolcott, another high-ranking official, became Ambassador to Indonesia too—from 1975 to 1978—then headed the Foreign Affairs Department. He remains a prominent media commentator on events in Indonesia.

As for the Labor Party, while it was not in office in 1965-66, its support for the Indonesian massacre was best summed up in the early 1990s by the then prime minister, Paul Keating. He referred to Suharto's coup as the most important and beneficial event in Australia's post-war strategic history.

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During Suharto's coup in 1965-66

US officials provided Indonesian military with death lists

By the Editorial Board

20 May 1998

It is critical that students and workers engaged in the struggle against the Suharto dictatorship not fall prey to any illusions in the so-called democratic role of the US government. The statements by President Clinton and the State Department urging restraint on the part of the Indonesian military must be placed in the context of the actual historical role of American imperialism in the massacre of hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants that accompanied the 1965-66 military coup which brought Suharto to power and the more than three decades of US support for his dictatorship.
In 1990 retired US diplomats and CIA officers, including former Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green, admitted helping the Indonesian military organize its mass killing. According to a report by States News Service, published in the Washington Post May 21, 1990, State Department and CIA officials at the US Embassy in Jakarta personally provided the names of thousands of local, regional and national leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to the armed forces, which then killed or detained most of those named.

A former political officer in the US Embassy in Jakarta, Robert Martens, was quoted as saying, "They probably killed a lot of people and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad. There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment."

Martens said he supplied the names to an aide to Adam Malik, the Indonesian foreign minister who played a prominent role in the planning of the military coup. The aide, Tirta Kentjana Adhyatman, who was interviewed in Jakarta, confirmed that he received lists of thousands of names from Martens and passed them on to Malik, who gave them in turn to Suharto's headquarters.

The lists provided a detailed read-out of the PKI leadership structure, including the names of provincial, city and other local PKI committee members, as well as the leaders of the PKI-controlled trade unions, women's and youth groups.

At the time, former US Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green confirmed the report, saying, "I know we had a lot more information [about the PKI] than the Indonesians themselves." "The US-supplied information was superior to anything they had," he said.

After the lists were turned over, US Embassy officials and CIA desk officers in Langley, Virginia carefully followed the progress of the extermination campaign by the Indonesian military. Former deputy CIA station chief Joseph Lazarsky said, "We were getting a good account in Jakarta of who was being picked up. The army had a 'shooting list' of about 4,000 or 5,000 people."

As the leaders of the PKI--then the third largest Communist Party in the world, after China and the Soviet Union--were rounded up or assassinated, US officials checked off the names against their own copies of the list. Lazarsky recalled that by the end of January 1966 there were so many checked-off names that CIA headquarters concluded that the PKI leadership had been destroyed.

The initiative in drawing up the lists of PKI members came from William Colby, who would later become the director of the CIA. In 1962 he was appointed chief of the agency's Far East division. In an interview around the time of the Washington Post article, Colby said in the early 1960s he had discovered that the CIA did not have comprehensive lists of PKI leaders. This, he said, "could have been criticized as a gap in the intelligence system."

The lists were prepared for "operational planning," he said, and without them, "you're fighting blind." Colby compared the intelligence-gathering on the PKI to the notorious Phoenix Program which he directed in Vietnam, in which 20,000 cadres and sympathizers of the National Liberation Front were targeted for assassination.
The "stabilization" of Indonesia in 1965 was regarded as vital by the administration of Democratic President Lyndon Johnson, which was then engaged in sharply escalating its military intervention in Vietnam. 1965 was the year of the influx of hundreds of thousands of US troops and the beginning of saturation bombing of the liberated northern part of the country.

The former State Department and CIA officials interviewed by States News Service in 1990 freely admitted that the purpose of the lists of PKI leaders was to organize mass killings. "No one cared, so long as they were communists, that they were being butchered," said Howard Federspeil, who was an Indonesian expert working at the State Department when Suharto orchestrated the anticommunist pogrom. "No one was getting very worked up about it."

Millions were killed outright or imprisoned in concentration camps where they died of torture, neglect and slave-labor. Even an internal CIA report, leaked to the press in 1968, said that the Indonesian security forces killed 250,000 people in "one of the greatest massacres of the twentieth century."

To this day, thousands of suspected PKI supporters remain in concentration camps in Indonesia and several dozen have been shot by firing squads since the early 1980s. Around the time of the Washington Post article, four prisoners, Johannes Surono Hadiwiyono, Safar Suryanto, Simon Petrus Sulaeman and Norbertus Rohayan, were executed, nearly 25 years after the coup. The continued repression was a clear sign that the Suharto regime feared the resurgence of the many-millioned Indonesian proletariat and poor peasantry which is taking place today.

At the time, former Ambassador Green was quoted as saying that he and two subordinates approved giving the CIA lists to the military. Green was later appointed US ambassador to Australia where he played a leading role in the preparations for the dismissal of the Whitlam Labor government in 1975, in the so-called Canberra Coup.

Source: World Socialist Web Site

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Former US Ambassador Marshall Green dead at 82

A key participant in Indonesian massacre

By Mike Head

26 June 1998

A former US Ambassador to Indonesia and Australia, Marshall Green, one of the key participants in the 1965-66 military coup which brought General Suharto to power, died of a heart attack in Washington on June 6. He was 82.

The New York Times published a respectful obituary, describing Green as the personification of American foreign policy in Asia from the 1950s to the 1970s. Likewise, The Australian presented a tribute, penned by John Wheeldon, a minister
in the 1972-75 Australian Labor Party government of Gough Whitlam, in whose downfall Green was also involved.

Green, a long-time operative of the US State Department, played a direct and personal role in preparing and overseeing the massacre of up to one million workers and peasants in the period of the Indonesian coup. Under his command, State Department and CIA officials at the US Embassy in Jakarta provided the Indonesian armed forces with "shooting lists" bearing the names of thousands of local, regional and national leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

In 1990 Green and other retired US diplomats and CIA officers admitted helping the military organise the mass killing. Green confirmed a report by States News Service, published in the *Washington Post* on May 21, 1990, saying, "I know we had a lot more information [about the PKI] than the Indonesians themselves... The US-supplied information was superior to anything they had."

One of Green's former staff, Robert Martens, who served as a political officer in the Jakarta Embassy, was quoted as saying, "They probably killed a lot of people and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad. There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment."

Green arrived in Jakarta in 1965, just before the coup. This bloody overthrow was the product of years of intensive preparations by the CIA and the US military. The American forces trained and equipped the Indonesian military and then staged a provocation--a supposed coup by middle-ranking officers--to justify the ouster of Indonesian President Sukarno and the extermination of the PKI.

In early 1965 Sukarno had brought leaders of the PKI--then the third largest Communist Party in the world, after China and the Soviet Union--into his government, alongside a number of generals. But the pro-Chinese Stalinist PKI had failed to adequately suppress mounting unrest, including the seizure of plantations and factories by impoverished workers and peasants.

This situation threatened the interests of US oil and rubber companies, as well as the plans of Democratic Party President Lyndon Johnson, then engaged in sharply escalating the US military intervention in Vietnam. The Johnson White House selected Green to oversee the Indonesian bloodbath on the basis of proven experience. During Green's earlier term as charge d'affaires in Seoul, General Park Chung Hee had carried out a military coup, initiating nearly three decades of US-backed military dictatorship.

Green's long career centred on Asia and the Pacific, apart from five years in the US Embassy in Stockholm (1950-55). He was posted to South Korea twice, Japan twice, Hong Kong and New Zealand, as well as Indonesia and Australia. He rose to the upper echelons of the State Department, serving for two years as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He advised Henry Kissinger when Kissinger was secretary of state, and travelled with president Nixon to meet Mao Zedong in 1972.

Green was an unusually high-level and very controversial appointment when posted to Australia just after the election of the Whitlam government in 1972, the first Labor
Party government in 23 years. There can be little doubt that during his time in Canberra, the White House, Pentagon and CIA had a hand in the destabilisation of the Whitlam government prior to its dismissal by the Governor-General in November 1975. During Green's tenure, for example, businessmen with various intelligence connections embroiled the government in a scandal involving overseas loans, and Washington cast doubt over continuing collaboration in the US spy satellite base at Pine Gap.

In his obituary of Green, Wheeldon defends the former ambassador and the US against allegations that they helped bring down Whitlam's government. As if to underscore the Labor Party's loyalty to the US alliance and the capitalist order as a whole, Wheeldon writes of Green: "It did not take him long to recognise that, although we could be annoying, we were really rather harmless."

Wheeldon's highly favourable account of Green's career, and the praise offered by the New York Times are warnings that, far from the massacres and interventions associated with Green belonging to a by-gone era, new atrocities against the international working class are being prepared.

Chapter One

The historical background

In October 1965 the international working class suffered one of its greatest defeats and betrayals in the post-World War II period.

Up to one million workers and peasants were slaughtered in a CIA-organised army coup led by General Suharto which swept aside the shaky bourgeois regime of President Sukarno, crushed the rising movement of the Indonesian masses, and established a brutal military dictatorship.

Retired US diplomats and CIA officers, including the former American ambassador to Indonesia and Australia, Marshall Green, have admitted working with Suharto's butchers to massacre hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants suspected of supporting the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). They personally provided the names of thousands of PKI members from the CIA's files for the armed forces death lists.

According to Howard Federspeil, who was an Indonesian expert working at the State Department at the time of the anti-communist program: "No one cared, so long as they were communists that they were being butchered."

The coup was the culmination of a prolonged operation by the CIA, with the help of agents of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, to build up and train the Indonesian armed forces in preparation for a military dictatorship to suppress the revolutionary strivings of the Indonesian masses.

At the time of the coup, the PKI was the largest Stalinist party in the world, outside China and the Soviet Union. It had 3.5 million members; its youth movement another 3 million. It controlled the trade union movement SOBSI which claimed 3.5 million members and the 9 million-strong peasants' movement BTI. Together with the
women's movement, the writers' and artists' organisation and the scholars' movement, the PKI had more than 20 million members and active supporters.

During the independence struggle against the Dutch in the 1940s and throughout the 1950s and 1960s hundreds of thousands of class conscious workers joined the PKI, believing that it still represented the revolutionary socialist traditions of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

Yet by the end of 1965, between 500,000 and a million PKI members and supporters had been slaughtered, and tens of thousands were detained in concentration camps, without any resistance being offered.

The killings were so widespread that the rivers were clogged with the corpses of workers and peasants. While the CIA-backed military death squads rounded up all known PKI members and sympathisers and carried out their grisly work, *Time* magazine reported:

"The killings have been on such a scale that the disposal of corpses has created a serious sanitation problem in northern Sumatra where the humid air bears the reek of decaying flesh. Travellers from these areas tell us small rivers and streams have been literally clogged with bodies. River transportation has become seriously impeded."

How was this historic defeat able to be inflicted? The answer requires an examination of the history of the struggle of the Indonesian masses, the treachery of the national bourgeoisie led by Sukarno, the counter-revolutionary role played by the PKI, and the crucial part played by the Pabloite opportunists of the "United Secretariat" of Ernest Mandel and Joseph Hansen in aiding the treachery of the Stalinists.

**The 'Jewel of Asia'**

The bloody coup in Indonesia was the outcome of the drive by US imperialism to gain unchallenged control of the immense natural wealth and strategic resources of the archipelago, often referred to as the "Jewel of Asia".

The importance that United States imperialism attached to Indonesia was emphasised by US President Eisenhower in 1953, when he told a state governors' conference that it was imperative for the US to finance the French colonial war in Vietnam as the "cheapest way" to keep control of Indonesia.

Eisenhower detailed: "Now let us assume that we lose Indochina. If Indochina goes, several things happen right away. The Malay peninsula, the last little bit of land hanging on down there, would be scarcely defencible. The tin and tungsten we so greatly value from that area would cease coming, and all India would be outflanked.

"Burma would be in no position for defence. All of that position around there is very ominous to the United States, because finally if we lost all that, how would the free world hold the rich empire of Indonesia?

"So you see, somewhere along the line, this must be blocked and it must be blocked now, and that is what we are trying to do."
"So when the US votes $400 million to help the war (in Indochina), we are not voting a giveaway program. We are voting for the cheapest way that we can prevent the occurrence of something that would be of a most terrible significance to the United States of America, our security, our power and ability to get certain things we need from the riches of the Indonesian territory and from South East Asia.

Indonesia is estimated to be the fifth richest country in the world in terms of natural resources. Besides being the fifth largest oil producer, it has enormous reserves of tin, bauxite, coal, gold, silver, diamonds, manganese, phosphates, nickel, copper, rubber, coffee, palm oil, tobacco, sugar, coconuts, spices, timber and cinchona (for quinine).

By 1939 the then Dutch East Indies supplied more than half the total US consumption of 15 key raw materials. Control over this vital region was central to the conflict in the Pacific between the US and Japan during World War II. In the post-war period the US ruling class was determined not to have the country’s riches torn from their grasp by the Indonesian masses.

Following the defeat of the French in Vietnam in 1954 the US feared that the struggle of the Vietnamese masses would ignite revolutionary upheavals throughout the South East Asian region, threatening its grip over Indonesia.

In 1965, just prior to the Indonesian coup, Richard Nixon, soon to become US president, called for the saturation bombing of Vietnam to protect the "immense mineral potential" of Indonesia. Two years later he declared Indonesia to be the "greatest prize" of South East Asia.

After the coup, the value of Suharto's dictatorship to the interests of US imperialism was underlined in a 1975 US State Department report to Congress which referred to Indonesia as the "most strategically authoritative geographic location on earth":

"It has the largest population of any country in South East Asia.

"It is the principal supplier of raw materials from the region.

"Japan's continued economic prosperity depends heavily on oil and other raw materials supplied by Indonesia.

"Existing American investments in Indonesia are substantial, and our trading relationship is growing rapidly.

"Indonesia will probably become an increasingly important supplier of US energy needs.

"Indonesia is a member of OPEC, but assumed a moderate stance in its deliberations, and did not participate in the oil embargo.

"The Indonesian archipelago sits astride strategic waterways and the government of Indonesia is playing a vital role in the law-of-the-sea negotiations which are vital to our security and commercial interests."

Centuries of colonial plunder
The Dutch colonial powers mercilessly plundered Indonesia for 350 years, looting the natural resources, establishing vast agricultural estates, and ruthlessly exploiting its people.

In 1940 there was only one doctor per 60,000 people (compared to India, where the ratio was 1:6,000) and just 2,400 Indonesian graduates from high school. At the end of World war II, 93 percent of the population was illiterate.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the rising British bourgeoisie increasingly challenged the Dutch for domination over the region. In 1800 the Dutch East India company collapsed and the British occupied the region from 1811 to 1816. The Treaty of London of 1824 carved up the region between the two colonial powers: the British took control of the Malayan peninsula and the Dutch kept charge of the 13,000 islands in the Indonesian archipelago.

By the turn of the 20th century, the emerging imperialist power, the United States, began challenging the old European colonial power, particularly after the American occupation of the Philippines in 1898.

The US was locked into a trade war with the Dutch over oil and rubber. The Standard Oil Company began to contest the monopoly on the Indonesian oil fields by the Royal Dutch company. In 1907, Royal Dutch and Shell merged to combat the American competitor. Taking advantage of World War I, Standard Oil commenced drilling in central Java in 1914, and in the same year US corporations also moved into the rubber plantations. Goodyear Tyre and Rubber opened estates and US Rubber brought the largest rubber estates in the world under single ownership.

US strategy in the region during this period was summed up by Senator William Beveridge:

"The Philippines are ours forever ... and beyond the Philippines are China's illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either. We will not repudiate our duty in the archipelago. We will not abandon our duty in the Orient. We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustee under God, of the civilisation of the world ...

We will move forward to our work ... with gratitude ... and thanksgiving to Almighty God that he has marked us as his chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the world ... Our largest trade henceforth must be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean ... and the Pacific is the ocean of the commerce of the future. The power that rules the Pacific, therefore, is the power that rules the world. And with the Philippines, that power is and will forever be the American Republic." (Emphasis in the original)

The rise of Japanese imperialism and its expansion into Korea, Manchuria and China led to increasing conflict with US imperialism over control over the region, culminating in World War II. The drive by the Japanese bourgeoisie to contest US, British, French and Dutch hegemony brought into sharp focus the value of Indonesia as the South East Asian gateway to the Indian Ocean and as a source of natural resources.
In 1942 the Dutch colonialists surrendered control of Indonesia to the Japanese rather than allow the Indonesian people to fight for their independence. All the imperialist powers had good reason to fear the oppressed Indonesian masses.

As early as 1914 the best representatives of the Indonesian toilers had turned to Marxism when the Indies Social Democratic Association was founded on the initiative of the Dutch communist Hendrik Sneevliet. In 1921 it had transformed itself into the Indonesian Communist Party in response to the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.

The PKI had won great authority among the masses by taking the lead of the struggle against Dutch colonialism, including the first major uprisings, in Java and Sumatra in 1926 and 1927.

While the Chinese masses were rising up in the second Chinese Revolution of 1926-27, the Indonesian workers and peasants also came forward in a rebellion, led by the PKI. However, the Dutch colonial authorities succeeded in quelling the revolts. They arrested 13,000 suspects, imprisoned 4,500 and interned 1,308 in a concentration camp in West Papua. The PKI was outlawed.

**National liberation struggle betrayed**

At the end of World War II the oppressed masses in Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, China, throughout South East Asia and internationally came forward in revolutionary struggles to throw off the yoke of imperialism.

At the same time, the working class in Europe and the capitalist countries engaged in convulsive struggles. These were only contained through the treachery of the Soviet bureaucracy headed by Stalin and the Stalinist parties worldwide. The betrayal of the French, Italian and Greek workers in particular and the imposition of bureaucratically controlled regimes in Eastern Europe allowed imperialism to stabilise itself.

By the 1930s, the emergence of a privileged caste in the Soviet Union, which usurped political power from the Soviet proletariat, had destroyed the Communist Parties. From revolutionary internationalist parties they became transformed into counter-revolutionary organisations, suppressing the independent struggles of the working class.

In the colonial countries the Stalinised parties, including the PKI, systematically subordinated the masses to the national bourgeoisie led by figures such as Gandhi in India and Sukarno in Indonesia who sought to reach settlements with the colonial powers in order to maintain capitalist rule.

The post-war settlements did not achieve genuine national liberation from imperialism but imposed on the masses a new set of agents of imperialist rule. This was clearly the case in Indonesia where the national bourgeoisie, with Sukarno in the lead, entered into a series of reactionary deals with the Dutch.

Sukarno, the son of a Javanese school teacher of aristocratic family, was a young architecture graduate, part of a very thin layer of educated petty-bourgeois. He had been the founding chairman of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) in 1927 and had suffered imprisonment and exile at the hands of the Dutch for campaigning for national independence.
During World War II Sukarno and the national bourgeoisie worked with the occupying Japanese forces in the hope of achieving a degree of national self-government. In the dying days of the war Sukarno, with the reluctant support of the Japanese, declared the independent Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945.

The perspective of the national bourgeois leaders was not to lead a proletarian uprising against imperialism but to establish an administration and strengthen their hand for negotiations with the Dutch, who had no forces in the region.

But the response of the Dutch ruling class was to launch a brutal war to suppress the new regime. They ordered that Indonesia be kept under Japanese command until British troops could arrive. The British and the Dutch then used Japanese troops to attack the ferocious resistance of the Indonesian workers, youth and peasants. Thus all the imperialist powers united against the Indonesian masses.

As armed opposition erupted throughout Indonesia against the Dutch forces, Sukarno, backed by the PKI leadership, pursued a policy of compromise with the Dutch and signed the Linggadjati Agreement in March 1947. The Dutch nominally recognised Indonesian control over Java, Madura and Sumatra and agreed to evacuate their troops. But in fact the Dutch used this as a breathing space to build up their forces and prepare for a new attack of unsurpassed brutality in July and August 1947.

Throughout this period, hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants joined or supported the PKI because of their disillusionment with the bourgeois leaders and because they viewed the PKI as a revolutionary party. They were also greatly inspired by the advances of Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party in its war against Chiang Kai Shek. In the war against the Dutch, workers and peasants repeatedly seized property and mass unions were formed.

To head off this development, Sukarno's Republican government, led by the then Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin (a secret member of the PKI), signed the January 1948 Renville Agreement (so called because it was negotiated aboard the USS Renville in the harbour). This pact gave the Dutch control of half the sugar mills in Java, 75 percent of Indonesia's rubber, 65 percent of coffee, 95 percent of tea and control of Sumatran oil. Moreover, this US-imposed settlement provided for the withdrawal of guerrilla forces from Dutch-occupied territory and created the conditions for the liquidation of the PKI-led "people's armed units" in favour of the bourgeois "Indonesian National Armed Forces" controlled by Sukarno and his generals.

In 1948 a series of strikes erupted against the Republican government, now headed by right-wing Vice-President Hatta as Prime Minister, demanding a parliamentary government. These strikes were suppressed by Sukarno who appealed for "national unity".

At the same time, the exiled PKI leader Musso returned from the Soviet Union and a series of prominent leaders of the Indonesian Socialist and Labor parties announced that they had been secret PKI members for many years. The announcement
revealed a far wider base of support for the PKI than previously realised by the imperialist powers.

In July 1948 the bourgeois leaders, including Sukarno and Hatta, held a secret meeting with US representatives at Sarangan where the US demanded, in return for assistance to the government, the launching of a purge of PKI members in the army and the public service. Hatta, who also held the post of Defence Minister, was given $10 million to carry out a "red purge".

Two months later, in an attempt to crush the PKI, the Maduin Affair was launched in Java. A number of army officers, members of the PKI, were murdered and others disappeared, after they opposed plans to demobilise the guerrilla units of the army that had been at the forefront of the fight against the Dutch.

The killings provoked an uprising at Maduin which was suppressed bloodily by the Sukarno regime. Prime Minister Hatta proclaimed martial law. Thousands of PKI members were killed, 36,000 were imprisoned and PKI leader Musso and 11 other prominent leaders were executed.

The US Consul General Livergood cabled his superiors in the US that he had informed Hatta that "the crisis gives the Republican government the opportunity (to) show its determination (to) suppress communism".

Encouraged by the anti-communist pogrom, the Dutch launched a new military attack in December 1948, arresting Sukarno. But widespread resistance forced the Dutch to capitulate within six months.

Even then, the 1949 Round Table conference at the Hague imposed a new betrayal on the Indonesian masses, involving still more concessions by the Indonesian bourgeoisie.

The Sukarno regime agreed to take over the debts of the former colony, and gave guarantees to protect Dutch investments. The Dutch were to keep control of West Papua and the Indonesian Republic was to continue to cooperate with the Dutch imperialists within the framework of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The Sukarno government kept all the colonial laws intact. A new army was formed by incorporating the former Dutch troops of Indonesian nationality into the "National Armed Forces". In other words, the old colonial state apparatus and laws were retained beneath the facade of parliamentary government in the new Republic.

The PKI leadership supported the betrayal of the national liberation struggle and determined to confine the working class and peasantry to "peaceful democratic" forms of struggle. This was a continuation of the PKI's position throughout World War II when the PKI leadership (as well as the Communist Party of the Netherlands) had followed Stalin's line of cooperating with the Dutch imperialist government against Japan, and called for an "independent Indonesia within the Commonwealth of the Dutch Empire". This call remained PKI policy even during the post-war fighting against the Dutch.

But for the Indonesian masses, the fraud of "national independence" under the continued domination of Dutch, American and world imperialism became ever more
apparent. The natural resources, principal industries, agricultural estates and financial power remained in the hands of the foreign corporations.

For example, 70 percent of the inter-islands sea traffic was still controlled by the Dutch firm KPM and one of the big Dutch banks, the Nederlandche Handel Maatschappij, controlled 70 percent of all Indonesian financial transactions.

According to the Indonesian government calculations, in the mid-1950s, Dutch investments in the country were worth $US1.5 billion. The Sukarno government declared that even if it wanted to nationalise the Dutch possessions it did not have the money to indemnify the former colonial rulers. And to nationalise without compensation would be labelled "communism".

The growing disillusionment of the masses was reflected in the 1955 elections when the number of seats held by the PKI increased from 17 to 39.

Within two years the mass movement was to erupt in the seizure of Dutch, American and British factories, plantations, banks, shops and ships.

Chapter Two:

Stalinists betray the mass movement

In December 1957 the whole fabric of imperialist domination over the Indonesian economy was shaken by a massive eruption of the working class and peasantry. Factories, plantations, banks and ships were seized and occupied.

Sukarno's bourgeois nationalist regime was only able to survive because the Stalinist Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) leadership sabotaged the mass movement, insisting that the masses hand over the property they had seized to the US-backed army which was sent in by Sukarno to take control.

A dispatch in the New York Times of December 8, 1957 provided some idea of the scope and intensity of the upsurge: "The movement of the workers in Jakarta, to the extent we have been able to determine, took place without the government's sanction, and in opposition to the declarations of Prime Minister Djuanda, of the Army Chief-of-Staff, General Abdul Haris Nasution, and of other high governmental functionaries, according to whom such measures were inadmissible and rendered their participants liable to severe penalties...

"The three Dutch banks here, the Netherlands Trading Society, the Escompto and the Netherlands Commercial Bank, were seized by the delegates. They read a proclamation before their enthusiastic comrades and then before the Dutch administrators, stating that the seizure was made in the name of the Association of Indonesian Workers and that the banks would become the property of the Indonesian Republic."

The Dutch newspaper Volksrant reported with alarm on December 11, 1957: "In Jakarta the Communists continue to hoist red flags on the Dutch enterprises ... Today the main office of Philips in Jakarta and that of the Societe D'Assurances Nillmij have been 'expropriated' by the Indonesian personnel under the leadership of 'Communist' trade union functionaries."
The movement was not confined to Java. According to the New York Herald-Tribune of December 16: "Workers of SOBSI, central trade union organisation dominated by the Communists, seized Dutch bakeries and stores in Java and banks in Borneo." The New York Times of the same day reported that in Palembang, capital of South Sumatra, "security forces arrested a number of workers belonging to the central trade union organisation controlled by the Communists for having taken 'arbitrary action' against three Dutch proprietors. Thirty seven red flags hoisted by the workers before the houses occupied by the Dutch employees were confiscated".

Other bourgeois papers spoke of "a situation of anarchy in Bali" and a fleeing Dutch plantation owner was quoted as saying that in Atjeh and Deli, on the east coast of Sumatra, the mass actions were directed not only against the Dutch companies but also against the American and British. Similar reports came from North Sumatra, the Celebes and other islands.

There were reports too that the uprisings inspired resistance in Australian-occupied Papua New Guinea. At Karema 20 people were wounded when native people fought soldiers after a native nurse reported that she had been insulted.

The rebellion throughout Indonesia erupted in response to a call by Sukarno for a general strike against all Dutch enterprises. He had previously raised the question of nationalisation of Dutch industry at a mass rally. Sukarno's aim was to use the threat of nationalisation to pressure the Netherlands to withdraw from West Papua, which it retained under the 1949 Round Table Conference agreement, so that Indonesia could then take control.

Seeking to balance between the rapacious dictates of Dutch, US and British imperialism, the seething discontent of the oppressed masses and the growing strength of the US-backed military on which his regime relied, Sukarno sought to use the pressure of the masses to force the hand of Dutch imperialism.

Workers themselves began to occupy the Dutch companies. Sukarno was totally unprepared for such a response. He immediately authorised the military to move in to take control of the enterprises which had been seized by the masses.

The Political Bureau of the PKI rushed to Sukarno's assistance, issuing a resolution that urgently appealed to the people "to quickly resolve the differences of opinion on the methods of struggle against Dutch colonialism by negotiations, so that in this way unity in the people and between the people, the government and the army may be strengthened".

At the same time the PKI appealed to the workers, "not only to set going the occupied enterprises, but to make them function in a still more disciplined and better way and to increase production.

"The government must appoint a capable and patriotic direction for these enterprises and the workers must support this direction with all their strength."

In addition, the PKI insisted that the takeovers must be confined to the Dutch companies, seeking to reassure US and British imperialism that their interests would not be harmed: "All the actions of the workers, of the peasants and the organisations
of youth are directed against the Dutch capitalists. The other capitalist countries did not take a hostile attitude in the conflict between Holland and Indonesia in West Irian. That is why no action will be engaged against the enterprise of the capitalists of other countries."

Recognising the efforts of the PKI to choke the movement of the masses, Tillman Durdin wrote in the New York Times of December 16: "Members of the National Consultative Council of Communist orientation are known to have actually pronounced forcibly against the seizures by workers and have called such movements undisciplined 'anarcho-syndicalism'. The Communists defend a program of seizure directed by the government such as it is now applied."

Sukarno himself was ready to flee the country for a "holiday" in India, but the handing over of the Dutch enterprises to the military, on the instructions of the PKI, rescued his bourgeois regime. The Stalinist leadership of the PKI not only saved the day for the Sukarno government. They created the conditions for the military generals and their US backers to prepare for their bloody counter-revolution eight years later.

The perspective fought for by the PKI leadership was the Stalinist "two stage" theory that the struggle for socialism in Indonesia had to first pass through the stage of so-called "democratic" capitalism. The revolutionary strivings of the masses for socialist measures had to be suppressed and subordinated to a "united front" with the national bourgeoisie.

In line with this reactionary perspective, the Stalinist bureaucracies in the Soviet Union and China hailed Sukarno and his regime throughout this entire period. Krushchev, for example, visited Jakarta and said he would give Sukarno every assistance in "all eventualities". In fact most of the weapons that were to be used to massacre the Indonesian masses in 1965 were supplied by the Kremlin.

**Military preparations begin**

In 1956 the US-backed army had begun preparations for military dictatorship to crush the movement of the masses. In August the commander of the West Java military region ordered the arrest of Foreign Minister Roeslan Abdulgani on a charge of corruption. In November the army Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, attempted unsuccessfully to seize control of Jakarta and overthrow the Sukarno government. The next month there were regional military takeovers in Central and North Sumatra.

In October 1956 Sukarno moved to strengthen his hand against the masses and to appease the military by calling for political parties to disband themselves. This call was later extended to an attempt to form a National Council of all parties, including the PKI, to rule the country. When military commanders in East Indonesia, Kalimantan, Atjeh, and South Sumatra rejected the plan and took control of their provinces, Sukarno declared a state of emergency. Finally a new "non-party" cabinet was formed which included two PKI sympathisers.

In response to the mass upsurge of December 1957 the operations of United States imperialism were immediately stepped up. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been active since the 1940s, spending millions to subsidise pro-US elements
within the national bourgeoisie, particularly the Socialist Party (PSI) of Sumiro, a
colleague of Hatta, and its larger Moslem ally, the Masjumi party of Sjafruddin
Prawiranegara, with whom Hatta had also retained close links.

Throughout 1957 and 1958 a series of CIA-inspired secessionist and right-wing
revolts were orchestrated in the oil-rich islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi, where the
PSI and Masjumi dominated politically.

The first was the Permesta military revolt which began in March 1957 and continued
into 1958, ending in a CIA-backed attempted coup in February 1958.

The United States government provided substantial financial support, military
advisers, arms and a small airforce of B-26 bombers, piloted from bases in Taiwan
and the Philippines. US Secretary of State Dulles even publicly expressed his
support for the right-wing rebels.

An aircraft carrier of the US Seventh Fleet was sent to Singapore and for some time
it appeared that the US might directly intervene in Sumatra under the guise of
defending Caltex oil personnel and property.

The Indonesian military command finally decided that the rebellion, having failed to
win any popular support at all, had to be ended. The Sukarno leadership survived.

But the role of the army had been enormously strengthened. Over the next six years
the US poured huge resources into it, laying the basis for General Suharto to begin
his climb to power after leading the military campaign to seize control of West Papua
in 1962.

Between 1959 and 1965 the US supplied $64 million in military grant-aid to the
Indonesian military generals. According to a report in Suara Pemuda Indonesia:
"Before the end of 1960, the US had equipped 43 battalions of the army. Every year
the US trained officers of the right-wing military clique. Between 1956 and 1959 more
than 200 high-ranking officers were trained in the US, while low-ranking officers are
trained by the hundreds every year. Once the head of the Agency for International
Development in America said that US aid, of course, was not intended to support
Sukarno and that the US had trained a great number of officers and ordinary people
who would form a unit to make Indonesia a 'free country'."

At the same time, Sukarno instituted his system of "Guided Democracy". In July 1959
the parliament was dissolved and Sukarno imposed a presidential constitution by
decree again with the full support of the PKI. He further boosted the hand of the
military, appointing army generals to leading positions.

The PKI warmly embraced Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" and his supposed
consensus or Konsepsi alliance between nationalism, Islam and communism called
"NASAKOM".

In pursuit of their "national united front" with Sukarno and the national bourgeoisie,
the PKI leaders promoted the most deadly illusions in the armed forces.

Only five years before the bloody defeat inflicted upon the Indonesian workers and
peasants at the hands of the military, the PKI line was put most crudely in a
statement by the leadership of SOBSI, the PKI-led trade union federation, on May Day 1960:

"The SOBSI maintains the viewpoint that the armed forces of the Republic are still the true son of the popular revolution ... and therefore from the officers down to the NCOs and soldiers ... they cannot be drawn into actions which are treacherous to the Republic. Besides, president Sukarno, who identifies himself with the people, possesses a strong influence over members of the armed forces and he refuses to be a military dictator."

A new upsurge

In 1962, Indonesia's military annexation of West Papua was fully backed by the PKI leadership, along with the suppression of the resistance of the West Papuan people to the occupation.

In Indonesia itself, the underlying economic and class tensions, produced by the continued exploitation of the Indonesian masses by the imperialist corporations and their national bourgeois lackeys, re-emerged.

The period of "Guided Democracy," that is, of the collaboration of the PKI leadership with the national bourgeoisie in suppressing the independent struggles of the worker and peasant masses, failed to resolve any of the pressing economic and political questions. Export income declined, foreign reserves fell, inflation continued to spiral, and bureaucratic and military corruption became endemic.

From 1963 onwards the PKI leadership increasingly sought to avoid the growing clashes between the party's mass activists and the police and military. PKI leaders stressed the "common interests" of the police and "the people". PKI leader D.N. Aidit inspired the slogan "For Civil Order Help the Police".

In April, 1964, in an interview with S.M. Ali of the Far Eastern Economic Review Aidit set out for the international bourgeoisie the Stalinists' perspective of a peaceful and gradual "two stage" transformation to socialism in Indonesia.

"When we complete the first stage of our revolution which is now in progress, we can enter into friendly consultation with other progressive elements in our society, and without an armed struggle lead the country towards socialist revolution."

He presented a scenario in which the masses would be confined to placing pressure on the national bourgeoisie: "The chastening effect of the present stage of the revolution will maintain a kind of revolutionary pressure on Indonesia's national capitalists.

"There will be no armed struggle unless there is foreign armed intervention on the capitalists' behalf. And when we successfully complete our present national democratic revolution the chances of any foreign power interfering with Indonesia's international affairs will become extremely remote."
In August, 1964, Aidit urged all PKI members to rid themselves of "sectarian attitudes" toward the army, calling on all left-wing artists and writers to make the "soldier masses" the subject of art and literary works.

In late 1964 and early 1965 hundreds of thousands of peasants took action to seize the land of the big landowners. Fierce clashes developed with landlords and police. To forestall the revolutionary confrontation which was rapidly developing, the PKI called on its supporters to prevent violent conflict with the landlords and to improve cooperation with other elements, including the armed forces.

At a meeting of the PKI central committee Aidit urged the suppression of peasants' actions and denounced party cadre who, "carried away by their desire to spread the peasant actions, immediately became impatient, indulged in individual heroism, were insufficiently concerned with developing the consciousness of the peasants and wanting a definite event, were not careful enough in differentiating and choosing their targets."

PKI leaders justified halting the land takeovers and handing back the land to the landowners by referring to the "impending probable" formation of a "NASAKOM cabinet".

In early 1965 workers in the oil and rubber industries owned by US corporations began to seize control of them. The PKI leadership responded by formally joining the government. At the same time, leading generals were brought into the cabinet.

The PKI ministers not only sat beside the military butchers in Sukarno's cabinet, but they continued to promote the deadly illusion that the armed forces were part of the "peoples' democratic revolution".

Aidit delivered a lecture to army staff school trainees in which he referred to the "feeling of mutuality and unity that daily grows strong between all the armed forces of the Indonesian Republic and the various groups of Indonesian people, including the communists".

In this way, the Stalinists completely disarmed the most class conscious sections of the working class. The elementary Marxist understanding of the state as the "body of armed men" employed by the ruling class to maintain its rule was criminally denied.

Aidit rushed to assure the bourgeoisie and the military that the PKI opposed the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses. "The important thing in Indonesia now is not how to smash the state power as is the case in many other states, but how to strengthen and consolidate the pro-people's aspect ... and to eliminate the anti-people's aspect".

The Sukarno regime moved against the working class by banning all strikes in industry. The PKI leadership raised no objections because industry was considered to belong to the NASAKOM government.

Just before the coup, the PKI, well aware of preparations for military rule, called for the establishment of a "fifth force" within the armed forces, consisting of armed workers and peasants. Far from fighting for the independent mobilisation of the
masses against the military threat, the PKI leadership sought to constrain the deepening mass movement within the bounds of the capitalist state.

They grovelled to the generals, seeking to assure them that the PKI's proposal would lead to the strengthening of the state. Aidit announced in a report to the PKI central committee that the "NASAKOMisation" of the armed forces could be achieved and that the fifth force could be established with the cooperation of the armed forces. Right up to the very end, the PKI leadership suppressed the revolutionary aspirations of the working class.

As late as May 1965, the PKI Politburo sowed the illusion that the military and state apparatus was being modified to isolate the "anti-people's aspect" of state power:

"The strength of the pro-people's aspect (of state power) is already becoming steadily greater and holds the initiative and the offensive, while the anti-people's aspect, although moderately strong, is relentlessly pressed into a tight corner. The PKI is struggling so that the pro-people's aspect will become more powerful and finally dominate, and the anti-people's aspect will be driven out of the state power."

The Indonesian and international working class paid a bitter and bloody price for this Stalinist perfidy when Suharto and the generals struck on September 30, 1965.

Chapter Three
1965 -- Stalinism's bloody legacy

The Indonesian military coup of October 1-2, 1965 was the outcome of a carefully-orchestrated and long-planned operation by the CIA and the US-trained and backed commanders of the Indonesian armed forces.

Throughout 1965 class tensions mounted. The year began with peasants seizing the estates of large landowners and oil and rubber workers occupying US-owned enterprises. President Sukarno had brought the army commanders, led by General Nasution, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) leadership into his cabinet to suppress the movement.

The PKI leadership halted the takeovers but the mass movement was becoming increasingly difficult to control. There was growing discontent over the sentencing of 23 peasants to 15 to 20 years in prison for allegedly beating an army officer to death in the course of resisting military action to suppress land seizures in Sumatra.

On the evening of September 30, 1965, a CIA provocation was organised. A group of middle-ranking military officers, at least one of whom had close personal relations with General Suharto, arrested and executed the army chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Ahmad Yani, and five other leading generals, and announced the establishment of a Revolutionary Council.

The round up of the generals did not include two key figures. The first was Suharto, then the commander of the Strategic Reserve Forces (Kostrad), comprised of the military's crack troops. The mutineers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Untung made no attempt to arrest Suharto nor cut off his headquarters in Jakarta despite being in a
position to do so. The Defence Minister, General Nasution, also escaped. He was supposedly on the plotters' death list but miraculously survived.

Untung's so-called coup bid was a charade. Within 24 hours Suharto routed the rebels, virtually without a shot being fired, and took control of the capital, backed by Nasution.

By the end of the week, Suharto's reconstituted army command eliminated all pockets of resistance, and launched the greatest anti-communist pogrom in history, orchestrated by the US embassy and the CIA. The White House, Pentagon and CIA, already fighting an undeclared war in Vietnam, were determined to drown the Indonesian revolution in blood.

US diplomats and CIA officers, led by the US ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green, worked hand in glove with Suharto's death squads to exterminate every known member and supporter of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

**CIA-organised holocaust**

In preparation for the coup, US officials had spent at least two years compiling death lists which were handed over to the military with a clear instruction: exterminate them all. Suharto's men were ordered to report back after each set of killings so the names could be checked off on the CIA's lists.

Some of the American officers involved described what took place. "It really was a big help to the army," said a former political officer in the US embassy in Jakarta, Robert Martens. "They probably killed a lot of people and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad.

"There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment."

Martens headed an embassy group of State Department and CIA officers who, from 1962, compiled a detailed who's who of the leadership of the PKI. They included, he said, names of provincial, city and other local PKI committee members, and leaders of PKI-backed trade union, women's and youth groups.

The operation was masterminded by former CIA director William Colby, who was then director of the CIA's Far East Division, and thus responsible for directing US covert strategy in Asia. Colby said the work to identify the PKI leadership was a forerunner to the CIA's Phoenix Program in Vietnam, which attempted to exterminate supporters of the National Liberation Front in the late 1960s.

Colby admitted that the work of checking off the death lists was regarded as so important that it was supervised at the CIA's intelligence directorate in Washington. "We came to the conclusion that with the sort of draconian way it was carried out, it really set them (the PKI) back for years."

Deputy CIA station chief Joseph Lazarsky described with undisguised relish how Suharto's Jakarta headquarters provided the US embassy with running reports on the roundup and killing of PKI leaders. "We were getting a good account in Jakarta of who was being picked up. The army had a 'shooting list' of about 4,000 or 5,000 people."
"They didn't have enough goon squads to zap them all, and some individuals were valuable for interrogation. The infrastructure was zapped almost immediately. We knew what they were doing. We knew they would keep a few and save them for the kangaroo courts, but Suharto and his advisers said, if you keep them alive, you have to feed them."

All this was conducted with the approval of Green who was later appointed US ambassador to Australia, where he played a leading role in the preparations for the dismissal of the Whitlam government in 1975.

At least one million people were slaughtered in the six month holocaust that followed the coup. This was the estimate of a team of University of Indonesia graduates commissioned by the army itself to inquire into the extent of the killings.

Instigated and aided by the army, gangs of youth from right-wing Muslim organisations carried out mass killings, particularly in central and east Java. There were reports that at certain points the Brantas River near Surabaya was "choked with corpses". Another report from the east Javan hill town of Batu said there were so many killed within the narrow confines of a police courtyard that the bodies were simply covered over with layers of cement.

On the island of Bali, formerly considered to be a PKI stronghold, at least 35,000 were killed by the beginning of 1966. There the Tamins, the storm-troopers of Sukarno's PNI (Indonesian National Party) performed the slaughter. A special correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung told of bodies lying along the roads, or heaped in pits, and of half-burned villages in which peasants dared not leave the charred shells of their huts.

In other areas suspects were forced to kill their alleged comrades with their own hands to prove their loyalty. In the major cities anti-Chinese pogroms were conducted. Workers and public servants who went on strike in protest at the counter-revolutionary wave of terror were sacked.

At least 250,000 workers and peasants were thrown into concentration camps. An estimated 110,000 were still held as political prisoners at the end of 1969. Executions continue to this day, including several dozen since the early 1980s. Another four prisoners, Johannes Surono Hadiwiyono, Safar Suryanto, Simon Petrus Sulamean and Norbertus Rohayan, were executed nearly 25 years after the coup, a clear sign that the Suharto regime still fears the resurgence of the Indonesian proletariat and poor peasantry.

Stalinist betrayal deepens

While hundreds of thousands of suspected PKI members and supporters were being hunted down and slaughtered, the PKI leadership and their Stalinist counterparts in the Kremlin, Beijing and the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) urged PKI cadre and workers and peasants to offer no resistance, giving a green light for the generals to proceed with their mass executions.
The Stalinists deepened their reactionary line of demanding that the masses subordinate themselves to the national bourgeoisie and Sukarno, who was maintained by Suharto as a puppet president, and to the armed forces themselves.

On October 1, 1965 both Sukarno and PKI secretary general Aidit responded to the formation of the so-called rebel Revolutionary Council by moving to the Halim Air Base in Jakarta to seek protection.

On October 6 Sukarno called for "national unity," that is, "unity" between the military and its victims, and an end to violence. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PKI immediately urged all members and mass organisations to support the "leader of the Indonesian revolution" and offer no resistance to the military. Its statement was reprinted in the CPA's paper Tribune:

"Having studied the appeal by the supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Indonesian Republic, by the leader of the Indonesian revolution, president Sukarno, the political bureau of the central committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia declares full support for the appeal and appeals to all party committees and party members and sympathisers, as well as revolutionary mass organisations led by the PKI members to facilitate the carrying out of this appeal."

Meanwhile, Sukarno, the "leader of the Indonesian revolution," was collaborating with the military repression in the hope of saving his own neck. He called for a thorough purge of those allegedly involved in the "September 30 affair," (the alleged coup bid led by Colonel Untung), and permitted PKI leaders to be arrested and murdered. On October 15 he appointed Suharto as army chief.

Five months later, on March 11, 1966, Sukarno handed Suharto unchallenged decree-making power. He "ordered" Suharto to "take all steps" to re-establish order and to safeguard Sukarno's "personal safety and authority". Suharto's first exercise of his new powers was to formally outlaw the PKI. In recognition of the value of his services, Sukarno was retained as the titular president of the military dictatorship until March 1967.

The PKI leadership continued to demand that the masses bow to the authority of the Sukarno-Suharto regime. Aidit, who had fled, was captured and executed by the army on November 24, 1965 but his line was maintained by the PKI's Second Secretary Njoto. In an interview given to a Japanese newspaper correspondent he emphasised:

"The PKI recognises only one head of state, one supreme commander, one great leader of the revolution President Sukarno... It is President Sukarno united with the forces of the people who will decide the destiny and future of Indonesia."

All party members, Njoto continued, should "fully support the directives of President Sukarno and pledge themselves to implement these without reserve... Our party is making every effort in its power to prevent a civil war."

In other words, while the military butchers and their CIA mentors organised the systematic liquidation of not only the PKI leadership but the most class conscious
sections of the Indonesian masses, the PKI ordered its cadre to ensure that no-one fought back.

The utter bankruptcy and treachery of the Stalinist "two-stage" theory of insisting that the masses tie their fate to Sukarno and the national bourgeoisie could not have been spelt out more graphically.

The betrayal of the PKI was endorsed and reinforced by the Stalinist bureaucracies in Moscow and Beijing. The Kremlin blamed "putschist" and "adventurist" elements in the PKI for the defeat and called repeatedly for the "unity" of the Indonesian "revolution" around Sukarno's NASAKOM (Nationalism, Islam and Communism).

On October 12, 1965 Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Mikoyan and Kosygin sent a special message to Sukarno: "We and our colleagues learned with great joy that your health has improved ... We have with interest heard about your radio appeal to the Indonesian people to remain calm and prevent disorders ... This appeal will meet with profound understanding."

At a Tricontinental Conference in Havana in February, 1966, the Soviet delegation tried in every way to block a public condemnation of the counter-revolutionary terror raging against the Indonesian masses. Its stance won praise from the Suharto regime. The Indonesian parliament passed a resolution on February 11 expressing "full appreciation" for the "efforts of the delegations of Nepal, Mongolia, the Soviet Union and others at the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, who successfully neutralised the efforts of the counter-revolutionists of the so-called September 30 movement, and their protectors and leaders, to intervene in the internal affairs of Indonesia".

Thus, the betrayal of the Stalinists was so brazen that the parliamentary lapdogs of the military junta were able to refer to the CIA's September 30 set-up as an attempted counter-revolution!

The Beijing Stalinists similarly wiped their hands of the fate of the Indonesian masses. They even went ahead in Jakarta with a World Conference Against Foreign Bases and stood by without protest as their Indonesian comrades were arrested in the conference hall itself.

The legacy of the 'bloc of four classes'

The Stalinist betrayal in 1965 was the culmination of more than 20 years of treachery in which the PKI, working on the basis of the Stalinist "two-stage" theory and, in particular, the Maoist ideology of a "bloc of four classes," tied the working class and peasant masses to the bourgeois nationalist regime of Sukarno.

Aidit spelt out the ideological framework of the bloody defeat of the Indonesian revolution shortly after returning from 18 months in China in July 1950 and wresting control of the PKI leadership:

"The working class, the peasants, the petty-bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie must unite in one national front."
Aidit slavishly followed the line of the Maoist regime in China which suppressed the independent struggle of the working class and attempted to establish a "New Democracy", a bourgeois state, in alliance with sections of the national bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie after the collapse of Chiang Kai Shek's dictatorship.

Parroting Mao, he called for a "people's democracy" and a "united front of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal forces in the country. That is to say, the working class, the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie."

In keeping with the counter-revolutionary "two-stage" theory of Stalinism, "The task of this alliance is to bring about not socialist but democratic reforms".

Aidit demanded that the workers and peasant masses support not only the national bourgeoisie but also "all other patriotic and anti-colonial forces including the left (rather progressive) landlord group".

It was this line, which Aidit hammered out incessantly, which was used to suppress workers' and peasants' struggles, tie the working class to the Sukarno regime, and create the conditions for the US-backed military to strike.

Time and again, PKI members and supporters were instructed to strangle the class struggle and the revolutionary strivings of the oppressed masses in order to preserve the "national united front":

"The basic principle we must adhere to in the conduct of the national struggle is to subordinate the class struggle to the national struggle."

The "two stage" theory of Stalinism insists that in the colonial and semi-colonial countries such as Indonesia, the oppressed masses must not engage in struggles that threaten the national bourgeoisie nor raise the program of socialist revolution. The class struggle has to be stifled to prop up the national bourgeoisie and establish a national capitalist democracy.

The bloody counter-revolutionary consequences of this Stalinist line were first demonstrated in China in 1926-27 when the butcher Chiang Kai Shek inflicted a crushing defeat on the Chinese working class after the Communist Party had been instructed by the Kremlin leadership to join his bourgeois nationalist Koumintang.

The massacres carried out by Chiang confirmed Leon Trotsky's warnings that the weak and belated bourgeoisies of the oppressed nations are organically incapable of conducting any consistent struggle against imperialism and feudalism. That is because, to do so requires the mobilisation of the masses in revolutionary struggle and such a struggle immediately comes into conflict with the class position of the national bourgeoisie as exploiters of their "own" working class and peasantry.

As Trotsky explained in his writings on the betrayal of the Chinese Revolution:

"To really arouse the workers and peasants against imperialism is possible only by connecting their basic and most profound life interest with the cause of the country’s liberation. A workers' strike small or large an agrarian rebellion, an uprising of the oppressed sections in city and country against the usurer, against the bureaucracy, against the local military satraps, all that arouses the multitudes, that welds them
together, that educates, steels, is a real step forward on the road to the revolutionary and social liberation of the Chinese people... But everything that brings the oppressed and exploited masses of the toilers to their feet inevitably pushes the national bourgeoisie into an open bloc with the imperialists. The class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the masses of workers and peasants is not weakened, but, on the contrary, is sharpened by imperialist oppression, to the point of bloody civil war at every serious conflict." (Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution, New Park 1969, p.5)

The criminal role played by the PKI in tying the Indonesian masses to Sukarno's national bourgeois regime made Trotsky's analysis tragically prophetic.

The unresolved tasks of genuine national liberation, land redistribution, democracy and economic development in Indonesia and all historically-oppressed countries can be achieved only by the working class leading the peasant masses in the socialist revolution. That is, national self-determination can only arise as a by-product of the socialist revolution led by the proletariat.

The victory of this struggle is bound up with the development of the world socialist revolution to overthrow imperialism on a world scale.

This is the kernel of the Marxist theory of Permanent Revolution developed by Leon Trotsky and vindicated by the victory of the October 1917 Russian Revolution.

Chapter Four

_Pabloite accomplices of counter-revolution_

In the months following the bloody CIA-organised military coup of October 1-2, 1965, every known member and supporter of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and all working class parties, and hundreds of thousands of other Indonesian workers and peasants, were massacred or thrown into concentration camps for torture and interrogation.

The systematic extermination and ruthless suppression of working class opposition intensified after March 11, 1966 when Sukarno, the bourgeois nationalist leader retained by the military as President, granted unfettered decree-making power to the coup leader and army chief, General Suharto.

The betrayal of the tumultuous revolutionary movement of the Indonesian masses by the Stalinist leadership of the PKI was a profound defeat with enormous implications for the international working class.

The PKI blocked the repeated attempts of the workers and peasants to seize the factories and plantations. It tied the masses to the bourgeois nationalist regime of Sukarno and ultimately joined the US-backed military leaders, the future butchers of the masses, in the Sukarno cabinet. After the coup the Stalinists ordered their cadre to enforce Sukarno's appeal for "unity" with the military and to prevent any resistance to the holocaust that was being unleashed.

The blow struck to the Indonesian revolution reverberated throughout Asia and around the world. In particular it encouraged and enabled the massive escalation of
the US invasion of Vietnam, it crushed the hopes and revolutionary striving of the masses in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and it strengthened the hand of the unstable bourgeois regimes in the Indian sub-continent.

**Mandel and Hansen whitewash Stalinist treachery**

But the response of the Pabloite revisionists of the "United Secretariat," led by Ernest Mandel and Joseph Hansen, was to minimise the magnitude of the great Indonesian betrayal, to whitewash the counter-revolutionary role of the Stalinists, and, above all, to cover up their own responsibility for the bloodbath.

While the Indonesian masses were being slaughtered, Professor Mandel attempted to paint the most reassuring picture of the future prospects of the Indonesian revolution, in order to dull the consciousness of the international working class.

"Naturally the struggle has not ended in Indonesia," he wrote from the comfort of his Belgian university chair in an article published in the Pabloite journal *World Outlook* on March 11, 1966.

"A part of the Communist cadres have been able to go underground," he went on. "The discontent of the hungry masses is increasing from day to day; the empty stomachs of the workers and peasants are not filled through massacres. The revolt will widen against the corrupt regime. Sukarno understands this and will resume his eternal balancing act; he has just eliminated the most ferocious of the generals from his cabinet. The people will again have their turn."

This whitewash of the immense betrayal of the Indonesian masses demonstrates the counter-revolutionary consequences of Pabloite opportunism, which emerged in the Trotskyist movement from the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Led by Michel Pablo, elements such as Mandel adapted to the post-World War II stabilisation of capitalism and the seeming strengthening of the Stalinist bureaucracies which suppressed the revolutionary upsurge of the international working class in the immediate post-war period. They abandoned Trotsky's struggle for the construction of the Fourth International as the world party of socialist revolution and claimed that the Moscow and Beijing-line Stalinist bureaucracies and parties would be pressured by the masses into playing a progressive role. On this basis, they set out to liquidate the Fourth International into whatever Stalinist or social democratic formation then dominated the labour movement in each country, declaring that the road to socialism consisted of centuries of horribly deformed workers’ states of the type established in Eastern Europe and China.

In 1953 this liquidationism was combatted by the formation of the International Committee of the Fourth International in response to an Open Letter issued by American Socialist Workers Party leader James P. Cannon calling for the defence of "orthodox Trotskyism". However, by the early 1960s the SWP leaders themselves had increasingly adapted to the prolonged post-war boom. They hailed the apparent successes of national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeois elements, such as Castro in Cuba, as a substitute for the seizure of power by the working class led by revolutionary Marxist parties, proclaiming that socialism could be achieved through
such "blunted instruments". This was the perspective on which they reunified with the Pabloites in 1963 to form the United Secretariat.

Central to the Pabloite renunciation of proletarian revolution was the reactionary objectivist method which presented the struggle for socialism as a quasi-automatic "historical process" achieved through the spontaneous movement of the masses led by whatever political tendencies were at hand, regardless of their class composition and program.

Thus the Indonesian "people" would prevail regardless of the terrible crisis of leadership produced by the perfidy of the mass Stalinist party. Sukarno, by now the willing tool of General Suharto, was supposedly muzzling the most ferocious generals. And, even after its unspeakable betrayal, Mandel referred to the PKI as a "Communist" party.

Mandel's snow job was ratified by the "United Secretariat" in a statement issued on March 20, 1966. Its conclusion was that the emergence of General Suharto as the "strong man" of the counter-revolution was of little consequence, because "It is extremely unlikely that the counter-revolutionists now in power in Jakarta will be able to stabilise the situation for any length of time."

Today, with Suharto's military junta still riding ruthlessly on the back of Indonesia's oppressed millions, it is crucial to study how the Pabloite opportunists provided the essential political cover for the PKI and the Sukarno regime itself.

The "United Secretariat" statement sowed the most deadly illusion that even General Suharto's American-trained killers would be compelled to act in the interests of the Indonesian masses against imperialism as part of Sukarno's phoney "confrontation" with the newly-formed state of Malaysia: "The army leaders themselves will not readily give up their nationalist, anti-imperialist verbiage which reflects real conflicts of interest with British imperialism and the ruling comprador bourgeoisie and semi-feudal landowners of Malaysia."

While the Indonesian masses were left leaderless in the face of Suharto's horrific slaughter, the Pabloites loftily declared their confidence that somehow the masses would be victorious.

"The masses, though leaderless and deeply shaken, have not lost all fighting potential, particularly in the countryside. It will prove impossible to get the thousands of squatters to evacuate the imperialist-owned or 'nationalised' plantations managed by corrupt army officers, or to compel the thousands of plantation and oil workers to revert to the 'normal' working conditions of colonial times."

Above all, the Pabloites continued to insist that the masses place their trust in the Stalinist leaders of the PKI, arguing that they could be convinced to play a revolutionary role, even after they had strangled every mass movement against the Sukarno regime.

"If they succeed in regrouping and in regaining a mass following in some regions of the countryside by calling on the peasants to immediately take over the land held by the landlords, the plantations and army administration, they could gain on a
progressive scale due to the inability of the Indonesian reaction to solve the country's basic economic plight and due to the divisions in the ranks of the army which that inability will undoubtedly provoke."

In 1957, and again in 1964-65, the PKI had directed workers and peasants to surrender the factories, banks, oil installations, plantations and other enterprises they had occupied, saving the day for Sukarno and the Indonesian bourgeoisie. Now, the Pabloites claimed, they could play a progressive role.

Mandel's article and the "United Secretariat" statement were published, together with an article by a Pabloite member of the PKI, by the US Socialist Workers Party in a pamphlet called "The Catastrophe in Indonesia" dated December 1966. It was complete with an introduction by Joseph Hansen, an SWP leader who had played a poisonous role in the 1963 reunification with the Pabloites. Hansen, subsequently exposed as a Stalinist agent who became an FBI plant in the SWP, was a central instigator in the SWP's 1963 break from the ICFI. Hansen sought to reassure the pamphlet's readers that "one of the new features of world politics today" was "the quickness with which the masses recover from defeats that formerly would have left them prostrate for decades".

The stunning indifference of the Pabloites to the fate of the Indonesian masses was not simply the product of the callousness and contempt for the working class which characterises their fetid petty-bourgeois milieu but was also a bid to cover-up the critical factor in the Indonesian betrayal the role played by the Pabloites themselves and their Indonesian representatives.

It is a measure of the cynicism of the Pabloites and their subservience to the Stalinists and the national bourgeoisie that none of the articles and statements published in the 1966 pamphlet so much as mentioned the existence of a section of the "United Secretariat" in Indonesia, let alone explained the part it played in the events leading up to the coup.

There was just one brief appeal for the legalisation of and release of all members of the PKI, the Partai Murbah (a social democratic formation) and the Partai Acoma, even though the Acoma party had relations with the Pabloites at least as early as 1953 and was admitted as a section of the "United Secretariat" in 1960, just as the American SWP was intensifying its unprincipled reunification manoeuvres with the Pabloites.

This fleeting reference to their own members was a guilty attempt by the Pabloites to hide the part that they and their Indonesian proteges played in providing the PKI Stalinists with much-needed credibility throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

**How Pabloism emerged in Indonesia**

The Partai Acoma originated as a breakaway from the PKI in 1948. By falsely claiming to be Trotskyist, it served to divert and trap working class and peasant opposition to the support of the PKI for the national bourgeois regime of Sukarno. Led by an MP, Ibnu Parna, its programmatic documents presented the PKI as a "Marxist-Leninist party like us." As we shall show, this was a fraud in relation to both the PKI and the Partai Acoma.
The need for such a fake "Trotskyist" safety valve was demonstrated by the explosive events of 1948.

The collaboration of the PKI leadership in the post-war administrations headed by Sukarno and their acceptance of the Indonesian bourgeoisie's rotten agreements with the Dutch colonialists aroused intense working class opposition.

From July 5, 1947 to January 23, 1948 President Sukarno's Republican administration was headed by Amir Sjarifuddin who was both Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Sjarifuddin was a secret member of the PKI, as was the Deputy Prime Minister and a Minister of State. In addition, two Ministers of State were open members of the PKI. This administration signed the Renville Agreement with the Netherlands which maintained Dutch control of the lion's share of the sugar, rubber, coffee, tea and oil industries, required the withdrawal of guerrilla forces from Dutch-occupied territory and provided for the liquidation of the PKI-led "people's armed units" into the bourgeois "Indonesian National Armed Forces" controlled by Sukarno and his generals.

Such was the popular opposition to the acceptance of the US-imposed pact with the Dutch that the government was brought down and replaced by one headed by right-wing Vice-President Hatta as Prime Minister.

Strikes then erupted, demanding a parliamentary government. The PKI leadership supported the suppression of this movement by Sukarno who appealed for "national unity". When this betrayal was opposed by a section of the PKI, the PKI leadership responded savagely, executing the leaders of the opposition faction.

Partai Acoma emerged from this dissenting group. While it opposed the PKI leadership, the Acoma party maintained that the Indonesian revolution had to be carried out by the PKI as a "Marxist-Leninist party". Subsequently the Acoma leaders established contact with the "United Secretariat" which encouraged their pro-Stalinist positions and illusions in Maoism.

It is apparent that the Partai Acoma diverted wide layers of workers and peasants looking for an alternative to the class collaborationist program of the PKI.

From 1953 to 1955, for example, the Acoma's strength in the 200,000-strong Indonesian Peasants Association (SAKTI) delayed for two years plans by the PKI leadership to merge SAKTI with two PKI-controlled peasants' organisations, the RTI and the BTI.

**Pabloites prepare betrayal**

An article published in February 1958 in the Pabloite journal *Quatrieme International* provides a graphic indictment of the role played by Pabloism in opposing the fight for revolutionary Marxist leadership in the working class.

The article, "The Indonesian Revolution on the March," by Sal Santen, a close associate of Pablo, was written at the height of the revolutionary convulsions of December 1957, when workers and peasants seized control of Dutch and other imperialist-owned plantations and enterprises.
The article provided a criminal cover for the counter-revolutionary role of the PKI, which ordered the masses to hand over their conquests to the military in order to shore up the Sukarno administration.

According to Santen: "It must be added that the Communist militants, the basic and average cadres of the PKI and of the SOBSI, the big Indonesian workers' union organisation, have nothing of the bureaucratic character of Aidit (Communist Party leader) and Co. They are in front; they are the ones who took over the initiative in occupying the factories, the plantations, the banks and the ships. There is no doubt that the most conscious of them are inflamed by the revolutionary audacity of Tan Malakka, by Leon Trotsky's ideas of the permanent revolution."

Acting on this perspective, the Indonesian Pabloites politically disarmed the tens of thousands of workers and peasants who came forward into struggle only to find their way blocked by the PKI. Just at the point when the decisive task was to educate the most class conscious elements in the necessity for an uncompromising struggle against the Stalinist "two-stage" and "bloc of four classes" line of the PKI, and the need for a thorough arming with the program of Permanent Revolution, the Pabloites worked for the opposite.

Opportunist to the core, they equated Trotsky with Tan Malakka, an early PKI leader who opposed the plans for a revolt in 1926 and split from the PKI to form his own organisation. They falsified the Marxist theory of Permanent Revolution, transforming it from a conscious strategy to guide the struggles for the dictatorship of the proletariat into a spontaneously generated perspective.

The central tenant of Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution is the perfidy of the national bourgeoisie and their incapacity to lead a real struggle against imperialism. Only the working class can free the masses from national and class oppression, by carrying the socialist revolution and uniting with their class brothers throughout the world in a common struggle to overthrow imperialism internationally.

Such a struggle can only be undertaken consciously under the banner of the Fourth International in an uncompromising struggle against the Stalinist and petty-bourgeois forces, such as the Pabloites, who attempt to disarm the working class and tie it to its own bourgeoisie.

In the hands of the Pabloites, the program of Permanent Revolution became a justification for their own adaption to the national bourgeoisie and the Stalinists. The working class did not need its own revolutionary party to come to power because the PKI was the instrument through which the Permanent Revolution was being realised, albeit unconsciously.

Thus, Santen, speaking on behalf of Pablo and Mandel, declared:

"In any case it is clear that the whole of Indonesia is moving. The march of the masses has become irreversible although the process remains contradictory and has already reached the stage of dual power in a good part of Indonesia, and above all in Java. The occupation of enterprises, of plantations, of the fleet, and the banks by the masses has only one meaning: It is a question of the classical beginning of the proletarian revolution. The Indonesian revolution is in the act of breaking
the limits of the national revolution under a bourgeois nationalist leadership. It develops according to the laws of the permanent revolution." (Emphasis in the original)

The Pabloites held out the prospect of a peaceful transition to "worker and peasant power":

"A speedy and almost 'peaceful' victory of the revolution up to worker and peasant power (above all in Java) was possible, if the PKI, at the first moment pushed by the spirit of the masses, had not done everything to castrate the action of the masses by subordinating it to the control of the government."

What the Pabloites meant by "worker and peasant power" was completely opposed to the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Pabloites lined up as cheer leaders for the counter-revolutionary Stalinist "two-stage" perspective of demanding that the proletariat give up the struggle for socialist revolution.

To sanctify their opposition to the independent mobilisation of the working class and to the forging of a revolutionary proletariat, that is, Trotskyist, party, the Pabloites insisted that the PKI, despite its betrayal of the December 1957 occupations, would be pressured to the left by the masses:

"At the same time, at each aggravation of the situation, the masses have the tendency to push the SOBSI and PKI further. A great deal will now depend on the boldness, on the revolutionary Marxist understanding of the militants, of the average Communist cadres. We feel completely solidarised with them, inspired and enthused by their initiatives, by their boldness which we passionately hope will not stop before the 'taboos' of the Aidits. We salute the Indonesian Trotskyist cadres who are integrated in the PKI with the correct revolutionary perspective that the radicalisation of the masses will be realised above all through the PKI and SOBSI."

This was the greatest crime of Pabloism the liquidation of Trotskyist cadre, and those who were attracted to Trotskyism, into the camp of Stalinism.

Santen added a footnote to emphasise that this treacherous line was advanced in direct opposition to the struggle waged by the International Committee of the Fourth International since its founding in 1953 to defend Trotskyism against Pabloite liquidationism. Santen specifically denounced the ICFI's fight for the construction of sections of the Fourth International to defeat counter-revolutionary Stalinism:

"In contradiction to some sectarian 'orthodox' people, the International does not let itself be fascinated by the reactionary Stalinist policy, but orients itself, above all, on the dynamism of the situation itself, a dynamism that pushes the masses, and through the masses the PKI itself into contradiction with the present order in Indonesia."

This passage should be burned into the consciousness of every worker as the summation of Pabloism's pro-Stalinist dirty work.

In direct struggle against the ICFI, the Pabloites consciously pushed fatal illusions in the PKI Stalinists, precisely at the point where the burning question of the hour was
to expose the criminal role of the Stalinists and resolutely fight for a decisive break by the masses from the PKI to construct a revolutionary Trotskyist leadership.

The protracted and implacable struggle waged against the Pabloite opportunists by the ICFI, which appeared for many years to be a fight taken up by small isolated forces in the Fourth International, was a life and death question for millions of Indonesian workers and peasants.

**Counter-revolutionary handmaidens**

Within weeks of Santen's lines being penned, the rotten fruits of the PKI's betrayal of the December 1957 movement began to emerge. A counter-revolutionary government was formed in Central Sumatra in February 1958 by coup leader Colonel Achmed Hussein and headed by Dr Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. This CIA-backed operation, only possible because of the PKI's disarming of the December 1957 rebellion, was a test run for the bloody coup that was to take place seven years later.

Fully conscious that this was a dress rehearsal for counter-revolution, the response of the Pabloites was to intensify their wretched boosting of the PKI. *Quatrieme International*'s editor added a footnote which climaxed with the following purple passage:

"Since the 'rebels' main aim is to do away with Sukarno's 'guided democracy' in which is included the PKI, then any compromise will be at the expense of the PKI. In this case, the immediate perspective is that the PKI, under mass pressure, will be obliged, willy nilly, to execute a major policy about-face as was performed by the Chinese Communist Party in a similar situation in 1949, and to go past the bourgeois-nationalist stage of the revolution to the socialist stage of workers' power. Thus, in fact, but again without acknowledgement, operating on the basis of, and validating the Trotskyist theory of permanent revolution."

Thus the PKI, the hangman of the Indonesian revolution, was depicted as the unwitting instrument of the Permanent Revolution!

Added to this was the lie that the Chinese Stalinists, the mentors of Aidit and the other PKI leaders, had carried through the "socialist stage of workers' power" in 1949. In fact, the peasant armies of the Maoists brutally suppressed the proletarian uprising in 1949, murdered the Trotskyist opposition, and established an extremely deformed workers' state based on the Stalinist perspective of a partnership with the national bourgeoisie, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry. This was indeed the model upon which the PKI leadership based itself.

Not content with glorifying the Stalinists, the editor's special footnote then promoted the prospects of the national bourgeoisie undertaking a progressive transformation as well. It suggested an alternative scenario premised on the Sukarno government leading a struggle against the CIA-organised "rebels":

"In the other event, that the Sukarno government takes a stronger line of opposition and resistance to the 'rebels,' a further polarisation of all the bourgeois and semi-feudal counter-revolutionary forces will be seen; confronting a shadow bourgeois-
nationalist government and the masses. This confrontation of the masses against the new 'slaveholders' rebellion,' against the new 'Kornilov putsch,' will mean a new upsurge of the revolution, while the experience of this kind of revolutionary action by the masses will leave little chance of a relapse to the stability of a bourgeois nationalist regime.

The events of October 1965 were to prove the Sukarno regime to be no less accommodating to General Suharto's killers than the Kerensky government was to General Kornilov's coup bid in 1917. Sukarno displayed the essence of bourgeois nationalism by ending his political career as a puppet President for Suharto's military junta.

The conclusion of the editor's footnote should be inscribed on the tombstone of Pabloism: "In either case our optimistic perspective is justified. The Indonesian Revolution is on the march! Its victory as a socialist revolution is now in generation. (Emphasis in original) From 1957 to 1965 the Pabloites internationally perpetrated this objectivist cover-up of the grave dangers confronting the Indonesian revolution.

The work of the Pabloite section in Indonesia was central to the whole Pabloite world perspective. It was discussed intensively at the so-called Fifth World Congress of the "United Secretariat" in 1957.

"Our Fifth World Congress, in discussing the progress and the road of the world colonial revolution, gave serious attention to the developments in Indonesia. Recognising the Indonesian situation as pre-revolutionary, it expected a revolutionary explosion very soon," declared the article by Santen.

The entire Pabloite "United Secretariat" has blood on its hands. They aided and abetted the Stalinist betrayal of the Indonesian workers and peasants.

Chapter Five

Pabloites cover up Stalinist treachery

The crisis of working class leadership was never posed so sharply as in Indonesia between 1963 and 1965. The fate of the Indonesian workers and peasants depended entirely on overcoming and defeating the counter-revolutionary line of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) which bound the working class hand and foot to the tottering bourgeois nationalist regime of Sukarno while the US-backed military prepared for a bloody coup.

The PKI Stalinists, led by general secretary Aidit, repeatedly demanded that workers and peasants hand back factories and plantations which they had seized. They then joined the army generals in taking cabinet posts in the Suharto government and backed the outlawing of workers' strikes.

The more it became obvious that the generals were preparing for a bloody coup, the more the PKI leaders worked feverishly to assure the bourgeoisie and the military that the PKI opposed the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses.
Aidit repeatedly declared that the state power in Indonesia did not have to be smashed but could be reformed from within to "strengthen and consolidate the pro-people's aspect," which included President Sukarno. The PKI leader gave lectures at army colleges in which he heralded a "feeling of mutuality and unity that daily grows strong between all the armed forces of the Indonesian Republic and the various groups of Indonesian people, including the communists".

The PKI leadership could only advance these positions because the Indonesian Pabloites were working equally feverishly to prevent workers from breaking with the Stalinists. They vehemently opposed the construction of a new revolutionary leadership.

The responsibility for the bloody counter-revolutionary consequences of this line can be traced directly to the 1963 Pabloite Reunification Congress at which the American Socialist Workers Party consummated an unprincipled break from the International Committee of the Fourth International and joined the Pabloite "United Secretariat" of Ernest Mandel.

After leading the struggle against Pabloite liquidationism in 1953, the SWP leaders had in the late 1950s increasingly adapted to the pressure of the protracted post-war boom and the apparent quiescence of the working class. They abandoned the struggle for proletarian revolution led by a Bolshevik-type party and sought "regroupment" with petty bourgeois radicals and disaffected Stalinists. In 1963 they joined hands with the Pabloites in claiming that not only the Stalinist parties, such as the PKI, but also the bourgeois nationalist and petty-bourgeois nationalist forces in the backward countries, such as Castro in Cuba and Sukarno in Indonesia, could become vehicles for the establishment of socialism.

The reunification resolution declared that there was no crisis of revolutionary leadership in the oppressed countries: "In the colonial and semi-colonial countries ... the very weakness of capitalism, the whole peculiar socio-economic structure produced by imperialism, the permanent misery of the big majority of the population in the absence of a radical agrarian revolution, the stagnation and even reduction of living standards while industrialisation nevertheless proceeds relatively rapidly, creates situations in which the failure of one revolutionary wave does not lead automatically to relative or even temporary social or economic stabilisation. A seemingly inexhaustible succession of mass struggles continues, such as Bolivia has experienced for 10 years."

In other words, no matter how crushing were the defeats and betrayals inflicted on the masses, they would rise again. There was no need for a Trotskyist party. The criminal character of this opportunist complacency was soon to be spelt out in the blood of the Indonesian masses.

The 1963 conference was based on the rejection of the historical necessity of building sections of the Trotskyist movement in the backward countries. The Pabloite resolution declared: "The weakness of the enemy in the backward countries has opened the possibility of coming to power even with blunted instruments."

In Indonesia, the "blunted instrument" was to be the PKI.
The great betrayal in Sri Lanka

The Pabloite treachery in Indonesia was intimately bound up with the great betrayal in Sri Lanka in 1964 when the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), the Pabloite organisation, joined the bourgeois coalition government of Mrs Bandaranaike, together with the Stalinist Communist Party of Sri Lanka, in order to behead the mass working class movement against capitalist rule.

The LSSP had opposed the formation of the International Committee in 1953 and subsequently played a central role in preparing the American SWP's reunification with the Pabloites. Its opposition to the struggle against opportunism in the Fourth International was rooted in its increasingly nationalist orientation and abandonment of Trotskyist program and principles in order to accommodate with the Stalinists and Bandaranaike's capitalist party, the SLFP, in Ceylon.

The Pabloite Reunification Congress of 1963 covered up the LSSP's national opportunism by claiming that "Our Ceylonese section has progressively corrected the wrong orientation adopted in 1960 of supporting the liberal-bourgeois government of the SLFP. Since the masses began to go into action, it has not hesitated to place itself at their head against its electoral allies of yesterday." Just one year later the fake "Trotskyist" credentials supplied by the Pabloites were used by the LSSP to join the capitalist government.

This betrayal by a party hailed by the Pabloites as the "largest Trotskyist party in the world" had disastrous implications internationally, first of all in Indonesia. It strengthened the hand of the Stalinist and Maoist parties, such as the PKI, whose capacity to suppress and disarm the working class would have been shattered had the LSSP upheld the program of permanent revolution and fought for the overthrow of bourgeois rule in Sri Lanka.

Pabloites boost PKI

After the entry of their Sri Lankan section into the capitalist government in Sri Lanka alongside the Stalinists, the Pabloites continued to pursue a very similar pro-Stalinist and pro-national bourgeois line in Indonesia.

The Pabloites' pamphlet, The Catastrophe in Indonesia, not only covered up the part played by the Indonesian Pabloite section, the Partai Acoma, as we exposed in the previous chapter.

Even after the bloody coup in Indonesia, the pamphlet continued to promote the prospect of the national bourgeoisie and the PKI playing a progressive role.

It included an article by T. Soedarso, described by US Socialist Workers Party leader Joseph Hansen in the pamphlet's introduction as a "young member of the Indonesian Communist party who succeeded in making his way into exile". Hansen enthusiastically commended Soedarso's article as "an indication of the determination of an important sector of the Indonesian Communist Party to learn from what happened and to utilise the lessons in such a way as to ensure victory when the masses again surge forward, as they surely will".
Soedarso's article treated the counter-revolutionary program of the PKI leadership as a series of "mistakes", including the "errors" of "seeking to achieve socialism by peaceful means," and of pursuing a "policy" of a two-stage revolution and a united front with the national bourgeoisie.

Soedarso expressed no fundamental differences with the Stalinists, agreeing, for example, that "The revolutionary movement could and should support the progressive attitudes or actions of the national bourgeoisie". If ever proof was needed that the semi-colonial bourgeoisie, personified by Sukarno, was inherently incapable of a "progressive" program and would line up behind the slaughter of the working class, the Indonesian bloodbath provided it. For 18 months Sukarno served General Suharto's dictatorship as a puppet president, and even after that, from March 1967, he was retained as a token "president without powers".

The Pabloites likewise belittled the significance of the PKI's entry into the Sukarno NASAKOM coalition government with the military butchers. Soedarso implored the PKI to reverse this "line," as if it were a mere lapse.

Soedarso's virtual apology for this fundamental class treachery was no accident. The cardinal premise of Pabloism was the reversal of Trotsky's struggle against Stalinism. The evolution of Stalinism into a counter-revolutionary bureaucracy was established irrevocably in 1933 when the Stalinist Comintern, approved, without a single dissenting voice, the betrayal of the German Communist Party in handing over the German working class to Hitler without a shot being fired. From that point on Trotsky insisted that the Third International, following the Second, had passed definitely into the camp of the bourgeoisie, and that the Fourth International had to built as the world party of socialist revolution to ensure the continuity of Marxism.

Soedarso's article was a conscious cover-up, organised by Mandel and Hansen, for the reactionary role of Stalinism. The article deliberately did not use the word Stalinism, but fraudulently referred to the PKI as "Communist". And then to make his position crystal clear, Soedarso concluded: "The above criticism is not intended to undermine the role of the PKI nor to arouse distrust in Indonesian Communism."

Thus, a year after the military coup, by which time a million workers and peasants had perished, the Pabloites were whitewashing the lessons of 1965 and still urging the Indonesian workers and peasants to maintain their faith in the PKI.

**The Pabloite 'lessons' of Indonesia**

Soedarso's article was not an isolated instance. In fact the line advanced in the article provided the essential themes for the statement issued on March 20, 1966 by the Pabloite "United Secretariat". Entitled "The Lesson of Indonesia," it opposed any break from the PKI and issued no call for the building of a section of the Fourth International. On the contrary, it declared that the "Indonesian Communists" could "overcome the results of the present defeat" by assimilating certain lessons.

The first "lesson" was stated as follows: "While it is correct and necessary to support all anti-imperialist mass movements, and even to critically support all concrete anti-imperialist measures taken by representatives of the colonial bourgeoisie like Sukarno, for colonial revolution to be victorious it is absolutely essential to maintain
the proletarian organisations strictly independent politically and organisationally from the 'national' bourgeoisie."

Not only did the Pabloites continue to sow the most dangerous illusions in the "anti-imperialist" pretensions of the national bourgeoisie, their talk of "independent" proletarian organisations was an utter fraud. The political independence of the working class could only be forged by building a Trotskyist party in pitiless and audacious struggle against the Stalinists whom the Pabloites were trying to resuscitate.

The second Pabloite "lesson" claimed that "While it is correct and necessary during the first phases of the revolution in backward countries to place the main stress on the problems of winning national independence, unifying the country and solving the agrarian question (i.e., the historical tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution which constitute the most burning tasks in the eyes of 80 to 90 percent of the population), it is indispensable to understand that the solution of these tasks is only possible when the working class, in alliance with the poor peasantry, has conquered leadership of the revolution, establishes the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry and pushes the revolution through to its socialist phase."

With this opportunist line of "two phases," the Pabloites were trying to breathe new life into the discredited "two stage" theory of the Stalinists, which demanded that the "socialist phase" of the revolution be delayed until the completion of the democratic and national revolution. The Pabloite position was the opposite of Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution which was based on the international character of the socialist revolution and the revolutionary role of the international proletariat. Trotsky emphasised the essential lesson of the Russian revolution that, in this epoch, the democratic and national tasks in the backward and oppressed countries could be achieved only through the proletarian revolution and its extension on the world scale.

The Pabloite call for the "dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry" sought to revive the "Old Bolshevik" formula of the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" discarded by Lenin in 1917. Lenin adopted Trotsky's unequivocal position that the proletariat is the only consistently revolutionary class which can lead the peasants and carry through the democratic and socialist tasks of the oppressed nations as part of the struggle of the working class on a world scale.

The third "lesson" advanced by the Pabloites was: "While it is necessary to win the broadest possible mass base in the countryside, a revolutionary party capable of applying that policy must be based upon a hardened proletarian cadre thoroughly trained in Marxist theory and revolutionary practice."

The duplicitous character of this "lesson" can be seen from the fact that it was oriented toward the Stalinists. The references to a "hardened proletarian cadre" and "Marxist theory" were a sham.

In fact, the "United Secretariat" advised the survivors of the PKI leadership to take the road of rural guerrilla warfare.

Its statement expressed the hope that "what remains of that leadership along with the surviving party cadres especially the best educated, those steeled by the terrible
experiences they went through in the past six months will have taken the road of guerrilla war, if only out of self-defence.

They urged the Stalinists to turn to a peasant-based guerrilla war, aping the Maoists in China. Maoism is a variant of Stalinism based on peasant hostility to the hegemony of the working class. Arising out the defeat of the 1926-27 Chinese revolution and the destruction of the Chinese Communist Party's working class membership, Mao's turn to the peasantry led to the abortion of the 1949 Chinese revolution. It produced a highly deformed workers' state based on Mao's "bloc of four classes" the national bourgeoisie, the urban petty-bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the working class.

It was this very doctrine which guided the determination of the Aidit leadership of the PKI to prevent a proletarian socialist revolution in Indonesia. In Aidit's words: "The working class, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie must unite in one national front."

The Pabloites' pamphlet was a cynical bid to divert class conscious workers from the most essential lesson of the Indonesian betrayal the necessity for a Trotskyist party to defeat the Stalinists and their Pabloite accomplices who function as counter-revolutionary petty-bourgeois agencies within the mass movement. There was and is only one revolutionary party which can avenge the betrayal of 1965 by leading the Indonesian workers to power an Indonesian section of the International Committee of the Fourth International.

Conclusion

In 1951 the PKI leadership had set out clearly the path of betrayal it was to pursue. "In the struggle to realise their political convictions, the communists will not use force while the ruling class still leaves the peaceful, the parliamentary way open. If there is the use of force, the spilling of blood, a civil war, it will not be the communists who start it but the ruling class itself."

This counter-revolutionary perspective was only able to be inflicted on the Indonesian masses because the Pabloites tied the most class conscious sections of the working class to the banner and program of the PKI.

The Pabloite betrayals in Sri Lanka and Indonesia demonstrated the counter-revolutionary character of Pabloism. As the International Committee of the Fourth International stated in its 1988 perspectives resolution, The World Capitalist Crisis and the Tasks of the Fourth International:

"In the assistance it rendered to Stalinism, social democracy and bourgeois nationalism, the opportunism of the Pabloite centrists played a vital role in enabling imperialism to survive the crucial years between 1968 and 1975 when its world order was shaken by economic turmoil and an international upsurge of the working class and the oppressed masses in the backward countries. It verified Trotsky's assessment of centrism as a secondary agency of imperialism. The petty-bourgeois defeatists who pontificate on the doomed character of the proletariat while discovering new vistas for the bourgeoisie never bother to concretely analyse how decrepit capitalism survived into the 1980s. The Pabloites care least of all to examine
the results of their own policies. Inasmuch as the entire petty-bourgeois fraternity of centrists, radicals and declassed intellectuals dismiss a priori the revolutionary capacities of the working class and accept its defeat as inevitable, they never even consider what the consequences of a correct Marxist policy would have been in Sri Lanka in 1964, in France in 1968, in Chile in 1973, and in Greece and Portugal in 1974.

"The International Committee, on the other hand, derives from the strategical experiences of the proletariat during the postwar period the crucial lesson upon which it bases its preparation for the coming revolutionary upheavals: that the building of the Fourth International as the World Party of Socialist Revolution to ensure the victory of the international working class requires an uncompromising and unrelenting struggle against opportunism and centrism."

A new revolutionary leadership must be built to lead the Indonesian masses to smash the Suharto dictatorship, overthrow the bourgeoisie and throw off the yoke of imperialist exploitation in the fight for the world socialist revolution. Against the Stalinists and Pabloites who are preparing another bloody trap for the masses, an Indonesian section of the ICFI must be forged to lead this struggle.

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HTTP://MONDEDIPLO.COM/1998/06/02CHOMSKY

THIRTY FIVE YEARS OF COMPLICITY

Indonesia, master card in Washington’s hand

The Asian crisis has claimed its first victim - apart from the millions of workers now unemployed - General Suharto. President for over thirty years, he had a monopoly of power based on emoluments and corruption. Finally, he proved unable to carry out the reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund or to stop the riots. On 21 May 1998 he resigned. His successor, Jusuf Habibie, has given some signs of change with the announcement of elections, the release of political prisoners and changes at the top of the army. But will the country get the thorough-going change it needs?

By Noam Chomsky

On May 20 1998 United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called upon Indonesia’s President Suharto to resign and provide for "a democratic transition." A few hours later, Mr Suharto transferred formal authority to his hand-picked vice-president. The two events were not simple cause and effect. They do, however, give some indication of the nature of the relations that have evolved over half a century.

Four months earlier, an Australian publication had reported that while "IMF Director Michel Camdessus stood over Suharto with his arms folded in true colonial style,
Suharto signed a new IMF agreement." The photo showing the "humbling of Suharto" was "plastered across the local papers" the next day (1). Whatever the circumstances, the symbolism was not missed.

Mr Suharto’s rule relied crucially on US support. He has been a favourite of Western governments and investors since he took power in 1965. To sustain his power and violence, the White House has repeatedly evaded congressional restrictions on military aid and training: Jimmy Carter in 1978, Bill Clinton in 1993 and 1998. The Clinton Administration also suspended review of Indonesia’s appalling labour practices while praising Jakarta for bringing them "into closer conformity with international standards."

Mr Suharto’s recent fall from grace follows a familiar course: Mobutu, Saddam Hussein, Duvalier, Marcos, Somoza, etc. The usual reasons are disobedience or loss of control. In Suharto’s case, both factors operated: his failure to follow IMF orders that were subjecting the population to cruel punishment, then his inability to subdue popular opposition, which made it clear that his usefulness was at an end.

After the second world war, Indonesia had a prominent place in US efforts to construct an international political and economic order. Planning was careful and sophisticated; each region was assigned its proper role. The "main function" of Southeast Asia was to provide resources and raw materials to the industrial societies. Indonesia was the richest prize. In 1948 the influential planner George Kennan described "the problem of Indonesia" as "the most crucial issue of the moment in our struggle with the Kremlin" - that is, the struggle against independent nationalism, whatever the Kremlin role might be (in this case, very slight).

Kennan warned that a "communist" Indonesia would be an "infection" that "would sweep westward" through all of South Asia. The term "communism" is routinely used to cover any form of independent nationalism, and it is understood that "infections" spread not by conquest but by example.

"The problem of Indonesia" persisted. In 1958 US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed the National Security Council that Indonesia was one of three major world crises, along with Algeria and the Middle East. He emphasized that there was no Soviet role in any of these cases, with the "vociferous" agreement of President Eisenhower. The main problem in Indonesia was the Communist party (PKI), which was winning "widespread support not as a revolutionary party but as an organization defending the interests of the poor within the existing system," developing a "mass base among the peasantry" through its "vigor in defending the interests of the...poor (2)".

The US embassy in Jakarta reported that it might not be possible to overcome the PKI "by ordinary democratic means", so that "elimination" by police and military might be undertaken. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that "action must be taken, including overt measures as required, to ensure either the success of the dissidents or the suppression of the pro-communist elements of the Sukarno government."

The "dissidents" were the leaders of a rebellion in the outer islands, the site of most of Indonesia’s oil and US investments. US support for the secessionist movement
was "by far the largest, and to this day the least known, of the Eisenhower administration’s covert militarized interventions," two leading Southeast Asia specialists conclude in a revealing study (3). When the rebellion collapsed, after bringing down the last residue of parliamentary institutions, the US turned to other means to "eliminate" the country’s major political force.

That goal was achieved when Suharto took power in 1965, with Washington’s strong support and assistance. Army-led massacres wiped out the PKI and devastated its mass base in "one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century," comparable to the atrocities of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, the CIA reported, judging "the Indonesian coup" to be "certainly one of the most significant events of the 20th century (4)". Perhaps half a million or more were killed within a few months.

The events were greeted undisguised euphoria. The New York Times described the "staggering mass slaughter" as "a gleam of light in Asia," praising Washington for keeping its own role quiet so as not to embarrass the "Indonesian moderates" who were cleansing their society, then rewarding them with generous aid (5). Time praised the "quietly determined" leader Suharto with his "scrupulously constitutional" procedures "based on law, not on mere power" as he presided over a "boiling bloodbath" that was "the West’s best news for years in Asia" (6).

The reaction was near uniform. The World Bank restored Indonesia to favour. Western governments and corporations flocked to Suharto’s "paradise for investors," impeded only by the rapacity of the ruling family. For more than 20 years, Suharto was hailed as a "moderate" who is "at heart benign" (The Economist) as he compiled a record of slaughter, terror, and corruption that has few counterparts in postwar history.

Suharto is also hailed for his economic achievements. An Australian specialist who participated in economic modeling in Indonesia dismisses the standard figures as "seriously inaccurate": the regularly reported 7% growth rate, for example, was invented on government orders, overruling the assessment of the economists (7). He confirms that economic growth took place, thanks to Indonesia’s oil reserves and the green revolution, "the benefits of which even the massive inefficiency of the system of corruption could not entirely erode." The benefits were enhanced by extraction of other resources and the supply of super-cheap labour, kept that way by the labour standards that impress Washington. Much of the rest is "a mirage," as was quickly revealed when "foreign investors stampeded."

The estimated $80 billion private debt is held by at most a few hundred individuals, Indonesian economists estimate, perhaps as few as fifty. The wealth of the Suharto family is estimated at roughly the scale of the IMF rescue package. The estimates suggest simple ways to overcome the "financial crisis," but these are not on the agenda. The costs are to be borne primarily by 200 million Indonesians who borrowed nothing, along with Western taxpayers, in accord with the rules of "really existing capitalism".

In 1975, the Indonesian army invaded East Timor, then being taken over by its own population after the collapse of the Portuguese empire (8). The US and Australia, at least, knew that the invasion was coming and approved it. Australian Ambassador
Richard Woolcott urged his government to follow the "pragmatic" course of "Kissingerian realism," (Kissinger was then secretary of state in the Ford Administration). This was for one reason, because Australia might be able to make a better deal on Timor's oil reserves with Indonesia "than with Portugal or independent Portuguese Timor."

The Indonesian army relied on the US for 90% of its arms, which were restricted to use in "self-defense." The rules were followed in accord with that same "Kissingerian realism" and scant attention was paid to the restriction. Adhering to the same doctrine, Washington immediately stepped up the flow of arms while declaring an arms suspension.

The UN Security Council ordered Indonesia to withdraw, but that was an empty gesture. As UN Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan explained in his memoirs, he followed the directives of the State Department to render the UN "utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook" because "the United States wished things to turn out as they did" and "worked to bring this about." He also described how "things turned out," noting that within a few months 60,000 Timorese had been killed, "almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during the second world war."

The massacre continued, peaking in 1978 with the help of new arms provided by the Carter Administration. The toll is estimated at about 200,000, the worst slaughter relative to population since the holocaust. By 1978 the US was joined by Britain, France, and others eager to gain what they could from the slaughter. Under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud visited Jakarta to arrange for the sale of French arms, judging his visit to have been "satisfying in all respects" and adding that France would not "embarrass" Indonesia in international forums (9). Protest in the West was minuscule; little was even reported.

Atrocities continue to the present with the decisive support of the US and its allies, though popular protest has increased, within Indonesia as well, where courageous dissidents, also unreported, have been calling on the West to live up to its fine words. To bring this horror to an end requires no bombing, sanctions or other drastic means: simple unwillingness to participate might well have sufficed. But that was never considered an option. The implications remain unexamined, dismissed in favour of ritual and irrelevant appeals to the cold war.

In 1989 Australia signed a treaty with Indonesia to exploit the oil of "the Indonesian Province of East Timor" - which sober realists tell us is not economically viable and therefore cannot be granted the right of self-determination affirmed by the Security Council and the World Court. The treaty was put into effect immediately after the army massacred several hundred more Timorese at a graveyard commemoration of a recent army assassination. Western oil companies joined in the robbery, eliciting no comment.

So matters continued until General Suharto made his first mistakes...

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http://rwor.org/a/v23/1110-19/1116/indonesia.htm
Indonesia: U.S. Role in 1965 Massacres

Confessions from the U.S. State Department

Revolutionary Worker #1116, August 26, 2001, posted at http://rwor.org

"Communists, red sympathizers and their families are being massacred by the thousands. Backlands army units are reported to have executed thousands of communists after interrogation in remote jails...The killings have been on such a scale that the disposal of the corpses has created a serious sanitation problem in East Java and Northern Sumatra where the humid air bears the reek of decaying flesh. Travelers from those areas tell of small rivers and streams that have been literally clogged with bodies."

Time, December 17, 1965

The exact number of people killed in dictator Suharto’s rise to power in Indonesia in 1965-1966 may never be known. A U.S. State Department estimate in 1966 placed the figure at 300,000. Official Indonesian data released in the mid-1970s placed the number of deaths between 450,000 and 500,000. In 1976, Admiral Sudomo, the head of the Indonesian state security system, said more than 500,000 had been murdered. And Amnesty International has quoted one source placing the number killed at 700,000 and another at "many more than one million."

In 1990, 25 years after the massacre, a villager in a city in Northern Sumatra recalled that, "For six months, no-one wanted to eat fish from the river because they often found human fingers inside the fish."

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The people of the world will never forget and never forgive this horrendous crime against the people. But government officials in the U.S. are still trying wash the blood from their hands and cover up how the U.S. supported and aided this mass murder.

In late July 2001, the U.S. government ordered all copies of a research volume recalled from libraries and bookstores. The 800-plus-page volume, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968: Vol. 26--Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, talks about how the U.S. government provided financial and military support and lists of political activists to the Indonesian military as it carried out the huge 1965-1966 slaughter aimed at communists and other political activists.

The volume, part of a large documentary history of U.S. foreign policy, is an official publication by the U.S. State Department. Released 30 years after the period covered, these volumes are produced as "the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity."

The CIA also held up the release of the volume in the series that covers Greece, Turkey and Cyprus from 1964-1968. This volume most likely contains information about how the U.S./CIA backed the reactionary junta which seized control in Greece in 1967. In 1990, the CIA censored the volume on Iran in the 1950s -- deleting any reference to the CIA-backed coup that brought the Shah of Iran to power in 1953.
But the U.S. attempts to censor the volume on Indonesia have so far been unsuccessful. The volume was obtained by the National Security Archives at George Washington University, which posted them on the internet (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/). And publicity around the attempts at censorship has only drawn more attention to the volume. At the University of California Berkeley several faculty members have written letters urging the library to refuse to comply with the government’s request to return the book.

In early August, the State Department backed down and released the volume covering Indonesia in the 1960s -- denying there had been an attempt to censor the volume.

**From the Horse’s Mouth**

The new State Department volume on Indonesia, while hardly a complete documentation of U.S. covert actions related to the 1965 coup, does contain some revelations on matters previously denied by U.S. officials.

Before the coup the government in Indonesia was a coalition government headed by Sukarno. The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) was a major force in this coalition government.* The Sukarno government didn’t stand for genuine independence from imperialism, but it took some actions which reflected bourgeois national interests.

The new State Department book on Indonesia documents communications back and forth between the embassy in Jakarta and the U.S. State Department in 1965 and 1966 reporting on the arrests and killings of the PKI leadership. On August 10, 1966, Ambassador Green sent a memo to the State Department reporting that a "sanitized" [meaning without reference to their source in the U.S. embassy] version of the lists of PKI members was made available to the Indonesian government in December 1965 and "is apparently being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership at the time."

The volume also documents direct U.S. financial support for the Indonesian death squads called Kap-Gestapu. On December 2, 1965 Ambassador Green wrote a memo to Assistant Secretary of State Bundy about providing 50 million rupiahs to a leader of the death squads:

"This is to confirm my earlier concurrence that we provide Malik with fifty million rupiahs requested by him for the activities of the Kap-Gestapu movement…The Kap-Gestapu activities to date have been important factor in the army’s program, and judging from results, I would say highly successful. This army-inspired but civilian-staffed action group is still carrying burden of current repressive efforts targeted against PKI, particularly in Central Java…. The chances of detection or subsequent revelation of our support in this instance are as minimal as any black bag operation can be."

**Horrific Massacre: Made in the USA**

The U.S. had major strategic concerns about Southeast Asia. At this time, the U.S. was getting in deep trouble in Vietnam. Maoist China had become a powerful revolutionary influence throughout Asia and the world. Anti-U.S. sentiment was
growing in Indonesia. And given all this, the U.S. wanted a more reliable pro-U.S. regime in Indonesia.

Right before the coup in Indonesia, U.S. President Johnson said, "There are great stakes in the balance. Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist the growing might and the grasping ambition of Asia communism. Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield."

Guy Pauker, an analyst for the RAND Corporation (a U.S. government think tank) who also was on the CIA’s payroll, produced reports advocating military and economic aid to the Indonesian military in order for them to "succeed in the competition with communism." He expressed doubts that Indonesia’s leaders were capable of doing "what was necessary" to combat what the U.S. saw as a "communist threat." In a 1964 RAND memo Pauker wrote, "These forces would probably lack the ruthlessness that made it possible for the Nazis to suppress the Communist Party of Germany." According to Pauker, the military had to be relied on and strengthened and he explicitly mentioned Suharto as a figure the U.S. should groom for power.

By 1965, the United States had trained 4,000 officers in the Indonesian military. The CIA built networks of agents and informants in the trade unions, where the PKI had a lot of influence. And U.S. dollars also went towards strengthening Pertamina, the oil company run by the Indonesian army. Foreign oil money, particularly from U.S. and Japanese oil companies, was channeled through Pertamina and became another way that the U.S. built and strengthened the military forces it wanted to come to power.

The Indonesian army, led by the U.S.-trained generals, played a key role in the massacres--doing a large part of the killing directly, supplying trucks, weapons and encouragement to paramilitary and vigilante death squads, and actively promoting an anti-communist hysteria that spurred on the bloody murders.

*The New York Times* described the Johnson administration’s "delight with the news from Indonesia" and the private responses of U.S. officials who were "elated to find their expectations being realized." President Johnson’s secretary of state, Dean Rusk, cabled his encouragement to the Jakarta embassy. The "campaign against the communists," he wrote, must continue as the military "are [the] only force capable of creating order in Indonesia". The U.S. ambassador replied that he had assured Suharto and his generals "that the U.S. government [is] generally sympathetic with, and admiring of, what the army is doing."

**U.S. Lists, U.S. Denials**

In 1990, Kathy Kadane, a reporter with States News Service, published an article that appeared in the *South Carolina Herald Journal*, the *San Francisco Examiner* and the *Boston Globe*. Quoting senior officials in the U.S. embassy in 1965-1966, Kadane’s article documented the role of U.S. officials in providing lists of names of PKI members and leaders to the Indonesian military.
In lengthy interviews, former senior U.S. diplomats and CIA officers revealed how the U.S. compiled comprehensive lists of Communist activists--as many as 5,000 names--and gave them to the Indonesian army.

Robert J. Martens, a former member of the embassy’s political section who was responsible for compiling the lists and turning them over to the Indonesian military, told Kadane, "It really was a big help to the army. They probably killed a lot of people, and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that’s not all bad. There’s a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment."

Top U.S. Embassy officials approved release of the list, which was a detailed who’s-who of the leadership of the PKI. It included names of provincial, city and other local PKI committee members, and leaders of mass organizations such as the PKI national labor federation, women’s and youth groups. Embassy officials carefully recorded the subsequent destruction of the PKI organization. Using Martens’ lists as a guide, they checked off names of captured and assassinated PKI leaders, tracking the steady dismantling of the party apparatus. Detention centers were set up to hold those who were not killed immediately. By the end of January 1966, the deputy CIA station chief in Jakarta said the checked-off names were so numerous CIA analysts in Washington concluded the PKI leadership had been destroyed.

Former CIA Director William Colby, director of the CIA’s Far East division in 1965, revealed that compiling lists of members and leaders of liberation movements is a key part of the CIA strategy of repression. Colby compared the embassy’s campaign to identify the PKI leadership to the CIA’s Phoenix Program in Vietnam. Phoenix was a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese program set up by the CIA in December 1967 that murdered suspected members and supporters of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam. During Nixon’s first 2 1/2 years, State Department officially admitted that the CIA-run Phoenix program murdered or abducted close to 36,000 civilians. Speaking of the Phoenix program, Colby said, "The idea of identifying the local apparatus was designed to--well, you go out and get them to surrender, or you capture or you shoot them."

In 1962, when Colby took over as chief of the CIA’s Far East Division and discovered the U.S. didn’t have comprehensive lists of PKI activists, he said not having the lists "could have been criticized as a gap in the intelligence system," and that such lists were useful for "operation planning." Without such lists, he said, "you’re fighting blind."

Despite overwhelming evidence, the CIA denied the allegations in Kadane’s article. CIA spokesman Mark Mansfield said, "There is no substance to the allegation that the CIA was involved in the preparation and/or distribution of a list that was used to track down and kill PKI members. It is simply not true." Marshall Green, who was U.S. ambassador to Indonesia at the time, told the New York Times that the Kadane report was "garbage." But now, the U.S. State Department’s own official history of the 1965-1966 mass killings in Indonesia openly admits that the U.S. not only provided Suharto’s butchers with military leadership, political backing, and U.S. dollars--but the hit lists as well.
The Maoist journal *A World to Win* wrote in 1998 on the coup that brought Suharto to power: "The responsibility for this monstrous crime must be laid squarely at the doorsteps of the Indonesian reactionaries and their U.S. imperialist masters. At the same time it is true that the PKI was extremely vulnerable to such an onslaught, and no effective organized resistance to the massacre was ever built. By the mid-1960s, the core of the PKI leadership had become rotten with years of revisionism. The PKI put forward a wrong view of the state and in practice participated in and glorified Sukarno and the coalition government which decidedly was not under proletarian leadership. The PKI also went down the revisionist path on the process of revolution, seconding the thesis of a 'peaceful road to socialism' advocated by the Soviet revisionists who came to power in 1956." For more on this see "Self-Criticism of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) – 1966" in *AWTW* #24.

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HTTP://WWW.NYBOOKS.COM/ARTICLES/8144

VOLUME 25, NUMBER 9 · JUNE 1, 1978

Email to a friend

Letter

WHAT HAPPENED IN INDONESIA?

By Benedict R. Anderson, Ruth McVey

In response to What Happened in Indonesia? An Exchange (FEBRUARY 9, 1978)

To the Editors:

As the "Cornell scholars" to whose study of the October 1, 1965 coup in Indonesia Francis Galbraith alludes in his attack on Amnesty International's criticism of extensive human rights' violations in that country (see his letter in *The New York Review of Books*, February 9, 1978), we feel that his remarks deserve some comment.

Mr. Galbraith's view of things is simple: the "coup" of 1965, in which six generals were killed, was a bungled communist attempt to seize power. He asserts that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has made "repeated and bloody" attempts to over-throw governments in Indonesia, namely, in 1926, 1948, and 1965—but neglects to mention that the first of these was a rebellion against Dutch colonial rule! The Party's penchant for violence, he suggests, was demonstrated before the coup by the fact that it "stimulated conflict in the villages of East and Central Java by a program of land expropriations carried out by force by PKI followers." The unwary reader should be advised that this "program," carried out in 1964, was an attempt to obtain compliance with statutes on land-reform and share-cropping, dating back five years. Much of the actual violence of 1964 was the result of landlord efforts to extract (illegally) the usual high rents in the face of heightened peasant resistance.
After the coup, Mr. Galbraith writes, "the PKI led a second-stage attempt to dominate Indonesia. They were killing those who opposed them; non-Communists struck back." This is not quite what happened, if we are to trust the CIA history of the coup, which Mr. Galbraith recommends as giving "an excellent account of what happened and why."[1] For despite Mr. Galbraith's high opinion of the CIA's historiographical effort, he seems oddly ignorant of its findings.

In fact, the CIA study is quite specific on the absence of Communist-sponsored violence. Commenting on the activities of PKI chairman Aidit in Central Java immediately after the coup, it notes that he warned subordinates:

at all costs not to allow the PKI to be provoked into violent action...he told the people who assembled to hear him that there must be no demonstration of support for the coup.... A tense and watchful stillness reigned everywhere, but there was no sign of PKI activity anywhere. [Pp.77-79]

In Sumatra, the CIA report states, the communists "never challenged the army in any resort to armed force...which was the story of the PKI surrender to the army all over Indonesia after the coup" (p. 63).

In fact, in contrast to Mr. Galbraith's claims, the CIA study repeatedly, if inadvertently, reveals the implausibilities in the Suharto government's official version of the coup. There is, for one thing, the problem of sources. The Indonesian military authorities have disseminated thousands of pages of "materials" on the coup, few of them reliable and none unprejudiced. The CIA study both uses and adds to this dubious collection. For example, it cites "statements" by top communist leaders Njono and Sakirman as evidence of PKI Politburo meetings which supposedly decided to launch the coup (pp. 225-227). That Njono's "account" flatly contradicts well-established facts about Aidit's movements, and that his "statement" derives from a "confession" so improbable that it had to be replaced within a matter of hours by an "improved" version, goes unmentioned in the report.[2] The study asserts that Sakirman's "statement" was made in court; if so, it must have been made posthumously, since the Indonesian military announced that he was shot "while attempting to escape" shortly after his arrest.

Like the Suharto regime, the CIA study fails to produce a plausible explanation of the motives of the purported coup-makers; indeed its account unconsciously undermines the anticommunist case it imagines it is making. Take the question of why the PKI should have resorted to violence at all.

In the situation of Indonesia's headlong slide towards the left, with Sukarno and the PKI in the lead, the time seemed near at hand when the Communists would take over control of the country—either with the passing of Sukarno from the scene, or possibly before that. Most observers in the West conceded this.... Indonesians seemed resigned to it. Certainly, the PKI had good reason to believe it.

On 12 October 1964 [Aidit] answered a series of questions on the PKI and the Indonesian revolution with the unprecedented claim that "Among the world communist parties the PKI is the one that has the most authority to talk about the
'peaceful transition' toward socialism, because the PKI takes part in both the central and local governments and it has the actual potential to carry out its policies." [Pp. 168-170]

Or did some unexpected factor—like the dire illness of Indonesia's charismatic president, Sukarno, a patron of the PKI—persuade the Communist leaders that they had to plot a coup? The CIA report raises this possibility only to abandon it in view of Sukarno's obvious vigor and the fact that "it is unlikely that the party would have moved on the assumption that Sukarno was dying anyway…" (p. 260).

A second possible reason for the PKI suddenly to turn to violence is that the Party feared a seizure of power by the army leadership, its main political opponent. The middle-ranking officers who actually killed the six generals did, after all, announce that they were "safeguarding" Sukarno from an imminent coup by a CIA-backed Council of Generals. But if an army coup was imminent, why did Aidit—politically close to Sukarno, and in constant touch with him (pp. 234-5)—fail to alert the President to the danger that threatened them both, instead of acting on his own? And if Sukarno did involve himself in the coup (the CIA study speculates that he may have), why would he have done so in a way that used none of the legitimate authority of his office or his immense popular support and was bound to unite army opinion against him?

In spite of these enigmas, the CIA study is definite that in November 1964 the PKI established a clandestine organization to penetrate and subvert the Indonesian armed forces. Named the Special Bureau, it was allegedly headed by a certain Sjam. This Special Bureau was a very deep secret indeed:

Apparently, only a very few people in the Politburo even knew of the existence of the Special Bureau; it is not at all clear whether anyone besides Aidit knew the identity of the man who headed the organization. [Pp. 265-266, and cf. p. 101]

Aidit being dead, the CIA's authority for the existence of this Bureau is Sjam himself—whose name is pronounced, perhaps not inappropriately, Sham. Fortunately, he has proved to be "the most cooperative of witnesses." "Once the Army got Sjam to talk, it seems that he was almost anxious to tell everything he knew about the coup—almost out of a sense of pride, it seems" (pp. 76 and 76a, note). Perhaps his talkativeness derived from ten years' experience as a professional informer for Indonesian military intelligence, reporting on the doings of the PKI and other political parties (p. 107). The CIA takes these facts to show the shocking extent of PKI penetration of the military apparatus—but it is surely not the only way they can be read.

What was the goal of the Special Bureau's subversive manipulations of military officers? Not, it surprisingly turns out, the seizure of state power:

For it now seems clear that the Indonesian coup was not a move to over-throw Sukarno and/or the established government of Indonesia [sic]. Essentially, it was a purge of the Army leadership, which was intended to bring about certain changes in the composition of the cabinet. In this sense, it is more correct to refer to [it] as a
purge, rather than a coup. [N.p.; from the Foreword by John Kerry King, Chief of the DDI Special. Research Staff; and cf.pp.29-30]

This "purge"—the murder of six top generals—was accomplished in the dead of night by the obscure Lt.-Col. Untung and one battalion of troops (p. 64). Oddly drastic means to secure a cabinet reshuffle; oddly few men to ensure immunity from retribution by fellow-officers. The CIA study's comment is no less bewildering:

It bespeaks both the success of the Special Bureau's program of subversion in the Armed Forces that the PKI could even bring off such a thing as the kidnapping of the Army's whole top command, and also the general state of unpreparedness [sic] of the PKI at the time for an all-out challenge from the military. [P. 180]

To compensate for their woeful lack of military strength, one would have expected the coup-makers to exploit Sukarno's name and authority. Yet strangely enough, they did not do so, even in their first triumphant broadcast.

The CIA analyst is puzzled by this:

It is almost inconceivable that anyone staging a coup in Indonesia in 1965 would not have tried to make use of Sukarno's authority to swing public support behind the movement.... The fact that Sukarno was mentioned only as being "under the protection" [of the coup group] created a vague impression that the coup might be anti-Sukarno. [P. 22]

A strange error for Sukarno-protected communists to make. Stranger still, as the CIA study makes clear, the coup-makers did not mobilize the mass support which the Communists could muster:

If the PKI had engineered the coup...why had it failed to mount an all-out propaganda campaign in support of it...the PKI was unique in its ability to mobilize public opinion in Indonesia.... [P. 128]

The one exception to this puzzling passivity was a 200-word editorial in the PKI newspaper on the morning of October 2 which, by endorsing the acts of the coup leaders "provided the army with the documentary justification for the PKI's own obliteration" (p. 67). It is curious that the editorial appearing on October 2, well after the coup collapsed, was so rash, when on the previous day Communist journals were notably cautious. The CIA report assumes that the editors thought the coup was still going well when the newspaper was set on the afternoon of October 1 (p. 68), yet elsewhere it says that by early afternoon it was clear to all that the coup had gone awry. Stranger yet, the newspaper's appearance was not stopped by General Suharto, who by early evening on October 1 had taken control of the capital and placed all media under strict military control. How did the incriminating editorial appear on the newsstands the next morning? The CIA report suggests that it must have been composed beforehand (p. 68). Perhaps it was, but not necessarily by the Party leadership.

If, as some of this evidence suggests, the coup was intended not to enhance, but rather to break the power of the Communists, it is very unlikely that such a maneuver was set in motion by the army leadership, whose bloody deaths it entailed. But the
higher echelons of the Indonesian army were far from united. One of the senior generals who had not been admitted to the cliques around the two top generals—Nasution and Yani—was the man whom the coup actually brought to power, namely General Suharto.

Suharto was commander of KOSTRAD, the crack strategic army reserve, and, after Yani, the most senior general on active service. He maintained only very cool relations with Nasution and Yani. As the CIA study notes, he was not a target of the coup group—"certainly a major error of the coup planners" (pp. 2-3). This is particularly curious since the three top military coup-makers had special reason to know what kind of man Suharto was and why KOSTRAD was so important: Lt.-Col. Untung, Brig.-Gen. Supardjo and Col. Latief had once or were currently serving directly under Suharto. Shortly before the coup, Latief led combined-service exercises to test the capital's defenses—so it is inconceivable that he did not know what were the installations vital for military control of the city.

Yet Suharto was not molested. Indeed, no attempt was made to seize or surround KOSTRAD HQ, where Suharto established his counter-coup command post. And although the coup troops seized civilian communications centers, they made no attempt to control nearby KOSTRAD's highly sophisticated communications, the principal military emergency system—through which Suharto proceeded to gather the reins of power into his own hands. In fact, Suharto's main problem on October 1 was not the coup group but President Sukarno, who rejected Suharto's claim to army leadership and put forward instead the more trusted Pranoto—a long-time rival of Suharto. Eventually though—after encircling the airbase where Sukarno had taken refuge, and delivering a virtual ultimatum to the President—Suharto had his way.

The CIA's interest in all this? Perhaps merely scholarly historiographical concern. Or possibly the Agency had a closer connection to what its analyst concludes "may well prove to be one of the most significant events of the post war [World War II] period. The political repercussions of the coup have not only changed the whole course of Indonesian history but they have had a profound effect on the world political scene, especially that of Southeast Asia" (p. 70). Indeed, for the CIA, it would presumably have been worth no small risk to stop the "headlong slide to the left" of the world's fifth largest nation, particularly at a time when the United States was committing itself to all-out opposition to Communist advances in Vietnam. If so, the Agency has been very modest about its accomplishments. But perhaps that is understandable, for the move involved not only the murder of six generals but, in the anti-Communist pogroms which followed, one of the great slaughters of our time. As the CIA's analyst concludes:

In terms of the numbers killed, the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s. In this regard, the Indonesian coup is certainly one of the most significant events of the twentieth century, far more significant than many other events that have received much more publicity. [P. 71, note]

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Notes

[1] CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, Indonesia—1965: The Coup That Backfired, (1968) oddly enough, the only CIA study of Indonesian politics ever released to the public on the Agency’s own initiative.


Killer File

Mohamed Suharto

(Suharto can also be spelt Soeharto.)

Country: Indonesia.

Kill tally: Up to two million killed following an alleged coup attempt in 1965 (most reports estimate the number at around 500,000). Over 250,000 deaths following the invasion of East Timor in 1975. Thousands more killed in various Indonesian provinces.

Background: The Indonesian archipelago is first exposed to the West in the 16th Century when the Portuguese attempt to monopolise the lucrative spice trade and spread Christianity. The Portuguese are supplanted by the Dutch in the first half of the 17th Century. During the 19th Century the Dutch extend their colonial rule across the archipelago, bringing all the land area of modern Indonesia, with the exception of Portuguese East Timor, under their control.

The country proclaims its independence on 17 August 1945 then fights a war with the Dutch when they attempt to reimpose control. In December 1949 the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) is established with independence activist Sukarno as president. When the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) supposedly attempts a coup d’état in September 1965, the army steps in. Sukarno is deposed. Major-
general Suharto rises to power, establishing a 'New Order' (Orde Baru). More background.

**Mini biography:** Born on 8 June 1921 in the village of Kemusu Argamulja in Central Java, Indonesia. Though his family are simple peasants, Suharto receives a relatively good education.

1940 - After working in a village bank, then as a labourer, Suharto enlists for a three-year term in the Dutch colonial army, the KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger - Royal Netherlands East Indies Army), beginning his service in June.

1941 - Suharto is accepted for training as a sergeant at a military school at Gombong in Central Java. A week after his training begins the Dutch surrender to the invading Japanese.

1942 - Joins the occupation police force then, in 1943, becomes a battalion commander in the Peta (Defenders of the Fatherland), a Japanese-trained militia.

1945 - On 14 August Japan surrenders unconditionally, ending the Second World War.

Suharto officially joins the Indonesian Army on the same day it is founded, 5 October. He fights against the Dutch during the war for independence, is appointed commander of the Third Regiment, and distinguishes himself during an attack on Yogyakarta on 1 March 1949.

Following independence, Suharto remains in the military. He serves on the island of Sulawesi, then returns to Central Java.

1953 - In March Suharto is posted to Solo as commander of Infantry Regiment 15.

1955 - At Indonesia's first democratic election held on 29 September no party wins a majority of seats in the country's single House of Parliament, although Sukarno's Indonesian Nationalist Union (PNI) wins more votes than any other party. The resulting political instability is heightened by the self-serving actions of military officers in some regional areas and by the growth of an Islamic separatist movement.

1957 - In attempt to prevent the new republic from breaking apart Sukarno proclaims martial law on 14 March and turns to the PKI and the armed forces (ABRI) to assist with his plan for the introduction of a 'Guided Democracy'.

At the end of the year, PKI-controlled unions lead a movement to nationalise Dutch-owned companies. The Royal Packetship Company (which controls most of the archipelago's shipping) and Royal Dutch Shell are seized and 46,000 Dutch nationals are expelled from the country. Officers from ABRI are given a role in managing the nationalised firms.
Meanwhile, Suharto is promoted to regional commander in the Diponegoro Division in Central Java, with the rank of full colonel. In this position he begins to engage in business ventures to help fund his command, a practice that is common throughout the Indonesian military.

1958 - Military and Muslim political figures rebel against Sukarno in February, proclaiming the Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic. The rebellion is quashed by the middle of the year. The United States' covert support of the rebels pushes Sukarno closer to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

1959 - The success of Suharto's extra-military business activities attracts the attention of the high command. Suharto is implicated in sugar smuggling and other corrupt practices. He is removed from his command and ordered to take a course at the Army Staff and Command School in Bandung, West Java. However, despite this reprimand, Suharto will be promoted to brigadier-general in January 1960.

In July Sukarno dissolves the House of Representatives and formally introduces 'Guided Democracy'. A new parliament established in March 1960 contains a majority of directly appointed representatives, including blocks from the military (later known as the Golkar party) and from the PKI. The leader of the PKI heads a newly formed House of Assembly.

The influence of the PKI expands in the early 1960s. Membership of the party reaches two million. Affiliated unions and peasant organisations have as many as nine million members. The PKI is directly involved in the implementation of land and social reforms encompassed by the 'Guided Democracy' credo and is active in pursuing an independent foreign policy aligning Indonesia with China. By 1964 fears of a communist takeover of the country become widespread.

1960 - Sukarno breaks diplomatic relations with the Dutch and sets up the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), a special military unit formed to recover West New Guinea, which is still occupied by the Dutch. Suharto commands the unsuccessful 'Operation Mandala' to drive the Dutch out. Full-scale war is averted by a United Nations (UN) and US-brokered settlement that sees the territory handed to Indonesia in May 1963. However, under the 'New York Agreement' the territory will have the right after five years to make an "act of free choice" to determine its future.

1961 - Suharto is posted to Army Headquarters in Jakarta. Following this posting he embarks on his first overseas trip.

1962 - At the start of the year Suharto is promoted to major-general and placed in charge of the Diponegoro Division.

1963 - On 23 September Sukarno begins a confrontation with the newly formed state of Malaysia, across the Strait of Malacca to the north of Sumatra. The low-level conflict draws in Britain, the US and the Soviet Union and lasts
until 1964, the so-called 'Year of Living Dangerously'. Meanwhile Suharto is made commander of Kostrad, which now acts as a special alert force.

**1964** - Golkar (the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups) is established by the military and backed financially and organisationally by the government.

**1965** - Suspicions that the communists will attempt to take over the country are raised when the PKI, with Chinese backing, proposes to establish a "fifth force" of armed peasants and workers. The military divides into factions, with one group supporting Sukarno and the PKI, and the other opposed. Suharto, who is now army chief-of-staff, sides with the opponents.

On 30 September pro-communist military officers (the so-called September 30 Movement) attempt to stage a coup d'état, allegedly to prevent a coup by their opponents in the military. Six anti-Sukarno generals and a lieutenant are kidnapped and killed by the pro-communists. Suharto, who had been informed of the anti-Sukarno coup plot but failed to head it off, leads a counter force that puts down the pro-communists and allows him to take control of the army.

The failure of the coup will result in widespread reprisals against the communists, although the role of the PKI in the coup attempt is unclear.

Suharto's position is formalised on 16 October when Sukarno appoints him as minister for and commander of the army. Suharto subsequently orders the military to "clean up" the PKI.

PKI members and Chinese are targeted by the military, military-backed militias and violent mobs, with up to two million being murdered (most reports estimate the number at around 500,000). The military is purged of pro-Sukarno elements. Sukarno is now politically and militarily isolated, allowing Suharto to rise to ultimate power.

**1966** - On 11 March Sukarno transfers supreme authority to Suharto, who quickly acts to introduce his 'New Order' (Orde Baru). The PKI is banned on 12 March. PKI members are purged from the parliament. Labour organisations are banned and controls on the press are tightened. The confrontation with Malaysia is ended, relations with Western powers are reestablished, and ties with China are suspended. All power is centralised on Suharto, who is the final arbiter of all political decisions.

Overall spending on the military is increased, with some financial assistance coming from the US, and the armed forces are given a central and permanent role in civil governance and economic management, setting the ground for the later development of endemic corruption. Two new intelligence gathering agencies are established to prevent the reemergence of the PKI - the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) and the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (Bakin).

The military detains about 200,000 people allegedly involved in the attempted coup, with the detainees being divided into three categories.
Those in 'Group A' (PKI leaders and associates "directly involved") are sentenced by military courts to death or long terms in prison; 'Group B' detainees (those less actively involved) are sent to prison, in some cases until 1980; those in 'Group C' (mostly rank and file PKI members) are generally released. Executions of detainees continue until as late as 1990.

1967 - On 12 March the House of Assembly strips Sukarno of all political power and installs Suharto as acting president. Sukarno is kept under virtual house arrest until his death on 21 June 1970. During the year Indonesia joins with Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore to form a new regional and officially nonaligned grouping, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indonesia’s diplomatic relations with China are broken and most Chinese-language newspapers are closed.

In August, Suharto places all the divisions of the armed forces under his control. Full political control is also ensured when the Assembly agrees that the government will directly appoint one third of its members. Suharto handpicks judges, the governor of the central bank, the board of directors of each state-owned company and the chairman of the Security and Exchange Commission.


1969 - Suharto honours the 'New York Agreement' and allows West New Guinea vote on the UN-monitored "act of free choice" to determine if it wants to join the Indonesian Republic. The vote is carried but the method of the referendum throws the result into question. Rather than a general plebiscite the vote is restricted to 1025 selected community representatives. After the UN General Assembly ratifies the vote in November West New Guinea becomes the 26th province of Indonesia and is renamed Irian Jaya (Victorious Irian).

The local resistance, the Free Papua Movement (OPM), rejects the referendum result and begins an ongoing low-level insurgency, operating from sanctuaries along the border with neighbouring Papua New Guinea (PNG). The OPM advocates unification with PNG.

The Indonesian military establish a permanent presence in Irian Jaya to control the indigenous population, who become increasingly concerned by the influx of mainly Javanese immigrants brought in under the government’s transmigration program.

1970 - On 22 January student protests are banned following a series of demonstrations against corruption. In July a Suharto-appointed commission finds that corruption is widespread throughout government. The commission is shut down.

1971 - Golkar wins 62.8% of the vote in general elections held in July. It becomes entrenched as the dominant political force in Indonesia, winning 62.1, and
64.3 percent of the popular vote respectively in the general elections of 1977 and 1982. Other parties are marginalised and forced to amalgamate and have their activities restricted.

By 1973 there are only three political parties allowed to operate in Indonesia - Golkar, the United Development Party, and the Indonesian Democratic Party. Suharto directly appoints over 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. All Indonesia's public servants are required to join a Golkar-controlled association and are compelled to vote for Golkar at elections.

1974 - A military coup in Portugal sees the installation of a new Portuguese Government determined to sever the ties with its colonies, including East Timor and the small enclave of Oecusse on the north coast of Timor. The decision divides the East Timorese population.

The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially favours a continued association with Portugal. The Marxist Revolutionary Front for East Timor's Independence (FRETILIN) calls for the immediate participation of East Timorese in the colonial government leading to full independence. When the UDT shifts its position the two groups join in an independence campaign. The Popular Democratic Association of Timor (Apodeti) favours integration with Indonesia and receives backing from the Indonesian Government, which also wants to see the province integrated.

Indonesia's policy on East Timor hardens following a meeting in September between Suharto and Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, who acknowledges that it may be best if the province joins Indonesia, if the East Timorese so wish.

1975 - The rise in the influence of FRETILIN causes concern in Indonesia, which fears that East Timor may become a beachhead for communist subversion. On 28 November FRETILIN proclaims the Democratic Republic of East Timor. The opposition groups call on Indonesia to intervene. Jakarta responds immediately.

On 7 December, Indonesia invades, landing forces at the capital Dili and at Baukau, 100 kilometres to the east, and installing a puppet government composed of members of UDT and Apodeti.

The occupation takes place with the blessing of US President Gerald Ford and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who meet with Suharto in Jakarta on 6 December, the day before the Indonesian troops are mobilised.

"I would like to speak to you, Mr President, about another problem, Timor. ... FRETILIN is infected the same as is the Portuguese Army with communism ... We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action," Suharto tells the visitors.

Ford replies, "We will understand and will not press you on this issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have."
Kissinger says, "You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create problems. ... It depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self-defence or is a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens, happens after we return."

It is estimated that 60,000 East Timorese or 10% of the population are killed in the first two months of the invasion. All told, up to 250,000 of East Timor's 1975 population of about 650,000 will die as a result of the occupation, which will last for 24 years.

1976 - The extent of corruption within Pertamina, the national oil producer, is revealed when the company begins to default on debt repayments. The company's total debt is estimated at more than US$10 billion.

1978 - Widespread student demonstrations against the regime result in a tightening of control over university campuses and the press.

1980s - Political and economic corruption emerges as a major issue. Ties to Suharto are seen as an essential prerequisite to doing business in Indonesia, with those in favour being given lucrative government contracts often at the expense of economic efficiency. Cronies of the regime use their positions for personal enrichment and to enhance their political power. Suharto's six children use their privileged position to launch questionable business ventures.

Nevertheless, the number of Indonesians living in absolute poverty drops from 60% to 14% between 1970 and 1990.

1980 - On 5 May a group called the 'Petition of Fifty', composed of former generals, political leaders, academics, students, and others, calls for greater political freedom. The petition is not reported in the Indonesian media. Restrictions are placed on the signatories to the petition. The government takes no action on the concerns they have raised.

1982 - In September a new press-licensing scheme is introduced that allows the government to close down an entire publishing house for an unfavourable article published in a single newspaper or magazine.

1983 - A cease-fire agreement is signed between the Indonesian Government and FRETILIN on 23 March, however the Indonesian Army resumes its offensive on 31 August.

1984 - The 'Petition of Fifty' accuses Suharto of attempting to establish a one-party state. After riots against the regime break out in September a high level member of the 'Petition of Fifty' and former secretary-general of ASEAN is put on trial for antigovernment activities and sentenced to a 10-year jail term.

1985 - In August hundreds of alleged PKI supporters are removed from government jobs. Many PKI members imprisoned since the coup attempt of 1965 are executed.
1987 - Golkar wins the general elections held in April with an increased majority.

1990 - Resistance to Indonesian rule begins to resurface in the staunchly Islamic province of Aceh, in the westernmost part of Sumatra, spearheaded by the Free Aceh (Aceh Merdeka) separatist movement. The military are unsparing in their efforts to crush the separatists, with the number killed estimated to be about 5,000. The conflict continues throughout the 1990s, as does that in Irian Jaya.

1991 - On 12 November at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, Indonesian troops shoot and kill 271 unarmed Timorese attending the funeral of a young Timorese killed during an earlier demonstration. The so-called 'Dili Massacre' receives worldwide coverage.

The international community responds to the incident by suspending or threatening to suspend aid to Indonesia, prompting Suharto to appoint a national investigation commission to look into the incident.

The commission finds the army guilty of "excessive force". The senior officer in East Timor and his superior in Bali are replaced, three officers are dismissed from the army, and at least eight officers and soldiers are court-martialled. Four junior officers are sentenced to jail terms of between eight and 14 months. However, the punishments are relatively light compared to the harsh sentences meted out to the Timorese accused of instigating the incident.

1992 - At the general elections held in June Golkar is again returned with a massive majority.

1993 - In March the US begins to support critics of Indonesia's rule in East Timor. The UN Human Rights Commission adopts a resolution expressing "deep concern" at human rights violations by Indonesia in East Timor. In May the administration of US President Bill Clinton places Indonesia on a human rights "watch" list. When Suharto meets Clinton in Tokyo in July, concerns are raised about the East Timor human rights issue.

1994 - Talks between senior Indonesian Government figures and some Timorese resistance leaders are reported to take place in September. Talks between Indonesia and Portugal about East Timor also resume. Riots break out in the territory in November.

Towards the middle of the year Suharto indicates that he may not stand for a seventh term as president at the elections scheduled for 1998.

1996 - Rioting breaks out in Jakarta on 27 July after security forces seize the headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party, occupied since June by supporters of former party head Megawati Sukarnoputri, Sukarno's daughter, following her ousting in a government-engineered takeover of the party.

1997 - In February Suharto visits Burma to finalise a deal on the construction of toll roads by a company run by his eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana.
('Tutut'). Most of the cars imported into Burma are manufactured by a company controlled by Suharto, whose second and youngest sons are also involved in business ventures in the country.

Golkar wins general elections held on 29 May, increasing its majority. The election takes place in an atmosphere of violence. Over 250 are estimated to have died in clashes before the poll, including at least 17 in East Timor, where the military clamp down on protesters following the vote.

According to the US State Department, "Parliamentary elections are tightly controlled by the Government of Indonesia. The electoral system severely limits political competition; Indonesian citizens do not have the ability to change their government through democratic means."

Towards the end of the year a financial and economic crisis in Asia sends shockwaves through Indonesia. Conditions attached to a multi-billion International Monetary Fund aid package see prices rise, causing widespread social discontent. The floating of the currency sees the value of the rupiah plummet. Inflation and unemployment soar and the flight of capital accelerates.

Meanwhile, a World Bank report estimates that at least 20-30% of Indonesian's development budget over two decades has been embezzled for personal and political benefit.

In September Burmese dictator Ne Win travels to Indonesia for talks with Suharto, who complains that the level of corruption in Burma is affecting his investments.

1998 - Riots break out across the Indonesian archipelago in February. In March, Suharto stands for and wins a seventh term as president, despite earlier indications that he would step down. Students take to the streets in massive and sustained demonstrations calling on Suharto to resign and demanding political change.

At the same time fresh riots shake Jakarta, with looters targeting Chinese businesses. The riots are quelled by the military but the largely peaceful student demonstrations are allowed to proceed. With the pressure mounting, Suharto finally relents, announcing his resignation on 21 May. He is replaced by his deputy, Jusuf Habibie.

1999 - In May, Time Asia reports that the Suharto family fortune is worth an estimated US$15 billion in cash, shares, corporate assets, real estate, jewellery and fine art. US$9 billion of this is reported to have been deposited in an Austrian bank. The family is said to control about 3.6 million hectares of real estate in Indonesia, including 100,000 square metres of prime office space in Jakarta and nearly 40% of the land in East Timor. Over US$73 billion is said to have passed through the family’s hands during Suharto's 32-year rule.
2000 - Suharto comes under investigation for the corruption that occurred during his presidency. On 29 May he is placed under house arrest. In July it is announced that he will be charged under a 1971 anticorruption law. He is accused of embezzling US$571 million of government donations to one of a number of foundations under his control and then using the money to finance family investments. The trial is set to begin on 31 August but the case collapses on 28 September when a panel of court-appointed doctors find him permanently physically and mentally unfit to stand trial.

2002 - On 4 June it is reported that Indonesian state prosecutors will check on Suharto's health with a view to possibly reopening the corruption case against him. Suharto had been spotted walking unaided and talking animatedly at a wedding in Jakarta.

A team of physicians examines Suharto on 18 June. They say they need to run more tests. On 12 August the doctors announce that Suharto is suffering from a non-specified "brain disease" that leaves him barely able to speak. A state prosecutor says it is now unlikely that Suharto will ever go to trial.

Meanwhile, on 26 July Suharto's youngest son, Hutomo 'Tommy' Mandala Putra, is found guilty and jailed for 15 years for organising the murder of the judge who in September 2000 sentenced him to 18 months for his role in a land scam. He is the first member of the Suharto family to be found guilty and jailed for any offence.

The young Suharto maintains his innocence but says he will not appeal the verdict or the sentence. He is incarcerated in Cipinang Penitentiary in a well-appointed three-room cell and is granted protection by his own bodyguards and the services of a personal secretary.

His wife, family and friends are allowed to come and go as they please and he makes frequent trips to Jakarta for health checks. It is also reported that he continues to conduct his business affairs while behind bars.

2003 - In January the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights announces that it will conduct a wide-ranging inquiry into violations committed during Suharto's reign. Beginning with an investigation into the massacre of communists that followed the alleged coup attempt in 1965, the 15-strong team will determine whether human rights violations took place; whether state policies provided a basis for rights violations; and whether Suharto was directly involved. The investigation is expected to take five months and could result in prosecutions.

2004 – In January the prospect that Suharto will face prosecution is reignited when Indonesia's attorney-general orders that new medical tests be conducted to determine whether the former dictator is healthy enough to stand trial for corruption.

The development is reported to be a reaction to public concerns following the naming of Suharto's eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana ('Tutut'),
as a candidate for upcoming presidential elections, and to perceptions that Suharto is currently in good health.

On 10 February the attorney-general's office confirms that Suharto will made to undergo further examinations by a special medical team. "Recently, he (Suharto) met (former Malaysian leader) Mahathir and people received an impression that he was healthy," says spokesman Kemas Yahya. "We don't know whether he is physically fir or not. That's why he must be examined."

Suharto's lawyer says that while his client is in good health physically "his disease becomes apparent when he is asked to speak, especially when he is asked to remember something."

Meanwhile, on 25 March the international anticorruption organisation Transparency International (TI) places Suharto at the top of a list of the world's most corrupt political leaders of the past two decades.

According to TI, Suharto is alleged to have embezzled between US$15 billion and US$35 billion from Indonesia.

2005 - Suharto is admitted to the Pertamina Central Hospital in Jakarta on 5 May with "massive digestive bleeding" caused by diverticulosis. On 11 May he is allowed to return to his home, although he still requires intensive medical treatment.

Meanwhile, Tommy Suharto's sentence for the murder of a judge is reduced by the Indonesian Supreme Court from 15 to 10 years. With remissions, it is possible that Tommy Suharto could be released from jail within 12 months.

Comment: There is no doubt that the nascent Republic of Indonesia required strong and stable leadership to set it on a path of progress and development. And there is no doubt that this was always going to be difficult.

The country was catapulted from what was basically a feudal society to a democratic state in a matter of years. There was no tradition of multiparty, participatory government and no great familiarity or understanding of democratic institutions. There was however a legacy of brutal colonialism and a tradition of political corruption overlying a pervasive and ongoing cultural fatalism.

Someone like Suharto was necessary to ensure social cohesion in Indonesia, but that does not excuse his excesses - the mass killings, the breathtaking corruption, the refusal to step aside until his position became untenable, the suffocating paternalism that brought a nation to its knees.

Suharto is an embodiment of all that is worst in Asian despots of the 20th Century. He combines the bloodthirstiness of Cambodia's Pol Pot and the greed of the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos.

More information
Indonesia - A Country Study (Library of Congress Country Studies Series)
Sejarah Indonesia: Indonesian Time-Line
Prof. Henk Schulte Nordholt maintains that in Indonesia's history, the intensity of violence increases during the transition of power, the reinforcement of power, and also amid economic woes. This is exactly what happened throughout the period of the New Order.

The root of violence can be traced to the colonial era. While history textbooks in Indonesia describe the early 20th century as the period of implementation of the Dutch ethical policy in this archipelago, at the same time successive military expeditions were in fact dispatched to Aceh, Lombok, Central and South Sumatra, Borneo, Aceh, Central and South Sulawesi, Seram, Flores, Timor, Bali and again Aceh. Some 75,000 people or 15 percent of the Acehnese population were killed by Dutch colonial troops.

Following Indonesia's independence, various rebellions broke out in the country with a high death toll, though they were eventually stamped out. This was not the case with the Sept. 30, 1965 movement (G30S) coup attempt, which set off the longest conflict after independence. That year seems unending. Despite the passage of 40 years, the impact of this incident lingers, leaving deep and lasting repercussions up to the present.

Communists and Communism became the enemy constantly recycled by the New Order or especially the New Order military. This country turned into the most anti-Communist nation that probably ever existed. The Nazis exterminated millions of Jewish people in gas chambers at one juncture in history. But in Indonesia the torture inflicted on Communists or those accused of being ones lasted for decades, making them suffer physical pain followed by mental torment.

I share the view of Australian historian Robert Cribb that we could not have guaranteed the absence of brutality if the Communists had risen to power. But I wish to point out that the slaughter of 500,000 people in 1965 was the gravest tragedy of humanity in Indonesia's history.

The 1965 incident also served as a watershed, marking major changes in economic, political and cultural areas. The free-and-active, non-aligned foreign policy became pro-American and pro-western. The self-supporting economy shifted to a market economy relying on capital and external loans. The entire cultural potential was mustered to ensure successful development, with no more polemics or criticism. Unlike the changes occurring in other periods, in 1965 they were so simultaneous that their reverberations were more alarming.
Below is the process and modes of institutionalization of state violence during the New Order era.

The institute formed after the outbreak of G30S had unlimited power. Kopkamtib (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) seized and interrogated people considered dangerous to the government. It also instructed the attorney general to banish B-category political detainees to Buru Island (1969-1979).

These detainees' involvement in G30S was suspected but there was not sufficient evidence to bring them to court. Kopkamtib decided whether somebody was "environmentally clean" (with no family members directly or indirectly implicated in G30S) through special screening in the selection of civil servants and armed forces candidates, or periodical screening in the framework of rank/office promotion of servicemen and civil servants.

Under Admiral Sudomo, the agency prohibiting the public from undertaking any activity or publishing anything seen by the government as a potential source of conflict relating to the key areas of ethnicity, religion, race and societal relations, a concept known as SARA. At the end of the New Order, this body changed into the Coordinating Agency to Support the Strengthening of National Stability (Bakorstranas), which was dissolved by then president Abdurrahman Wahid.

The 1965 incident also led to a diplomatic freeze with the People's Republic of China. Everything suggestive of China was suspect and banned. Parcels of magazines with Chinese characters were examined by immigration personnel; religious and socio-cultural activities were considerable restricted if not prohibited. In the various social disturbances arising under the New Order regime, the Chinese often became a target of mass fury.

The policy of giving Indonesian names to or renaming citizens of Chinese descent is worth noting. It was a form of oppression that considerably affected individuals in a community. A name has its meaning and members of society treat each other also according to their names as they indicate the status and position of families.

In 1959 the law of land reform was enforced, which as a whole was not so radical. But it also contained provisions on production sharing between farm workers and owners, which was very favorable to laborers and could overturn the rural social order. While earlier land owners got 60 percent and laborers 40 percent of harvests, the law ruled otherwise.

Starting from 1962/63, the Indonesian Farmers Union and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) launched "unilateral actions" against village evils, including landlords, rural authorities and loan sharks. Protests, land takeovers and village-head overthrows prevailed. Insurgencies in Java's villages were far more widespread and intense because poor masses were involved. Some of their victims were devout Muslims and clerics. The confused and uncontrolled situation prompted people to arm or protect themselves. The G30S coup attempt took place against this backdrop.

In the New Order era, the government supported by the security apparatus could easily seize people's land for and in the name of development.
The 1965 conflict was purposely maintained by the New Order regime to perpetuate its power. One of the characteristics of the 1965 incident was the utilization of history to maintain conflicts.

The New Order's orchestration of history took different forms, such as: The Indonesian National History (SNI) school textbooks clearly mentioned Sukarno's involvement in the Sept. 30 coup attempt.

Labor Day was annulled and the June 1 Pancasila (state philosophy) anniversary was replaced by the Oct. 1 Pancasila Sanctity Day, which had nothing to do with Pancasila. The killing of six generals was commemorated by ignoring the massacre of 500,000 people that happened thereafter.

Until now, none of Soeharto's successors, including Sukarno's own daughter, Megawati Soekarnoputri, have been able or willing to find the truth behind the Sept. 30 coup attempt. It will remain one of the darkest chapters in the nation's history.

The writer is research professor at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.

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The 9/30 tragedy - Editorial of The Jakarta Post Something horrible happened 40 years ago that changed the course of Indonesia's history, unfortunately for the worse. But while the circumstances surrounding the kidnapping and murder of six Army generals on the night of Sept. 30, 1965, remain shrouded in mystery, the effects of this tragic event are unequivocal: it was a case of one tragedy leading to another, and another, and another.

Whoever was responsible for the kidnappings and killings, and whatever their motives -- both questions remain contentious to this day among historians -- the events of that night, which lasted until the early hours of Oct. 1, unleashed a killing spree that went on for months, with the main targets, though by far not the only targets, being suspected members and supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which was blamed for the murder of the generals.

If that was not enough of a tragedy, the nation saw the young Army general Soeharto seize the presidency the following year, ushering in an era of repression, brutality and corruption that would last for the next three decades.

Soeharto was easily one of the most ruthless rulers of the 20th century, and his human rights record matches those of other dictators of his era: the jailing of tens of thousands of people without trial, the invasion of East Timor and the ensuing brutal rule of the territory, the silencing of politicians, clerics and students who disagreed with his policies, his brutal policies in Aceh and Papua, to name but a few. Last week, more than seven years after his removal from office, the National Commission on Human Rights announced that 14 government critics who went missing during Soeharto's rule had been murdered. Soeharto's legacy goes beyond the atrocities he and his regime committed. The militaristic and often brutal nature of our political culture today, from the intolerance to the use of violence to settle differences, is deeply rooted in Soeharto's New Order, and it will likely require one or two
generations to undo this unfortunate legacy as the nation struggles to transform itself into a democracy.

But the biggest tragedy for the nation is our own denial that 9/30 was a tragedy of horrific proportions. Soeharto used the event to sanctify Pancasila, effectively turning the state ideology into an instrument he could wield to justify his brutal policies.

Officially, at least during the Soeharto years, the event was marked on Oct. 1, thus confining the tragedy solely to the killing of the six generals and, at least according to military historians, to the abortive coup by the PKI. What happened afterward was justified as a necessary evil, even a historical necessity, although the killing spree was not openly recognized.

There was no mention in the military-dictated official history books of the ensuing bloodshed, which according to international human rights organizations left at least half a million people dead. The precise figure will never be known precisely because we as a nation pretend it never happened.

C. L. Sulzberger, writing in The New York Times from Jakarta on April 13, 1966, compared the Indonesian killings with other slaughters of the 20th century, including the Armenian massacres, Stalin's starvation of the Kulaks, Hitler's Jewish genocide, the Muslim-Hindu killings following India's partition and the purges following China's turn to communism. "Indonesia's bloody persecution of its communist rivals these terrible events in both scale and savagery," Sulzberger wrote. Four decades later the nation has not fully come to terms with the reality of these events. We barely know the truth. We only have the truth Soeharto's military wanted us to have. The worst part is that most of us do not seem to want to know what happened. We would rather bury this ugly past and forget it entirely.

But here is the bad news: We can never bury the past. This dark page in our history will continue to haunt us for as long as we fail to get to the truth. As they say, only the truth shall set us free. More than seven years since Soeharto left the political stage, surely the time has come for the nation to rewrite the history of what happened on the night of Sept. 30, 1965. History is always written from the perspective of the victors. Soeharto was the winner of the power struggle in the mid-1960s, thus he had his day. But as his legacy shows, there are no real winners here. The entire nation suffered, and continues to suffer to this day. There are only losers. ch professor at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LThe 9/30 tragedy Something horrible happened 40 years ago that changed the course of Indonesia's history, unfortunately for the worse. But while the circumstances surrounding the kidnapping and murder of six Army generals on the night of Sept. 30, 1965, remain shrouded in mystery, the effects of this tragic event are unequivocal: it was a case of one tragedy leading to another, and another, and another.

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If that was not enough of a tragedy, the nation saw the young Army general Soeharto seize the presidency the following year, ushering in an era of repression, brutality and corruption that would last for the next three decades. Soeharto was easily one of the most ruthless rulers of the 20th century, and his human rights record matches those of other dictators of his era: the jailing of tens of thousands of people without trial, the invasion of East Timor and the ensuing brutal rule of the territory, the silencing of politicians, clerics and students who disagreed with his policies, his brutal policies in Aceh and Papua, to name but a few. Last week, more than seven years after his removal from office, the National Commission on Human Rights announced that 14 government critics who went missing during Soeharto's rule had been murdered.

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Can a religious nation be proud of butchering its own? Harry Bhaskara and Kornelius Purba, The Jakarta Post If ever they have the opportunity to read it, The New York Times' correspondent C.L. Sulzberger's report from Jakarta on April 13, 1966, might help three young girls understand why, on every Sept. 30, their father locks himself away. How well they know the grief that overcomes him as he shuffles to his room to shut himself in on the last day of every September. If they had the chance to read C.L. Sulzberger's report they would probably understand the source of his sorrow. In the report titled When a nation runs amok, Sulzberger said the Sept. 30 massacre was comparable to the world's worst killings, like Hitler's Jewish genocide. The article was written just seven months after the so-called G30S tragedy. "The twentieth century grimly remembers many monstrous slaughters: Turkey's Armenian massacres; Stalin's starvation of the Kulaks; Hitler's Jewish genocide; the Moslem-Hindu killings following India's partition, the enormous purges after China's communization. Indonesia's bloody persecution of its Communist rivals these terrible events in both scale and savagery," Sulzberger wrote from Jakarta. Today, the girls' father will likely repeat his annual ritual. He has never told his daughters that his father was a victim of the Sept. 30 tragedy. Neither are they aware that their father finished his studies at the prestigious Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) under a name that was not his own. The children suffer from a stigma: They are the children of an Indonesian Communist (PKI) member. The children inherited the "sins" of their father.

"For 33 years until 1998 (Soeharto's fall), I and my other siblings had to hide our real identities. I don't want my daughters to suffer from the same 'disease' although the situation is rather different now," said the man who has a small construction company. The daughters do not know much about the massacre as, while they watched the same film every Sept. 30 until 1998, they were too young to understand it. It is hard for them to fathom why their father is reluctant to talk about his childhood in Medan, North Sumatra. Millions of innocent children lost their parents and have never been informed of their whereabouts. The state treated them like pariahs and gave them no protection, though it was their right to receive it. In the scenario that their parents were indeed PKI members and committed crimes, why does the state demand of children that they pay for the sins of their parents? September was the month when it was compulsory, under the New Order government, to view a film depicting the murders of seven generals in 1965.

This was its view of the events that preceded a year-long program that claimed thousands, perhaps, millions of lives. The film -- graphic scenes of the cruelty of the communists in the eyes of the New Order -- has not been screened since Soeharto fell from power in 1998. For more than two decades, millions of Indonesians watched it, without being able to question the historical accuracy of it under a dictatorship. What really happened on Sept. 30, 1965, remains a matter of
controversy. Teachers are at a loss to explain the course of events to their students. History books were withdrawn and revised editions published. Only a few facts, however, are revealed in the revised histories, which has left many dissatisfied. Along with the film's presentation, there was an annual ceremony to remind the people of the murders of the generals and the dangers of communism. It was held at the Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole), presumably the site of these horrendous killings. This ceremony has been sporadically held in recent years. Former presidents Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid skipped it, but not Megawati Soekarnoputri -- although many people hope she will be able to clear her father's name in the alleged coup attempt. Soeharto brainwashed Indonesians so thoroughly that, until now, many Indonesians believe that the PKI and communists are despised by God. Even as communism has lost its popularity in China, many Indonesians still believe that there is nothing worse in this world than communism. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is scheduled to preside over the ceremony at Lubang Buaya on Saturday, the day that has been called Pancasila Sanctity Day. He has promised the ceremony will reflect more willingness to reveal the historical facts. However as his own father-legendary Lt. Gen. (ret) Sarwo Eddie, played a decisive role in the rise of Soeharto to power, it is difficult to imagine he can distance himself from the official version of history.

We proudly call ourselves a religious nation. And apparently, as a nation, we are also proud to have killed hundreds of thousands ifin-law, the millions of people, whom we regarded as the enemies of God.

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Tragedy: Between amnesia and lustration

Mochtar Buchori, Jakarta

We all know what "amnesia" means, but "lustration" is a strange word to many Indonesians. "Amnesia" means "partial or total loss of memory". "Lustration" means "purification". The meaning of the verb form of the word, "lustrate", is "to purify". I came across these two words in an article about the former Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia. In his inaugural address as the first president of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel made an appeal to his people to forgive each other for the mistakes the nation made in the past. He asked his people not to distrust each other, not to hate each other and above all not to seek revenge. He stated that in his opinion every citizen of the country was guilty and responsible for the rise of a Communist government in 1948. He asked his people to concentrate their energy on the problems of the future, and not constantly to accuse each other for the past. This policy was called the "amnesty-and-amnesia" policy. It can be translated as the "forgive-and-forget" policy. This policy proved to be a failure. Under the protection of this policy bureaucrats from the old Communist regime remained in their positions, and they used these positions to obstruct any new policies that might jeopardize their personal interests. The public became restless and a new movement was born under the name of the "lustration movement", aimed at "purifying" the government of the cronies from the old Communist regime. This movement also failed to achieve its goals. The end result was that the Federal Republic of
Lifting the Curtain on the Coup of October 1st 1965 -- Suing for the Justice

Czechoslovakia was split into two independent republics, i.e. the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia.

This story about Czechoslovakia, and the great leader Vaclav Havel, made me think of our own situation in Indonesia. Forty years ago, on Sept. 30, 1965, a national tragedy occurred. It used to be referred to as the "G-30-S affair", G-30-S standing for Gerakan 30 September, literally meaning "the September 30th Movement".

The political power that came out of this tragedy was called the Orde Baru -- meaning the "New Order" -- and it quickly proclaimed that the tragedy was an abortive coup d'état by the now defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In academic circles, however, there is a countertheory that it was a preemptive attempt by political forces rallying behind the PKI to abort an imminent coup by the Council of Generals (Dewan Jendral). Which of these two claims is closer to the truth is thus far unresolved. Historians must still complete their academic task of uncovering the mysteries that surround this affair.

Many changes have happened since this bloody political affair happened. But these changes have still not brought about a society that is close enough to the idea of a "just and prosperous society". In spite of all the economic progress made thus far, we still cannot call our society a prosperous one. There are still too many Indonesians who live below the poverty line. And in spite of all the legal reforms attempted thus far we still cannot call our society a just one. There are still too many injustices inflicted on the common people. This raises the question of whether we have learned enough from the horrible affair of 40 years ago, and from the tumultuous aftermath of this affair. Admittedly, we did learn a number of important things, but we failed to learn one very important lesson; i.e. the lesson about democracy building and about transforming our political culture.

We learned to reject totalitarianism, but we failed to prevent an authoritarian government. We are also not aware that we failed to learn that democracy is not only reserved for the political elite, but that it aims primarily to protect the interests of the common people. We have failed to learn that democracy cannot be built on the basis of force, but that it requires the consent of the people. Consent cannot be obtained by threat or intimidation. The genuine consent that is the basis of a lasting democracy can come only from citizens who are fully aware of their rights and obligations.

Looking at the ways our political system works today, and the level of political literacy obtained by the people, it is really no wonder that we constantly repeat the mistakes of the past. To me, the important question in this regard is whether we will ever have the ability to learn from our past mistakes. Our failure to learn the important lessons of the 1965 tragedy may also be caused by the fact that so far there has been no sincere or honest historical account of the affair. What we have thus far is, to use the expression of Lord Michael Howard of Oxford, "instant judgment" rather than an "historical account". And instant judgment always tell us more about the parties judging than the situation judged. The task of our historians is not easy. For one thing, historians must distinguish between "the significant" and "the transitory", and determine whether an event is purely fortuitous or indicative of a long-term trend.
But no matter how difficult the task of historians may be, they are the only ones who can provide the nation with reliable guidelines regarding how the nation should proceed in the future to find true answers to our present problems. The writer has a doctorate in education from Harvard University.*

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September 30, 2005

*Forty years on, events of 1965 remain a mystery *

Hera Diani, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Noted Muslim cleric Yusuf Hasyim held up a number of large mug-shots -- people whom he said were victims of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) scheme to take over the country four decades ago.

Yusuf, who was a young Muslim leader at the time, revealed the details of the assassinations during a book launch on Thursday. He argued that the PKI indeed masterminded two abortive coup attempts in 1948 and the Sept. 30, 1965, and was responsible for the killing of its opposition.

"There are two versions of the history. But by overlooking the involvement of PKI in the coup, we tend to whitewash a black part of our history," said the Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) cleric and an uncle of former

Known by Indonesian acronym as G-30S/PKI, the 1965 incident revolved around the killing of six Army generals. Another general was injured, while his daughter was shot and killed by the attackers.

With only a few key eyewitnesses of the incident left alive today, the 1965 coup attempt, which led to the widespread massacre of communists and the establishment of New Order authoritarian regime, has remained one of the most controversial events in the country's history.

Historians are still debating the role of PKI in the event, with some saying the party was only a scapegoat. Other versions say Gen. Soeharto, who assumed power following the incident, conflicting factions in the Army, or the CIA were the culprits of the murders.

During 32-year of Soeharto’s rule, thousands of people linked to the party were jailed without trial, while their families and offspring were robbed of their civil, economic and political rights. Several historians have written revisionist histories, saying that old government line blaming the PKI was heavily biased. Meanwhile, the latest school history textbooks have left out completely the coup attempt and the 1965 bloodbath. These textbooks were later were pulled by the Ministry of National Education after numerous complaints from the public.

Earlier this month, the Central Jakarta District Court overturned a class action from a number of former PKI political prisoners who demanded the government apologize and restore their rights. The judge’s unusual decision left the case to the
administrative court, although that court could not hear the prisoner's suit because their arrests occurred outside of its time frame, a lawyer for the former prisoners said.

Historian Aminuddin Kasdi from Yogyakarta's Gadjah Mada University said while he was not against the rehabilitation of former political prisoners, it didn't mean that the PKI was not culpable in the coup.

"Rehabilitation does not necessary means they (PKI members) are innocent. Facts and witnesses show that PKI was indeed the mastermind of the abortive coup. We cannot deny that," he said during the launch of his book titled G30S PKI/1965, Bedah Caesar Dewan Revolusi Indonesia (the Caesarean Section of the Indonesian Revolutionary Council).

In an interesting turn of events, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono plans to preside over a commemoration of the military crackdown on people behind the coup on Oct. 1. Such a ritual has been absent since Soeharto stepped down in 1998.

Historian Anhar Gonggong told The Jakarta Post recently that controversy over certain historical facts was inevitable, as happened with the holocaust in Europe or regarding Japanese abuses during World War II.

The education ministry, he said, needed to take a firm stance as to which version or which facts it would choose, to avoid confusion. "It's up to people to criticize," he said, adding that history (lessons) were aimed at imparting knowledge.

Meanwhile, noted cleric and human rights activist Solahuddin Wahid said that if historians could bridge the differences, they should agree to disagree.

"It seems that our historians are unable to shed the mystery of the 1965 event. Then give people both versions, as long as it is backed by strong evidence (each way). Let people decide which (story) is true."

JKT POST 5 OCT 05

*Democracy takes root in largest Muslim country,*

M. Taufiqurrhaman

In a period of less than eight months, Indonesia held this year an unprecedented three direct elections -- proving the skeptics wrong in their peaceful process and conclusion -- and heralding a new era in its political evolution.

First was the nationwide legislative election on April 5, which 24 political parties contested for a combined total of over 17,000 seats at the House of Representatives, the Regional Representatives Council and local legislative councils.

Three months later on July 5, voters cast their ballots once again to choose their leader from among five candidates in the first direct presidential election -- complete with campaigns of a distinctly Indonesian flair, featuring dangdut artists and colorful party T-shirts, and another first, televised debates, or "dialogs".
With no candidate garnering a clear majority, the stage was set for an election runoff on Sept. 20 between then incumbent Megawati Soekarnoputri and her key rival, former security chief Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Might up to the moment the General Elections Commission (KPU) announced the country’s sixth president and vice president, Susilo and Jusuf Kalla, not a single case of violence was reported within the eight months of the official election period.

However, in the lead-up to the election year, supporters of the Golkar Party and Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) clashed following a district Golkar meeting in northern Bali, killing x and injuring dozens.

Nevertheless, the peaceful and democratic elections was a noteworthy feat that was lauded internationally, not the least because the country and its people had only just rid themselves of a dictatorial regime through the reformasi movement less than six years earlier.

Under Soeharto's iron-fisted rule, the "electorate" was herded once every five years to the polling booths under the guise of a general election to endorse the autocrat's continued reign.

Following the demise of the dictatorship, all hell broke loose, most visibly as communal and religious conflicts in several regions. In Maluku and Poso, Central Sulawesi, Muslims and Christians clashed bloodily, while in West and Central Kalimantan, native Dayak and migrant Madurese lynched one another.

The transitions during and after the first democratic presidential? legislative? election in 1999 were also painful. Rioting erupted following Megawati’s defeat in her bid for the presidential seat, which was put to the vote in the People's Consultative Assembly, and PDI-P supporters took the streets and went on a rampage.

A similar incident occurred when former president Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid was impeached by the Assembly the same year, with his supporters cutting down trees and ransacking the offices of a political party thought to be responsible for their patron’s ouster.

All the turmoil raised concerns that in Indonesia, where Islam is the predominant faith, that the religion's values were simply incompatible with democracy. Firebrand Muslim groups often reject democracy outright, as they view it as a Western concept.

At the outset, a peaceful election year seemed improbable amid heightened tension and sporadic violence in several regions, as well as the undercurrent of possible terror since the Bali bombings of 2001.

However, voters were enthusiastic and went to the polls in an orderly, sometimes festive, manner, voting for their preferred candidates independent of any directives or advice from political machinery.

Among the indicators of this was the voter turnout: 82 percent for the legislative election; 78 percent for the first-round presidential election; and 76 percent for the runoff.
The result of the election also showed that voter preferences were largely moderate, as the bulk of them voted for nationalism-oriented parties and the Justice Prosperous Party (PKS) -- considered the standard bearer of Islamic values -- because of their anticorruption stance.

Analysts have said credit should go to Megawati for drawing up and conducting a peaceful and fair elections. However, these analysts have not pointed out Megawati's direct contribution to the successful election, apart from being the incumbent at the time.

In fact, Megawati was busy, focusing on her campaign and traveling extensively throughout the country to woo voters, sometimes during official visits.

As for the parties, nothing much could be expected from them in terms of keeping the peace among the electorate, as they had a tendency to exploit voters' differences of opinion to bolster their own chances.

The media, on the other hand, which should have played an indispensable role in educating voters, instead showed a degree of partiality. A report from the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM), for example, revealed that a number of prominent media were biased in their reporting on presidential candidates.

Thus, voters were left to their own devices to make an independent and informed choice, and in the end, surprised the elite with their political maturity.

Megawati lost her reelection bid with under 40 percent of votes against more than 60 percent for Susilo, as voters judged that her administration had delivered nothing significant in its three years in power as a transitional government from the reform era toward democratization.

In short, voters had punished her for this gross shortcoming. "This election demonstrates a very strong popular rejection of selfish political elites within the political parties," political observer of the now-defunct Far Eastern Economic Review Michael Vatikiotis said.

Vatikiotis, who traveled extensively through Java's rural regions ahead of the runoff, said he found voters at the grassroots level tolerant and respectful of each other's choices.

A member of the General Elections Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu), perhaps summed up the election year best: The people proved their maturity, showing the country and the world that the nation was ready for democracy.

The peaceful elections has thus shown that at least in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, Islam and democracy are a natural fit and can coexist in harmony.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
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A Statement by the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) Rehabilitation and redress for massacre victims essential for true commemoration

Forty years have passed since the occurrence of one of the largest and least known crimes against humanity of the twentieth century: the 1965-66 massacre of some half a million to a million unarmed civilians in Indonesia, who were alleged to be communists. In addition to those killed, hundreds of thousands more were tortured and imprisoned, including political opponents of the ruling regime. The families of those killed or imprisoned were also victimized through a programme of institutional ostracism that denied them the opportunity to engage in normal economic and social life.

To this day, September 30 is officially commemorated in Indonesia by mourning the six generals killed during the purported leftist coup attempt that General Suharto used as the means to seize state power in 1965. By contrast, nothing is officially said of the millions murdered afterwards. In fact, the survivors and family members of those targeted during the massacre continue to be discriminated against in every aspect of their lives. They have been imprisoned, dismissed from their jobs, denied access to education and faced social ostracism by having ex-tapol (ex-political prisoner) put on their identification documents. This is the case seven years after the downfall of Suharto and his New Order regime, who were responsible for the atrocity.

Indonesia is at present being governed by its first elected president. There can be no legitimacy to a government that ignores the massacre of a million of its citizens. Elected representatives have a responsibility to the people; by ignoring evidence painstakingly compiled by victims' families and concerned groups, eyewitness reports and the uncovering of mass graves, the Indonesian government is blatantly shirking this responsibility. By continuing the institutional ostracism of the survivors through legal and social regulations that prevent them from enjoying their fundamental human rights, the present government is perpetuating the atrocities committed by its predecessors, rather than upholding its reported commitment to human rights and democracy.

This year, a week of activities was initiated by numerous groups to commemorate the massacre and inform the public of a truth that is still not officially being told. The activities included public discussions, the viewing of documentary films, launching of books of victim testimony and a demonstration to the president's residence, demanding that the victims be compensated and rehabilitated with dignity and honor. The focus of these activities continues to remain the same: the truth be told, enabling the victims to shed the stigma they have lived with for four decades.

This truth must begin with the revision of school textbook contents. Indonesian students are learning the same lessons of history as they did under the New Order. They learn that the country was threatened by communism and saved by quick army intervention. They learn a mythological account of the events surrounding September
30. They learn nothing of the millions murdered in the bloodbath that followed. Although these textbooks were earlier exchanged for ones that made no mention of the coup attempt and subsequent atrocities, they are in use again after the new ones were removed from school curriculums by the Ministry of National Education due to public complaints.

Like the education system, the country's legal system is also discriminatory in nature, leaving it unable to serve justice to the victims of the massacre. A class action lawsuit by a group of individuals imprisoned after 1965-66 was recently heard in court against the current and former presidents of Indonesia. The victims, demanding the restoration of their honor and compensation for the discrimination they experience to date, were harassed and threatened when they appeared in court. The judge decided the case purely on jurisdictional issues, not on merits; the court can apparently only hear cases that are filed within a certain period of time after the

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission bill, passed by the government in September 2004, is yet another act of injustice delivered to the victims. The bill omits any definition of who is a perpetrator and further forces the victims to forgive their perpetrators if they want compensation; according to the bill's provisions, only when the perpetrators are given amnesty by the government can the victims be given compensation, and amnesty is given after the victims grant forgiveness. While the Commission is at present in the process of being established, it has understandably little support from victims and other concerned groups. Without provisions for genuine justice—which would include legal remedies for the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators as well as compensation for the victims—the Commission is a tool to whitewash the massacre, rather than an attempt at reconciliation.

Genuine national reconciliation is possible only when the truth is told. To this end, the AHRC urges that school textbooks be immediately rewritten with accurate accounts of the events of 1965-66 and that legal mechanisms be established for the purpose of giving redress to the victims, as well as to monitor and investigate the existing forms of discrimination suffered by the survivors and family members. To aid these mechanisms, it is necessary to enact the witness and victim protection bill that is currently pending in parliament. All concerned groups and individuals should urgently take these issues up with the relevant government agencies.

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About AHRC The Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and lobbying human rights issues in Asia. The Hong Kong-based group was founded in 1984.

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The Mass Killings in Indonesia After 40 Years

by John Roosa and Joseph Nevins *

One of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century." That was how a CIA publication described the killings that began forty years ago this month in Indonesia. It was one of the few statements in the text that was correct. The 300-page text was devoted to blaming the victims of the killings -- the supporters of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) -- for their own deaths. The PKI had supposedly attempted a coup d'état and a nationwide uprising called the September 30th Movement (which, for some unknown reason, began on October 1). The mass murder of hundreds of thousands of the party's supporters over subsequent months was thus a natural, inevitable, and justifiable reaction on the part of those non-communists who felt threatened by the party's violent bid for state power. The killings were part of the "backfire" referred to in the title: Indonesia -- 1965: The Coup that Backfired. The author of this 1968 report, later revealed to be Helen Louise Hunter, acknowledged the massive scale of the killings only to dismiss the necessity for any detailed consideration of them. She concentrated on proving that the PKI was responsible for the September 30th Movement while consigning the major issue, the anti-PKI atrocities, to a brief, offhanded comment. [1]

Hunter's CIA report accurately expressed the narrative told by the Indonesian army commanders as they organized the slaughter. That narrative rendered the September 30th Movement -- a disorganized, small-scale affair that lasted about 48 hours and resulted in a grand total of 12 deaths, among them six army generals -- into the greatest evil ever to befall Indonesia. [2] The commander of the army, Major General Suharto, justified his acquisition of emergency powers in late 1965 and early 1966 by insisting that the September 30th Movement was a devious conspiracy by the PKI to seize state power and murder all of its enemies. Suharto's martial law regime detained some 1.5 million people as political prisoners (for varying lengths of time), and accused them of being "directly or indirectly involved in the September 30th Movement." The hundreds of thousands of people shot, stabbed, bludgeoned, or starved to death were labelled perpetrators, or would-be perpetrators of atrocities, just as culpable for the murder of the army generals as the handful of people who were truly guilty.
The September 30th Movement was Suharto's Reichstag fire: a pretext for destroying the communist party and seizing state power. As with the February 1933 fire in the German parliament that Hitler used to create a hysterical, crisis-filled atmosphere, the September 30th Movement was exaggerated by Suharto's clique of officers until it assumed the proportions of a wild, vicious, supernatural monster. The army whipped up an anti-communist propaganda campaign from the early days of October 1965: "the PKI" had castrated and tortured the seven army officers it had abducted in Jakarta, danced naked and slit the bodies of the army officers with a hundred razor blades, drawn up hit lists, dug thousands of ditches around the country to hold countless corpses, stockpiled guns imported from China, and so on. The army banned many newspapers and put the rest under army censorship. It was precisely this work of the army's psychological warfare specialists that created the conditions in which the mass murder of "the PKI" seemed justified.

The question as to whether or not the PKI actually organized the September 30th Movement is important only because the Suharto regime made it important. Otherwise, it is irrelevant. Even if the PKI had nothing whatsoever to do with the movement, the army generals would have blamed the party for it. As it was, they made their case against the PKI largely on the basis of the transcripts of the interrogations of those movement participants who hadn't already been summarily executed. Given that the army used torture as standard operating procedure for interrogations, the statements of the suspects cannot be trusted. Hunter's CIA report, primarily based on those transcripts, is as reliable as an Inquisition text on witchcraft.

The PKI as a whole was clearly not responsible for the September 30th Movement. The party's three million members did not participate in it. If they had, it would not have been such a small-scale affair. The party chairman, D.N. Aidit, however, does seem to have played a key role. He was summarily and secretly executed in late 1965, as were two of the three other core Politburo leaders (Lukman and Njoto), before they could provide their accounts. The one among them who survived the initial terror, the general secretary of the party, Sudisman, admitted in the military's kangaroo court in 1967 that the PKI as an institution knew nothing of the September 30th Movement but that certain leaders were involved in a personal capacity. If the movement's leaders had been treated as the leaders of previous revolts against the postcolonial government, they would have been arrested, put on trial, and sentenced. All the members of their organizations would not have been imprisoned or massacred.

With so little public discussion and so little scholarly research about the 1965-66 mass killings, they remain poorly understood. Many people outside of Indonesia believe that the victims were primarily Indonesian Chinese. While some Indonesian Chinese were among the victims, they were by no means the majority. The violence targeted members of the PKI and the various organizations either allied to the party or sympathetic to it, whatever ethnicity they happened to be: Javanese, Balinese, Sundanese, etc. It was not a case of ethnic cleansing. Many people imagine that the killings were committed by frenzied mobs rampaging through villages and urban neighborhoods. But recent oral history research suggests that most of the killings were executions of detainees. [3] Much more research is needed before one can arrive at definitive conclusions.
President Sukarno, the target of the PKI's alleged coup attempt, compared the army's murderous violence against those labeled PKI to a case of someone "burning down the house to kill a rat." He routinely protested the army's exaggerations of the September 30th Movement. It was, he said, nothing more than "a ripple in the wide ocean." His inability or unwillingness to muster anything more than rhetorical protests, however, ultimately doomed his rule. In March 1966, Suharto grabbed the authority to dismiss, appoint, and arrest cabinet ministers, even while maintaining Sukarno as figurehead president until March 1967. The great orator who had led the nationalist struggle against the Dutch, the cosmopolitan visionary of the Non-Aligned Movement, was outmaneuvered by a taciturn, uneducated, thuggish, corrupt army general from a Javanese village.

Suharto, a relative nobody in Indonesian politics, moved against the PKI and Sukarno with the full support of the U.S. government. Marshall Green, American ambassador to Indonesia at the time, wrote that the embassy had "made clear" to the army that Washington was "generally sympathetic with and admiring" of its actions. [4] U.S. officials went so far as to express concern in the days following the September 30th Movement that the army might not do enough to annihilate the PKI. [5] The U.S. embassy supplied radio equipment, walkie-talkies, and small arms to Suharto so that his troops could conduct the nationwide assault on civilians. [6] A diligent embassy official with a penchant for data collection did his part by handing the army a list of thousands of names of PKI members. [7] Such moral and material support was much appreciated in the Indonesian army. As an aide to the army's chief of staff informed U.S. embassy officials in October 1965, "This was just what was needed by way of assurances that we weren't going to be hit from all angles as we moved to straighten things out here." [8]

This collaboration between the U.S. and the top army brass in 1965 was rooted in Washington's longstanding wish to have privileged and enhanced access to Southeast Asia's resource wealth. Many in Washington saw Indonesia as the region's centerpiece. Richard Nixon characterized the country as "containing the region's richest hoard of natural resources" and "by far the greatest prize in the South East Asian area." [9] Two years earlier, in a 1965 speech in Asia, Nixon had argued in favor of bombing North Vietnam to protect Indonesia's "immense mineral potential." [10] But obstacles to the realization of Washington's geopolitical-economic vision arose when the Sukarno government emerged upon independence in Indonesia. Sukarno's domestic and foreign policy was nationalist, nonaligned, and explicitly anti-imperialist. Moreover, his government had a working relationship with the powerful PKI, which Washington feared would eventually win national elections.

Eisenhower's administration attempted to break up Indonesia and sabotage Sukarno's presidency by supporting secessionist revolts in 1958. [11] When that criminal escapade of the Dulles brothers failed, the strategists in Washington reversed course and began backing the army officers of the central government. The new strategy was to cultivate anti-communist officers who could gradually build up the army as a shadow government capable of replacing President Sukarno and eliminating the PKI at some future date. The top army generals in Jakarta bided their time and waited for the opportune moment for what U.S. strategists called a final "showdown" with the PKI. [12] That moment came on October 1, 1965.
The destruction of the PKI and Sukarno's ouster resulted in a dramatic shift in the regional power equation, leading Time magazine to hail Suharto's bloody takeover as "The West's best news for years in Asia." [13] Several years later, the U.S. Navy League's publication gushed over Indonesia's new role in Southeast Asia as "that strategic area's unaggressive, but stern, monitor," while characterizing the country as "one of Asia's most highly developed nations and endowed by chance with what is probably the most strategically authoritative geographic location on earth." [14] Among other things, the euphoria reflected just how lucrative the changing of the guard in Indonesia would prove to be for Western business interests.

Suharto's clique of army officers took power with a long-term economic strategy in mind. They expected the legitimacy of their new regime would derive from economic growth and that growth would derive from bringing in Western investment, exporting natural resources to Western markets, and begging for Western aid. Suharto's vision for the army was not in terms of defending the nation against foreign aggression but defending foreign capital against Indonesians. He personally intervened in a meeting of cabinet ministers in December 1965 that was discussing the nationalization of the oil companies Caltex and Stanvac. Soon after the meeting began, he suddenly arrived by helicopter, entered the chamber, and declared, as the gleeful U.S. embassy account has it, that the military "would not stand for precipitous moves against oil companies." Faced with such a threat, the cabinet indefinitely postponed the discussion. [15] At the same time, Suharto's army was jailing and killing union leaders at the facilities of U.S. oil companies and rubber plantations. [16]

Once Suharto decisively sidelined Sukarno in March 1966, the floodgates of foreign aid opened up. The U.S. shipped large quantities of rice and cloth for the explicit political purpose of shoring up his regime. Falling prices were meant to convince Indonesians that Suharto's rule was an improvement over Sukarno's. The regime's ability over the following years to sustain economic growth via integration with Western capital provided whatever legitimacy it had. Once that pattern of growth ended with the capital flight of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the regime's legitimacy quickly vanished. Middle class university students, the fruits of economic growth, played a particularly important role in forcing Suharto from office. The Suharto regime lived by foreign capital and died by foreign capital.

By now it is clear that the much ballyhooed economic growth of the Suharto years was severely detrimental to the national interest. The country has little to show for all the natural resources sold on the world market. Payments on the foreign and domestic debt, part of it being the odious debt from the Suharto years, swallow up much of the government's budget. With health care spending at a minimum, epidemic and preventable diseases are rampant. There is little domestic industrial production. The forests from which military officers and Suharto cronies continue to make fortunes are being cut down and burned up at an alarming rate. The country imports huge quantities of staple commodities that could be easily produced on a larger scale in Indonesia, such as sugar, rice, and soybeans. The main products of the villages now are migrant laborers, or "the heroes of foreign exchange," to quote from a lighted sign at the Jakarta airport.
Apart from the pillaging of Indonesia's resource base, the Suharto regime caused an astounding level of unnecessary suffering. At his command, the Indonesian military invaded neighboring East Timor in 1975 after receiving a green light from President Gerald Ford and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. The result was an occupation that lasted for almost 24 years and left a death toll of tens of thousands of East Timorese. Within Indonesia proper, the TNI committed widespread atrocities during counterinsurgency campaigns in the resource-rich provinces of West Papua and Aceh, resulting in tens of thousands of additional fatalities.

With Suharto's forced resignation in 1998, significant democratic space has opened in Indonesia. There are competitive national and local elections. Victims of the "New Order" and their families are able to organize. There is even an official effort to create a national truth commission to investigate past atrocities. Nevertheless, the military still looms large over the country's political system. As such, there has not been a thorough investigation of any of the countless massacres that took place in 1965-66. History textbooks still focus on the September 30th Movement and make no mention of the massacres. Similarly, no military or political leaders have been held responsible for the Suharto-era crimes (or those that have taken place since), thus increasing the likelihood of future atrocities. This impunity is a source of continuing worry for Indonesia's civil society and restless regions, as well as poverty-stricken, now-independent East Timor. It is thus not surprising that the government of the world's newest country feels compelled to play down demands for justice by its citizenry and emphasize an empty reconciliation process with Indonesia. Meanwhile in the United States, despite political support and billions of dollars in U.S. weaponry, military training and economic assistance to Jakarta over the preceding four decades, Washington's role in Indonesia's killing fields of 1965-66 and subsequent brutality has been effectively buried, thus enabling the Bush administration's current efforts to further ties with Indonesia's military, as part of the global "war on terror." [17] Suharto's removal from office has not led to radical changes in Indonesia's state and economy.

Sukarno used to indict Dutch colonialism by saying that Indonesia was "a nation of coolies and a coolie among nations." Thanks to the Suharto years, that description remains true. The principles of economic self-sufficiency, prosperity, and international recognition for which the nationalist struggle was fought now seem as remote as ever. It is encouraging that many Indonesians are now recalling Sukarno's fight against Western imperialism (first the Netherlands and then the U.S.) after experiencing the misery that Suharto's strategy of collaboration has wrought. In his "year of living dangerously" speech in August 1964 -- a phrase remembered in the West as just the title of a 1982 movie with Mel Gibson and Sigourney Weaver -- Sukarno spoke about the Indonesian ideal of national independence struggling to stay afloat in "an ocean of subversion and intervention from the imperialists and colonialists." Suharto's U.S.-assisted takeover of state power forty years ago this month drowned that ideal in blood, but it might just rise again during the ongoing economic crisis that is endangering the lives of so many Indonesians.

*) John Roosa is an assistant professor of history at the University of British Columbia, and is the author of Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th

Other Articles by Joseph Nevins

* Washington Backs Indonesian Military Again
* Mass Murderers and Double Standards of Justice
* "Tiger Force" and the Costs Of Forgetting US Crimes in Vietnam
* Beyond the Myth: Remembering Jimmy Carter, the President
* Border Death-Trap: Time to Tear Down America's Berlin Wall

NOTES

1. A former CIA agent who worked in Southeast Asia, Ralph McGehee, noted in his memoir that the agency compiled a separate report about the events of 1965, one that reflected its agents' honest opinions, for its own in-house readership. McGehee's description of it was heavily censored by the agency when it vetted an account he first published in the April 11, 1981 edition of The Nation. Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA (New York: Sheridan Square, 1983), pp. 57-58. Two articles in the agency's internal journal Studies in Intelligence have been declassified: John T. Pizzicaro, "The 30 September Movement in Indonesia," (Fall 1969); Richard Cabot Howland, "The Lessons of the September 30 Affair," (Fall 1970). The latter is available online: www.odci.gov/csi/kent_csi/docs/v14i2a02p_0001.htm.

2. In Jakarta, the movement's troops abducted and killed six army generals and a lieutenant taken by mistake from the house of the seventh who avoided capture. In the course of these abductions, a five year-old daughter of a general, a teenaged nephew of another general, and a security guard were killed. In Central Java, two army colonels were abducted and killed.


4. Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to Department of State, November 4, 1965, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. 26, p. 354. This FRUS volume is available online at the National Security Archive website: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/#FRUS.

6. Frederick Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture' Policy Toward Indonesia in the Months Leading up to the 1965 'Coup',' Indonesia, 50 (October 1990), p. 59.


17. For information on U.S.-Indonesia military ties, see the website of the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network at: www.etan.org/ <http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Oct05/Roosa-Nevins1031.htm>
**LAMPIRAN – ATTACHMENTS**

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Information about KUDETA 65/ Coup d'etat '65, click: http://www.progind.net/
http://geocities.com/lembaga_sastrapembebasan/

**D.N. Aidit Menggugat Peristiwa Madiun**

Tulisan ini adalah pidato Kawan D.N. Aidit didalam Sidang DPR tanggal 11 Februari 1957 mendjawab keterangan anggota DPR Udin Sjamsudin (Masjumi) jang mentjoba menutupi maksud2 kontra-revolusioner dari "dewan2 partikelir" di Sumatera dengan menjinggung2 soal Peristiwa Madiun.

Dengan pidato Kawan D.N. Aidit ini masjarakat dapat mengetahui dengan lebih djelas lagi hakekat Peristiwa Madiun, suatu provokasi reaksi jang dilantjarkan oleh Hatta dan arti pemberontakan kontra-revolusioner gerombolan Siinbolon dan Ahmad Husein jang satu tahun kemudian mentjapai puntjaknja dengan diproklamasikannja "Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia" di Padang oleh gembong2 Masjumi-PSI seperti Sjafruddin Prawiranegara dan Sumitro Djojohadikusumo.

Dengan tulisan ini Rakjat Indonesia sampai sekarang mempunjai tiga dokumen penting tentang Peristiwa Madiun jaitu : B u k u P u t i h t e n t a n g P e r i s t i w a M a d i u n jang diterbitkan oleh Departemen Agitprop CC PKI, M e n g g u g a t P e r i s t i w a M a d i u n dan K o n f r o n t a s i P e r i s t i w a M a d i u n 1 9 4 8 -- P e r i s t i w a S u m a t e r a ( 1 9 5 6 )

Komisi Pilihan Tulisan

D.N. Aidit dari CC PKI.

Terlebih dulu saja ingin menjatakan bahwa Pemerintah Ali-Ildham dalam keterangannja pada tanggal 21 Djanuari dan dalam djawabannja pada pandangan umum babak pertama pada tanggal 4 Februari jl. bisa membatasi diri pada persoalannja, jaitu tentang kedjadian2 di Sumatera dalam bulan Desember 1956. Hal ini dapat saja hargai dan tentang ini kawan2 sefraksi saja sudah menjatakan pendapat Fraksi PKI.

Pada pokoknja pendapat kami mengenai kedjadian2 di Sumatera dalam bulan Desember tahun jl. Adalah sbb. :

Pertama : Kedjadian2 di Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Tengah dan Sumatera Selatan adalah rentetan kedjadian jang sengadja ditimbulkan oleh sebuah partai ketjil jang kalah dalam pemilihan umum jl. jang berhasil mendalangi sebuah partai besar dan oknum2 liar, jang tidak melihat kemungkinan dengan djalan demokratis dapat duduk kembali dalam kekuasaan sentral, dan jang hanja melihat kemungkinan dengan djalan menggunakan saluran partai2 lain, dengan djalan mempertadjam pertentangan antara partai2 agama dengan PKI dan PNI, dengan bikin2an menimbulkan kemarahan Rakjat didaerah2 supaja memberontak terhadap Pemerintah Pusat, dengan djalan mengadudomba suku satu dengan suku lainnja dan dengan djalan menghasut orang2 militer supaja memberontak kepada atasannya.
Kedua : Kedjadian2 tersebut terang sedjalan dan berhubungan dengan rentjana
kaum imperialis, jang dipelopori oleh Amerika Serikat untuk menarik Indonesia
ekadalam pakt militer SEATO. Rentjana2 dari pemberontak di Sumatera untuk
memisahkan Sumatera dan Kalimantan dari Pemerintah Pusat dan untuk mendirikan
negara sendiri jang mempunjai peralatan sipil dan militer sendiri, jang mempunjai
hubungan luarnegeri sendiri, adalah sepenuhnja sedjalan dengan rentjana Amerika
Serikat jang diatur oleh Pentagon (Kementerian Pertahanan) dan State Department
(Kementerian Luarnegeri) Amerika Serikat, oleh "djendral2" DI-TII dan oleh aparat2
serta kakitangan2 Amerika Serikat jang ada di Indonesia.

Djadi, persoalannja adalah djelas, jaitu. kepentingan vital Rakjat Indonesia disatu
fihak berhadapan langsung dengan kepentingan kaum imperialis asing difihak lain.
Dalam hal ini Pemerintah Ali-Idham menjatukan diri dengan kepentingan Rakjat
Indonesia, dan oleh karena itu PKI tidak ragu2 berdiri difihak Pemerintah dan
melawan kaum pemberontak serta aktor2 intelektualisnja. Demikianlah, kalau
mengenai persoalannja. Djelas dimana kami berdiri, dan djelas pula dimana fihak
lain berdiri. Tetapi, disamping pemerintah dapat membatasi diri pada persoalan jang
sedang dihadapi, anggota jang terhormat Udin Sjamsudin telah mem-bawa2
Peristiwa Madiun, dengan maksud mengaburkan persoalan.

Dalam Soal Peristiwa Madiun Kaum Komunis Adalah Pendakwa Anggota tsb. telah
me-njebut2 Peristiwa Madiun dalam hubungan dengan Peristiwa Sumatera, antara
lain dikatakan "pelopor pemberontakan di Indonesia ini setelah Indonesia
Merdeka adalah Partai Konunis Indonesia", selanjutnja "kaum Komunislah yang
mendjadi mahaguru pemberontakan" dan "bibitnja sudah menular keseluruh
Indonesia". Maksud pembibitjara tsb. djelas, jaitu supaja dalam soal peniberontakan
Kolonel Simbolon dan Letnan Kolonel Ahmad Husein djuga PKI jang disalahkan.
Lihatlah, betapa tidak tahu malunja orang mentjari kambinghitamnja, sama dengan
tidak tahu malunja mereka menjalahkan PKI dalam hubungan dengan Peristiwa
Madiun. Saja tidak membantah, bahwa baik Peristiwa Madiun maupun Peristiwa
Sumatera mempunjai satu sumber dan satu tudjuan, jaitu bersumber pada
imperialisme Amerika dan Belanda dan bertudjuan untuk meletakkan Indonesia
sepenuhnja dibawah telapak kaki mereka.

Berhubung dengan sebuah statement Politbiro CC PKI tanggal 13 September 1953
saja pernah dihadapkan kemuka pengadilan. Dalam sidang pengadilan tanggal 27
Djanuari 1955, dengan berpegang pada ajat 3 fasal 310 KUHP jang ditimpakan pada
saja, sudah saja njatakkan kesediaan saja kepada pengadilan untuk membuktikan
dengan saksi2 bahwa Peristiwa Madiun memang provokasi dan bahwa dalam
Peristiwa Madiun tsb. tangan Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir cs. memang berlumuran darah.
Dengan ini berarti bahwa Hatta, ketika itu masih wakil Presiden, harus tampil sebagai
saksi berhadapan dengan saja. Kesediaan saja ini, jang djuga diperkuat oleh
advokat saja, Sdr. Mr. Suprapto, tidak mendapat persetujuan pengadilan. Djaksa
menjataka keberatannja akan pembuktian jang mau saja adjukan dengan saksi2.
Oleh karena djaksa menolak pembuktian jang mau saja adjukan, maka djaksa
terpaksi mentjabut tuduhan melanggar fasal 310 dan 311 KUHP. Djelaslah, bahwa
ada orang2 jang kuatir kalau Peristiwa Madiun ini menjadi terang bagi Rakjat.
Lifting the Curtain on the Coup of October 1st 1965 – Suing for the Justice


Dalam pembelaan saja dimuka pengadilan tanggal 24 Februari 1955 telah saja kataran "bahwa diantara orang2 jang karena tidak mengertinja telah ikut dalam pengedjaran 'terhadap kaum Komunis', tidak sedikit sekarang sudah tidak mempunjai purbasangka lagi terhadap PKI dan sudah berdjandji pada diri sendiri untuk tidak lagi mendjadi alat perang-saudara dari kaum imperialis dan kakitangannja". Alat2 negara sipil maupun militer sudah mengerti bahwa dalam Peristiwa Madiun mereka telah disuruh memerangi saudara2 dan teman2nja sendiri.

Sudah mendjadi rahasia umum, bahwa dalam pemiiihan umum untuk Parlemen maupun untuk Konstituante lebih 80% daripada anggota2 Angkatan Perang memberikan suaranja kepada partai2 demokratis, dan 30% daripada suara jang diberikan anggota Angkatan Perang adalah diberikan kepada PKI. PSI dan Masjumi hanja mendapat kurang dari 20%, djadi kurang dari suara jang didapat oleh PKI sendiri atau PNI sendiri. PSI jang mempunjai pengaruh disedjumlah opsis tinggi adalah partai kelima didalam Angkatan Perang, sedangkan Masjumi, karena politik pro DI-nja, adalah partai keenam. Dengan ini, saja hanja hendak memublikikan bahwa memukul PKI dengan menjembar-njemburkan Peristiwa Madiun adalah tidak merugikan PKI, malahan memberi alasan pada kami untuk berbitjara dan mendjelas-detjelaskan tentang Peristiwa Madiun.

Apalagi sekarang, sesudah terjadi pemberontakan kolonel Simbolon di Sumatera Utara dan pemberontakan "Dewan Banteng" di Sumatera Barat, menggunakan Peristiwa Madiun untuk memukul PKI adalah seperti menepuk air didulang, bukan muka PKI jang kena, tetapi muka Masjumi dan PSI sendiri jang sekarang membela pemberontak2 di Sumatera itu dengan mati2an.

Hatta Bertanggungdjawab Atas Pentjulikan, Pembunuhan Dan Perang-Saudara Tahun 1948


Nah, tindakan inilah, tindakan mengangkat Wakil Walikota mendjadi Residen sementara inilah yang dinamakan oleh pemerintah Hatta tindakan "merobohkan pemerintah Republik Indonesia", tindakan "mengadakan kudeta" dan tindakan "mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet". Kalau dengan mengangkat seorang Wakil Walikota mendjadi Residen sementara bisa dinamakan merobohkan pemerintah Republik Indonesia, bisa dinamakan kudeta dan bisa dinamakan mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet, nama apakah lagi yang bisa diberikan kepada tindakan komplotan Simbolon dan "Dewan Banteng" di Sumatera? Selain daripada itu, djika memang demikian halnja, alangkah mudahnja merobohkan pemerintah Republik Indonesia, alangkah mudahnja mengadakan kudeta dan alangkah mudahnja mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet ! Djika memang demikian mudahnja, saja kira sekarang sudah tidak ada lagi Republik kita, karena nafsu merobohkan Republik sekarang, begitu di-kobar2kan dan begitu besarnja disentemara golongan, terutama dikalangan sebuah partai ketjil jang kalah dalam pemilihan umum jang lalu. Tetapi saja kira, merobohkan Republik Indonesia tidaklah begitu mudah sebagaimana sudah dibuktikan oleh kegagalan Simbolon dan oleh makin merosotnja pamor "Dewan Banteng", disamping Republik Indonesia tetap berdiri tegak. Apalagi mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet, tidaklah
semudah mengangkat seorang Wakil Walikota mendjadi Residen sementara. Rakjat Tiongkok dan Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat Tiongkok yang sudah berdua mati2an selama ber-puluh2 tahun dibawah pimpinan Partai Komunis Tiongkok hingga sekarang belum sampai ketararaf mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet, artinya pemerintah sosialis di Tiongkok. Djadi, alangkah bebalnya, atau alangkah mentjari2nya orang2 yang menuduh PKI merobohkan Republik dan mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet di Madiun dengan menganarkat Wakil Walikota Supardi mendjadi Residen sementara.


Demikianlah, "kebidjaksanaan" Hatta sebagai Perdana Menteri dalam menghadapi persoalan-persoalan masjararakat dan persoalan politik jang kongkrit. Karena kepitiikannya dari kesornbongannya sebagai burdijus Minang jang ingin melondjak tjepat sampai keangkasa, karena kehausannya akan kekuasaan, karena kepalabatunja, karena ketakutanannya akan keterlaluan kepada Komunisme, maka Hatta sebagai Perdana Menteri dengan setjara gegabah mengerahkan alat2 kekuasaan negara untuk mentjulik, membunuh dan mengobarkan perangsaudara. Orang sering salah kira dengan menjamakan sifat kepalabatu Hatta dengan "kemauan keras" atau sikap jang "konsekwen". Tetapi saja yang djuga mengenal Hatta dari dekat berpendapat, bahwa sifat kepalabatu Hatta adalah disebabkan karena sempit pikirannya, dan karena sempit pikirannya ia tidak bisa bertukar fikiran setjara sehat, tidak pandai bermusjawarah dan tahunja hanja main "ngotot", "mutung", "basmi" dan "tangan besi". Dan apa akibatnja permainan "basmi" dan "tangan besi" Hatta ? Be-ribu2 pemuda dan Rakjat dari kedua belah fihak jang berperang mati karenanja. Seluruh Rakjat sudah mengetahui dari pengalamanannya sendiri bahwa semua ini dilakukan hanja untuk melapangkan djalan bagi Hatta buat pelaksanaan Konferensi Medja Bundar dengan Belanda jang langsung diawasi oleh Amerika Serikat, untuk membikin perdjandjian KMB jang chianat dan jang sudah kita batalkan itu.

Sifat gegabah dari tindakan Hatta lebih nampak lagi ketika ia meminta kekuasaan penuh dari BPKNIP, dimana didalam pidatonya dinjatakan bahwa "Tersiar pula berita -- entah benar entah tidak -- bahwa Musso akan mendjadi Presiden Republik rampasan itu dan Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin Perdana Menteri". Lihatlah betapa tidak bertangungdjawabnya tindakan Hatta. Ia bertindak atas dasar berita jang siftatnya "entah benar entah tidak" bahwa sesuatu "akan" terjadi. Ja, Hatta bertindak atas berita jang masih diragukan tentang akan terjadi sesuatu. Tetapi, adalah tidak
diragukan lagi bahwa tindakan Hatta sudah berakibat dibunuhnya ribuan orang yang tidak berdosa tanpa proses.

Hatta Ingin Berkuasa Sewenang-wenang Lagi

Berdasarkan pengalaman dengan Peristiwa Madiun, dimana Hatta menelandjangi dirinya sebagai manusia yang tidak berperikemanusiaan, maka saja seudung rambutpun tidak ragu bahwa Hatta, seperti belum lama berselang dimuat dalam koran2 pemah mengutipkan kepada Firdaus A. N., hanja bersedia berkuasa djika tidak bisa didjatuhan oleh Parlemen. Kalau mau tahu tentang Hatta, inilah dia ! Inilah politiknya, inilah moralnya, inilah segala-galanja! Jaitu, seorang yang mau berkuasa setjara se-wenang2.

Hatta samasekali tidak menghargai djerihpajah Rakjat yang kepanasan dan kehudjanan antri untuk memberikan suaranja untuk Parlemen kita sekarang. Lebih daripada itu, ia djuga tidak menghargai suaranja sendiri yang diberikannja ketika memilih Parlemen ini. Orang yang tidak menghargai orang lain sering kita temukan didunia ini. Tetapi orang yang tidak menghargai suaranja sendiri, ini keterlaluan.

Hatta ingin berkuasa kembali tanpa bisa didjatuhan oleh Parlemen, ia mengimpikan masa keemasannya ditahun 1948. Kali ini yang mau didjadikannja mangsa bukan hanja putera2 Indonesia asal suku Djawa dan Batak, tetapi djuga putera2 suku lain, termasuk putera2 suku Minangkabau, karena PKI sekarang sudah tersebar diseluruh Indonesia dan disemua suku. Tetapi, sebelum Hatta sampai kesitu, perlu saja peringatkan bahwa dalam tahun 1948 ia hanya berhadapan dengan 10.000 Komunis yang hanja tersebar setjara sangat tidak merata dipulau Djawa dan Sumatera, karena PKI ketika itu dilarang berdiri didaerah pendudukan Belanda. Tetapi sekarang, Hatta harus berhadapan dengan lebih satu djuta Komunis yang tersebar disemua pulau dan disemua suku. Saja perlu menjatakan ini, hanja untuk menerangkan betapa besar akibatnya kalau Hatta bermain "tangan besi" lagi. Dan .... besipun bisa patah !

Saja jakin, bahwa tiap2 orang yang mempunjai peran tanggungdjawab tidak ingin terulang kembali tragedi nasional seperti Peristiwa Madiun itu. Dari fihak Partai Komunis Indonesia, seperti sudah berulang-ulang kami njatakan, dan sudah mendjadi peladjaran didalam Sekolah2 Kursus2 Partai kami, kami ingin dan kami jakin bisa mterraform tudjuan2 politik kami setjara parlementer. Kami akan menghindari tiap2 perang-saudara selama kepada kami didjamin hak2 politik untuk memperdjuangkan tjita2 kami. Tetapi, kalau kepada kami disdorkan bajonet dan didesingkan peluru seperti dalam peristiwa Madiun, djuga seperti selama peristiwa itu, kami tidak akan memberikan dada kami untuk ditembus bajonet dan ditembus peluru kaum kontra-revolusioner.

Kami kaum Komunis tidak ingin menggangu siapa2 selama kami tidak diganggu. Kami ingin bersahabat dengan semua orang, semua golongan dan semua partai yang mau bersahabat dan bekerdiasama dengan kami untuk haridepan yang lebih baik bagi tanahair dan Rakjat Indonesia. Walaupun dihadapan kantor pusat Masjumi di Kramat Raja 45, Djakarta, terpantjang dengan djelas papan "Front Anti-Komunis", djadi anti kami, anti saja dan anti kawan2 saja, tetapi kami kaum Komunis tidak akan ikut gila untuk djuga memantjangkan papan "Front Anti-Masjumi", apalagi "Front Anti-Islam". Kami tidak akan membiarkan diri kami terprovokasi oleh pemimpin


Djadi, kapankah semua pemuka bangsa kita akan beladjar dari pengalaman Peristiwa Madiun jang tragis itu, supaja tidak lagi mengulangi kesalahan tindakan dan kebidjakasanaan agar persatuan bangsa kita terpelihara baik, supaja kita tidak gegabah dalam mengambil tindakan2, apalagi tindakan2 jang bisa berakibat luas ? Saja berusaha dan terus akan berusaha untuk menarik peladjaran sebanjak-banjaknja dari pengalaman sedjarah itu.

Kabinet Ali-ldham Ber-puluh2 Kali Lebih Bidjaksana Daripada Kabinet Hatta


November 1956, dan jang terang2an sudah pernah menolak dan menghina perutusan pemerintah pusat jang datang untuk berunding. Apalagi kalau dibanding dengan perbuatan komplotan kolonel Simbolon pada tanggal 22 Desember 1956, jang terang2an menjatakan tidak lagi mengakui pemerintah jang sah sekarang. Apalagi, kalau kita ingat bahwa maksud jang sesungguhnya dari semua tindakan itu jalah untuk memisahkan Sumatera dan Kalimantan dari Pemerintah Pusat, mendirikan negara Sumatera dan Kalimantan serta mengadakan hubungan luarnegeri sendiri. Apalagi kalau diingat bahwa ada maksud2 untuk menjerahkan
pulau We di Utara Sumatera kepada negara besar tertentu untuk didjadikan pangkalan-perang. Apalagi kalau diigat bahwa semua rentjana itu sesuai sepenuhnja dengan apa yang direncanakan oleh Pentagon dan State Department Amerika Serikat, oleh "djendral2" DI-Tll dan aparat2 serta kakitangan2 Amerika lainnja yang ada di Indonesia. Djika diingat semuanja ini, maka pengangkatan Wakil Walikota Supardi mendjadi Residen sementara Madiun adalah hanja "kinderspel" (permainan kanak2).


Dalam usaha menjelesaikan Peristiwa Sumatera ada orang2 jang ingin supaja soal kolonel Simbolon "diselesaikan setjara adat", supaja soal "Dewan Banteng" diselesaikan "setjara musjawarat", setjara "potong kerbau" dan dengan "menggunakan pepatah dan petith". Pendeknja, adat, kerbau serta pepatah dan petitih mau dimobilisasi untuk menjelesaikan soal kolonel Simbolon dan soal "Dewan Banteng". Sampai2 orang2, jang tidak beradat djuga berbitjara tentang "penjelesaiaan setjara adat".
Lifting the Curtain on the Coup of October 1st 1965 – Suing for the Justice


Mari sekarang kita lihat bagairnana sikap pemerintah Hatta terhadap perwira yang belum tentu bersalah dalam Peristiwa Madiun, dan bagaimana sikap pemerintah Ali-Ldham sekarang terhadap opsir2 yang sudah terang bersalah dalam pemberontakan2 di Sumatera. Pemerintah Hatta dengan tanpa memeriksa lebih dulu kesalahan mereka terus sadja memetjat perwira2, antara lain jang masih hidup sekarang bekas Djenderal Major Ir. Sakirman, bekas Letnan Kolonel Martono, bekas Major Pramudji, dan banjak lagi. Padahal perwira2 ini belum pernah dipanggil untuk menghadap, apalagi diperiksa; djadi samasekali tidak ada dasar untuk memetjat mereka. Para perwira yang belum tentu bersalah tidak hanja dipetjat, tetapi banjak djuga jang

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Menguak Tabir Peristiwa 1 Oktober 1965 – Mencari Keadilan
disiksa diluar perikemanusiaan dan dibunuh tanpa dibuktikan kesalahannja terlebih
dahulu.

Sekedar untuk mengetahui bagaimana penibunuhan2 kedjam oleh alat-alat resmi
ketika itu, bersama ini, saja lampirkan 3 buah turunan laporan resmi dan pengakuan
resmi tentang pembunuhan terhadap diri Sidik Aslan dkk. dan terhadap letnan
kolonel Dachlan dan major Mustoffa. Untuk menghemat waktu tidak saja batjakan
lampiran-lampiran ini. Lampiran2 ini, saja sampai yang dari penilaian siapa dan
bagaimana major Sabarudin, pembuat pengakuan2 tbs. Yang sudah terang major
Sabarudin bukan simpatikan PKI, apalagi anggota PKI. Kekedjaman pemerintah
Hatta selama Peristiwa Madiun adalah ber-puluh2 kali lebih kedjam daripada
pemerintah kolonial Belanda ketika menghadapi pemberontakan Rakjat tahun 1926.
Pemerintah kolonial Belanda masih memakai alasan2 hukum untuk membunuh,
memendjarakan dan mengasingkan kaum pemberontak, tetapi Hatta sepenuhnya
mempraktekkan hukum rimba. Semuanja ini mengingatkan saja kembali pada tulisan
Hatta yang berkepala "14 Djuli", dimuat dalam harian "Pemandangan" pada 14 Djuli
1941 dimana antara lain ia menulis tentang Petaïn, seorang Perantjis boneka Hitler,
sebagai "seorang serdadu yang berhati lurus dan djudjur". Hanja serigala mengagumi
serigala, hanja fasis mengagumi fasis !

Bandingkanlah sikap pemerintah Hatta terhadap kedjadian di Madiun dengan sikap
pemerintah sekarang terhadap kolonel Siinbolon yang sudah terang bersalah karena
mereduk kekuasaan disebagian wilajah Republik Indonesia, yang sudah terang
melanggar disiplin militer atau yang oleh Presiden Sukarno/Panglima Teringungi dalam
amanatnya tanggal 25 Desember 1956 dirumuskan telah berbuat yang "menggon-
tjangkan sendi2 ketentaraan dan kenegaraan kita, dan yang membahayakan
keutuhan tentara dan negara kita pula". Kolonel Simbolon hanja diberhentikan
sementara sebagai Panglima Tentara dan Teritorium I. Sedangkan terhadap
pemimpin2 pemberontakan militer di Sumatera Tengah sampai sekarang belum
diambil tindakan apa2.

Tentu ada orang2 yang mengatakan: ja, karena Panglima Teringungi, Pemerintah dan
Gabungan Kepala Staf Angkatan Perang sekarang tidak mempunjai kewibawaan,
maka mereka tidak menghukum perwira2 tersebut seperti Hatta dulu menghukum
perwira2 yang disangka tersangkut dalam Peristiwa Madiun.

Istilah "wibawa" pada waktu belakangan ini banyak dipergunakan orang dengan
masing2 mempunjai interpretasinja sendiri2. Kalau dengan istilah "wibawa" jang
dimaksudkan jalah kemampuan pemerintah untuk bertindak, maka terang bahwa
pemerintah sekarang sanggup bertindak, sanggup memerintah, artinja mempunjai
kewibawaan. Apakah bukan tanda wibawa dari pemerintah sekarang dengan
dapatkan digulingkan keradjaan sehari komplotan kolonel Simbolon dalam waktu jang
sangat singkat ?

Tanggal 22 Desember 1956 pemerintah memutuskan dan mengumumkan
pemberhentian sementara kolonel Simbolon sebagai Panglima TT I dan
menjerahkan tanggungjawab TT I kepada letnan-kolonel Djamin Gintings atau
letnan-kolonel A. Wahab Macmour. Dalam waktu hanja empat hari, jaitu pada
tanggal 27 Desember 1956 komplotan kolonel Simbolon sudah dapat diturunkan dari
keradjaan seharinja. Ini artinja bahwa seruan pemerintah dipatuhi, ini artinja pemerintah mempunjai kewibawaan.

Tentu ada orang2 yang berkata lagi: ja, tetapi itu mengenai Sumatera Utara. Mengenai Sumatera Tengah pemerintah tidak mempunjai kewibawaan. Mengenai ini saja djawab sbb. :

Tiap2 orang yang tahu imbangan kekuatan didalam negeri tidak sukar memahamkan, bahwa kalau pemerintah pusat sekarang mau bertindak, apalagi kalau mau bertindak serampangan seperti Hatta, maka dengan pengerahan serentak seluruh kekuatan Angkatan Darat, Angkatan Laut dan Angkatan Udara, dengan dibantu oleh massa Rakjat, maka keradjaan "Dewan Banteng" djuga hanja akan merupakan keradjaan sehari.

Soalnja bukanlah hanja menundjukkan kemampuan menggunakan kekuatan seperti yang pernah dilakukan oleh Hatta, tetapi djuga kebidjaksanaan. Pada pokoknja kami setudju bahwa pemerintah sekarang mengkombinasi kekuatan riilnja dengan kebidjaksanaan. Sikap ini merupakan dasar yang kuat bagi pemerintah, djika pada satu waktu pemerintah harus bertindak keras, karena djalan perundingan sudah tidak mempan lagi.

Walaupun kami kaum Komunis pernah diperlakukan setjara kedjam oleh pemerintah Hatta selama Peristiwa Madiun, tetapi kami tidak menjetudjui dijika pemerintah sekarang menghentikan perbuatan Hatta yang gegabah dan tidak bertanggungdjawab itu. Kita semua mengetahui bahwa politik "tangan besi" Hatta sepenuhnja menguntungkan kaum imperialis asing. Ja, walaupun banjat perwira penganut tjita-tjita PKI yang dibasmi setjara djasmaniah dalam Peristiwa Madiun, tetapi kami tidak menuntut supaja kolonel Simbolon, letnankolonel Abmad Husein dll. dibasmi setjara djasmaniah. Apalagi kami tahu bahwa banjat opsir2 yang tersangkut dalam pemberontakan2 di Sumatera adalah karena hasutan-hasutan sebuah partai ketjil yang keok dalam pemilihan umun, j.l. Kami tidak menghendaki penumpahan darah yang disebabkan oleh kehampaan kebidjaksanaan. Djadi apakah yang kami inginkan ?

tatatertib hukum didalam ketentaraan. Kalau tidak demikian lebih baik perwira2 yang bersangkutan menanggalkan epoletnya dan kembali kekampung untuk duduk dalam lembaga2 adat dikampung. Disanalah barangkali mereka akan menemukan ketenteraman dijiwanja.


Selandjutnja dapat pula ditarik kesimpulan, bahwa adalah perbuatan yang tidak bertanggungdjawab untuk memberi kans sekali lagi kepada Mohamad Hatta, bapak perang-saudara, seorang yang karena haus kekuasaan dan pendek akal telah menewaskan be-ribu2 Rakjat dan pemuda baik orang2 sipil maupun orang2 militer kita yang baik2.

Dwitunggal Tidak Pernah Ada

Sementara orang tentu akan bertanja: Tetapi bagaimana dengan "dwitunggal"? Pertama2 perlu saja njatakan bahwa dwitunggal tidak pernah ada, bahwa dwitunggal hanya ada dalam dunia impian orang2 yang tidak mengerti seluk-beluk sedjarah perdjuangan kemerdekaan dan sedjarah pentjetusan Revolusi Agustus 1945.

Kalau orang mau tenang dan mau meng-ingat2 kembali pada pertentangan pendapat yang sengit antara Sukarno dengan "Partai Indonesia" (Partindo) disatu fihak dan Hatta-Sjahrir dengan apa yang dinamakan "Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia" difihak lain, maka orang akan sepandang bahwa dwitunggal yang sungguh2 memang tidak pernah ada. Untuk pertama kali, pada kesempatan ini ingin saja njatakan, bahwa saja sudah lama merasa ikut berdosa karena sudah ambil bagian aktif dalam gerakan memaksa Hatta menandatangani Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945. Hatta sudah sedjak semula setjara ngotot menentang pentjetusan Revolusi Agustus. Ia menggantungkan kemerdekaan Indonesia sepenuhnja pada rachmat Saikoo Sikikan (Panglima Tertinggi Tentara Djepang di Indonesia) yang tidak kundjung tiba itu.

Saja merasa lebih2 ikut berdosa lagi ketika membata pidato Hatta waktu menerima gelar Dr. HC dari Universitas "Gadjah Mada" dimana dengan tegas dikatakannya bahwa revolusi harus dibendung. Kalau saja tidak salah Universitas "Gadjah Mada" sudah tiga kali memberikan gelar kehormatan, pertama kepada Presiden Sukarno, kedua kepada Hatta dan ketiga kepada Ki Hadjar Dewantara. Pemberian jang pertama dan ketiga, menurut pendapat saja, adalah tepat, karena Universitas "Gadjah Mada" yang dilahirkan oleh revolusi memberikan gelar kehormatan kepada orang2 revolusioner, pengabdi2 revolusi. Tetapi pemberian jang kedua, jaitu pada
Hatta, maaf, adalah satu kekeliruan yang mungkin tidak disengaja. Betapa tidak keliru, sebuah universitas yang dilahirkan oleh revolusi memberikan gelar kehormatan kepada seorang yang ingin membendung revolusi, kepada seorang kontra-revolusioner.

Dwitunggal yang terdiri dari seorang revolusioner dan yang seorang lagi kontra-revolusioner samasekali bukan dwitunggal. Oleh karena itulah saja katakan, dwitunggal tidak pernah ada, ketjuali didalam dongengan dan impian. Dongengan tentang dwitunggal inilah yang antara lain telah membikin revolusi kita mendjadi matjet, karena dwitunggal yang di-bikin2 itu, yang heterogeen itu, telah membikin kita terdjepeit diantara dua kutub, kutub revolusi dan kutub kontra-revolusi. Selama lebih sebelas tahun Rakjat Indonesia sudah ditipu dengan apa yang dinamakan dwitunggal.

Revolusi kita berdjalan terus, semua kekuatan revolusioner harus dipersatukan dan dimobilisasi untuk mengalahkan kekuatan2 kontra-revolusioner.

Demikianlah, penilaian saja mengenai kebidjaksanaan pemerintah sekarang, sesudah saja mengkonfrontasikan kebidjaksanaan pemerintah sekarang dengan kebidjaksanaan pemerintah Hatta ditahun 1948. Saja dipaksa untuk memberikan penilaian setjara ini, karena ada salahseorang anggota Parlemen kita jang dalam pemandangan umumnya membawa-bawa Peristiwa Madiun.

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Jalan Baru

Kata pengantar


"Djalan Baru" tidak hanja penting untuk anggota dan tjalon-anggota PKI. Tiap2 orang revolusioner dan progresif di Indonesia jang mau bekerdja baik untuk kemenangan revolusi tanahairnja diwadjibkan menguasai isi "Djalan Baru". Untuk mengerti PKI dan mengerti Revolusi Indonesia, hingga sekarang hanja "Djalan Baru" satu-satunja jang bisa memberi pendjelasan; isinja padat dan menggambarkan strategi jang djitu dan taktik2 jang tepat dalam tingkat perdjuangan nasional sekarang. Memang, diakui bahwa ada perkataan2 dan kalimat2 jang masih perlu dirubah (misalnja perkataan RIS supaja dibatja RI). Perlunja ada perubahan2 dalam bahasa ini, perubahan mana samasekali tidak mengubah isinja, adalah tidak mengurangi sedikitpun pentingnya "Djalan Baru", sebagai pedoman untuk pekerdjaan2 politik dan organisasi se-hari2.

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Djakarta, 23 Mei 1951.

Redaksi "Bintang Merah"

Keterangan Penerbit pada tjetakan ke-VI


Penerbit

Djakarta, Djuli 1952.

Keterangan Penerbit pada tjetakan ke-VII


Penerbit

Djakarta, 5 Oktober 1953.

Rapat Polit-Biro CC PKI pada tgl 13-14 Agustus 1948 di Djokjakarta, setelah mendengar uraian Kawan Musso tentang pekerdjaan dan kesalahan Partai dalam dasar2 organisasi dan politik serta setelah mengadakan diskusi se-dalam2nja memutuskan, mengambil resolusi sel bagai berikut : 

I Lapangan organisasi

Untuk dapat memahamkan kesalahan2 PKI dilapangan organisasi, sebaiknja diuraikan lebih dahulu sedikit riwajat PKI. 

melepaskan bentuknya yang illegal dan muntjul dalam masjarakat Indonesia Merdeka dengan terang2an.

Akan tetapi karena pada saat itu dan seterusnya bentuk yang illegal ini masih dipegang teguh, maka dengan demikian PKI telah mendorong orang2 yang menghendaki adanya PKI, untuk medirikan PKI legal, dan telah memberi kesempatan kepada anasir2 avonturir yang berhaluan Trotskis untuk medirikan PBI. Dengan berdirinja PKI legal dan PBI ini, maka timbullah keharusan bagi PKI illegal untuk merebut se-lekas2nja pimpinan atas Partai2 ini, supaja perjuangan klas buruh djangan sampai menjimpang dari rel revolusioner. Dengan sendirinja keharusan ini mengakibatkan terbagi-baginja kader illegal kita, yang sudah tentu melemahkan organisasi.


Adanja tiga Partai klas buruh sampai sekarang (PKI legal, PBI dan Partai Sosialis), yang semuanja dipimpin oleh Partai Komunis illegal, mengakui dasar2 Marxisme-Leninisme dan sekarang tergabung dalam Front Demoktasi Rakjat serta mendjalankan aksi bersama berdasarkan program bersama, telah mengakibatkan ruwetnja gerakan buruh seumumnja. Hal ini sangat menghalangi kemadjuan dan perkembangan kekuatan organisasi klas buruh, djuga sangat menghalangi meluas dan mendalamnya ideologi Marxisme-Leninisme yang konsekwen. Dengan demikian telah memberi banjak kesempatan kepada musuh klas buruh untuk menghalangi kemadjuan gerakan Komunis dengan djalan mendirikan ber-matjam2 Partai Kiri jang
palsu dan yang memakai sembojan2 yang semestinya mendjadi sembojan PKI (diantaranja : "Perundingan atas dasar Kemerdekaan 100\%"").


Pengaruh daripada kesalahan dalam lapangan organisasi yang telah dilakukan oleh kaum Komunis dengan djelas dan terang nampak djuga dikalangan perjuangan tani, dimana pengaruh PKI djuga sangat lemah. Padahal kaum tani amat besar artinja sebagai sekutu kaum buruh dalam Revolusi Nasional. Dengan tidak adanja bantuan yang aktif dari kaum tani, Revolusi Nasional tentu akan kalah.


Dikalangan pradjurit, kaum Komunis mempunjai pengaruh yang agak penting djuga. Akan tetapi karena adanja tiga Partai kaum buruh, maka kaum proletar dan kaum tani yang bersendjata ini dalam prakteknja tidak bersikap terang terhadap PKI dan dengan demikian simpati golongan pradjurit pada Komunisme tidak dapat diperluas. Dilapangan organisasi, PKI tidak mempunjai akar yang kuat dan dalam dikalangan pradjurit.

Semua keruwetan dalam lapangan organisasi djuga menjebabkan tidak kuatnya PKI dalam gerakan sosial dan kebudajaan seperti sport, kesenian dll.nja, baik dalam lapangan organisasi maupun dalam lapangan ideologi. Berhubung dengan kesalahan2 yang mengenai azas dalam lapangan organisasi seperti tsb. diatas dan menarik peladjaran dengan se-baik2nja dari kedjadian di Jugoslavia, maka rapat Polit-Biro PKI memutuskan untuk mengadakan perubahan jang radikal, jang bertudjuan supaja :

1. Selekas-lekasnja mengembalikan kedudukan PKI sebagai pelopor klas buruh.
2. Selekas-lekasnja mengembalikan tradisi PKI yang baik pada waktu sebelum dan selama perang dunia ke-II.
3 PKI mendapat HEGEMONI (kekuasaan jang terbesar) dalam pimpinan Revolusi Nasional ini.


Revolusi kita adalah Revolusi Nasional atau Revolusi Demokrasi Burdjuis dalam zaman imperialisme dan Revolusi Proletar dunia. Menurut kodratnja dan dipandang...
dari sudut sedjarah maka hanja klas buruhlah, sebagai klas jang paling revolusioner dan konsekwen anti-imperialisme, jang semestinja memimpin revolusi ini, dan bukan klas lain. Adapun tjara mewudjudkan fusi ini dengan selekas-lekasnja bendaknja sbb.:

1. Membersihkan PKI dari anasir2 jang tidak baik.
2. Membentuk Komite Fusi jang berkewadjiban:
   a. Mendaftar anggota 2 PBI dan Partai Sosialis jang dapat diusulkan dengan segera mendjadi anggota PKI.
   b. Menjiapkan masukja anggota2 lainnja jang masih kurang madju dengan memberi kepada mereka, kewadjiban untuk mempeladjari buku-buku Marxisme-Leninisme, kursus2, pekerdjaan jang tertentu dsb.
3. Setelah semua ini selesai, lalu mengadakan Kongres Fusi daripada ketiga Partai, dimana ketiga Partai diplebur mendjadi satu dengan memakai nama Partai Komunis Indonesia dan dipilih Central Comite jang baru setjara demokratis.

Dengan adanja hanja satu Partai klas buruh jaitu PKI, maka pekerdjaan akan mendjadi lebih sederhana dan rasionil. Adanja satu PKI jang legal, memudahkan dan menegaskan pekerdjaan tiap2 Komunis dalam serikat buruh, dalam perdjuangan tani, pemuda, wanita, dalam gerakan sosial dll.

Oleh karena PKI adalah Partai klas jang miskin dan jang tertindas, seharusnja susunan pimpinan dan susunan Partai seluruhnya sebagian besar terdiri dari elemen2 proletar sedangkan kaum intelektual seharusnja mendjadi Pembantu jang tidak dapat diabaikan dalam semua hal terutama dalam pekerdjaan pembentukan kader2 dan dalam mempertinggi tingkatan teori anggota PKI. Kesalahan2 pokok hingga sekarang, disebabkan pula oleh karena kurangnya elemen-elemen proletar dalam pimpinan Partai.


II Lapangan politik

Politik luarnergeri

Dalam lapangan politik luarnergeri, rapat Polit-Biro berpendapat, bahwa kesalahan2 besar jang telah dibuat oleh kaum Komunis Indonesia selama tiga tahun ini tidak bersifat kebetulan, melainkan mempunjai akar jang berasal semendjak meletusnja perang dunia II dan pendudukan tanahair kita oleh Djepang dan jang selandjutnja
dipengaruhi oleh pendirian jang salah dari partai2 sekawan, jaitu Partai-partai Komunis Eropa Barat (Perantjis, Inggris dan Belanda).


Setelah Soviet Uni terlibat dalam perang dunia II karena serangan fasis Djerman, maka bagi Soviet Uni djuga timbul keharusan untuk erat bekerdja bersama dengan negara2 besar jang bersekuatu melawan negeri2 fasis.


Kesalahan dari Partai2 Komunis Perantjis dan Inggris dan djuga Partai Komunis Belanda yang terpengaruh oleh Partai Komunis Perantjis, jalalah karena tidak dimengertinja perubahan besar jang telah berlaku dalam lapangan politik internasional sesudah perang dunia, terutama jang mengenai perdjuangan kemerdekaan dari Rakjat di-negeri2 djadjahan.

Pada saat perang dunia II berachir dengan hantjurnja negeri2 fasis, maka perdjuangan kemerdekaan di-negeri2 djadjahan harus dikobar-kobarkan lagi dengan sehebat-hebatnya dan Partai2 Komunis di-negeri2 kendadah harus menjokong sekutu2nya. Kerdjasama dalam perdjuangan kemerdekaan Rakjat yang didjadah dengan negeri2 imperialis sudah tidak lagi pada tempatnja!

Akan tetapi, karena tidak faham tentang perubahan keadaan politik ini, maka CPN (Partai Komunis Belanda) beranggapan, bahwa perdjuangan Rakjat Indonesia tidak boleh keluar dari batas dominion status dan oleh karenanja sembojan jang paling baik untuk Indonesia menurut pendirian mereka jalalah: "Uni-verband", atau dengan perkataan lain : tetap tinggal dalam lingkungan "Commonwealth" Belanda. Djadi Rakjat Indonesia harus terus-menerus "kerdjasama" dengan imperialism Belanda. Demikian pula pendirian Partai Komunis Perantjis terhadap perdjuangan kemerdekaan Vietnam...
Hal yang tidak boleh dilupakan jalah, bahwa di Indonesia selama pendudukan Jepang sudah ada Komunis2 palsu dan komunis2--renegat (penghianat), yang suka mendjalankan kerdjasama dilapangan politik dengan fasis Jepang.

Politik yang reformis dari Partai2 Komunis di-negeri2 Eropa Barat, disebabkan karena tidak fahamnya akan perubahan2 keadaan internasional yang penting sesudah perang dunia II berakhir. Oleh kawan2 bekas anggota CPN yang tiba di Indonesia, dengan otomatis dengan tidak dipikirkan dalam-dalam, juga dengan tidak ditjotjokkan dengan keadaan objektif (proklamasi kemerdekaan tanggal 17-8 tahun 1945), politik reformis ini telah dipraktekkan, sehingga akibatnja sangat membahayakan kemadjuan Revolusi Nasional kita. Perlu ditegaskan, bahwa politik reformis yang berasal dari kaum sosialis kanan (Sutan Sjahrrir). Politik reformis ini dapat dinjatakan dengan dua hal:


2. Menghadapi imperialisme Belanda tidak dengan perdjuangan yang konsekwen revolusioner dan anti-imperialis, melainkan dengan politik reaksioner atau politik kompromis yang bersemmbojan: "bukan kemenangan militer yang dimaksudkan, melainkan kemenangan politik". Djadi bukannja perdjuangan dengan sendjata yang diutamakan, melainkan perdjuangan politik, sedangkan, imperialisme Belanda terus-menerus berusaha memperkuat tenaga militernya.

Kaum Komunis jang membiarkan berkembangnja dan meradjalelanja politik reaksioner ini, malahan turut serta menjokongnja, telah membuat dua matjam kesalah:

ada tempat lain selainnya difahak golongan anti-imperialis! Hanja dari fihak golongan anti-imperialis sebagai sekutu jang sedjati, Revolusi Nasional Indonesia dapat memperoleh keuntungan dan bantuan jang diperlukan, dan bukan dari fihak golongan imperialis.

b. Kesalahan jang kedua jalah, bahwa tidak tjukup dimengerti perimbangan kekuatan antara Soviet Uni dan imperialism Inggris-USA, setelah Soviet Uni berhasil dengan sangat tjepatnja menduduki seluruh Tung Pai (Mansjuria). Pada waktu itu sudah ternjata kedudukan Soviet Uni jang sangat kuat dibenua Asia, jang mengikat banjak tenaga militer daripada imperialism USA, Inggris dan Australia dan dengan demikian memberi kesempatan baik bagi Rakjat Indonesia untuk memulai revolusinja. Pada saat itu kaum Komunis Indonesia sudah membesar-besarkan kekuatan Belanda dan imperialism lainnya dan mengetjilkan kekuatan Revolusi Indonesia serta golongan anti-imperialis lainnya.

Konsekwensi jang sudah semestinja dari politik kaum sosialis kanan (Sutan Sjahrir) jang reaksioner itu, jalah penanda-tanganan truce agreement 1946 dan selanjutnja penanda-tanganan persetudjuan Linggadjati jang memungkinkan imperialism Belanda menjiapkan perang kolonial, jang meletus pada tanggal 21 Djuli 1947.

Akibat kesalahan pokok dalam lapangan politik tidak habis disitu sadja; konsekwensi jang lebih mentjelakakan lagi jalah tidak lain daripada penanda-tanganan persetudjuan Renville. Persetudjuan Renville ini adalah puntjak ak ibat kesalahan2 jang reaksioner, jang telah membawa Republik pada tepi djurang kolonialisme. Tanggung-djawab jang berat ini terletak dipundak kaum Komunis.


Politik kompromis jang reaksioner ini makin menguntungkan imperialism Belanda dan makin membesar bahaya bagi Republik kita. Sesudah kaum Komunis tidak lagi duduk didalam pemerintahan dan setelah mereka, mulai giat bekerdja dikalangan Rakjat djelata, maka mereka mulai sedar akan kesalahan2 dan kekurangan-kekurangannja, diantara lain kelemahan2 organisasi Partai serta organisasi massa, terutama dikalangan kaum buruh dan tani. Mereka mulai insaf, bahwa terutama harus diusahakan penjelesaian soal agraria dengan se-lekas2nja, jang dahulunja sangat kurang mendapat perhatian mereka, padahal masaalah tani adalah masaalah jang penting bagi Revolusi Nasional Indonesia.
Djuga mulai diinsafi, bahwa dengan tidak adanya sokongan, terutama dari Rakjat pekerja (buruh, tani-pekerja dan pekerja lainnya) yang berorganisasi rapi, tidaklah mungkin mewujudkan hegemoni klas buruh dalam Revolusi National kita ini, dan tidak mungkin pula membentuk suatu pemerintahan kerakjatan yang kuat dan stabil (jang berdiri tegak). Oleh karenanya kaum Komunis berdaja-upaja dengan segi-sgiatnja mengorganisasi massa Rakjat pekerja, agar dalam waktu jang pendek dapat menjusun massa-organisasi jang rapi dalam berbagai kalangan Rakjat pekerja, jang berkewadjiban mendjalankan rol sebagai tulang-punggung Revolusi Nasional kita. Ternjata bahwa didalam 6 bulan jang belakangan ini, sedjak pimpinan negara dipegang oleh elemen2 burdjuis komprador, tumbuhnya politik jang reaksioner berdjalan dengan tjepatnja. Malahan pada beberapa bulan jang belakangan sudah tampak tanda2, bahwa politik pemerintah jang reaksioner itu akan tumbuh ketingkatan kontra-revolusioneer.

Hal ini sebagian disebabkan, karena agitasi dan propaganda dari fihak kaum Komunis untuk menjedarkan massa Rakjat pekerja tentang kekeliruan2 politik pemerintah, disana-sini telah didjalankan dengan tjara jang kurang bidjaksana, hingga menjinggung perasaan. Akan tetapi sebagian lagi disebabkan, karena tindakan2 jang reaksioner dari fihak pemerintah terhadap hak2 demokrasi Rakjat pekerja, sedangkan Rakjat pekerja sudah makin sedar akan rol dan kewadjibannya serta hak2nya dalam Revolusi Nasional. Tindakan2 reaksioner jang telah njata diantaranya jalah :

a. Penghapusan hak2 demokrasi jang pokok misalnja hak berdemonstrasi, walaupun buat sementara.

b. Niat untuk mengekang hak mogok bagi kaum buruh, dengan tidak mengindahkan samasekali faktor2 jang njata, jaitu jang memaksa kaum buruh menggunakan sendjata perdjuangannja jang paling tadjam itu untuk membela nasibnja dan membela Revolusi Nasional.

c. Politik dalam lapangan dkonomi jang terang-terangan reaksioner, jang menentang dan memperkosa UUD Republik kita fasal 33 dan jang sangat merugikan penghidupan Rakjat pekerja, serta kedudukan negara dan Revolusi Nasional kita. Ini semua hanja mengunfungkan beberapa orang burdjuis komprador jang dengan terang2an menundjukkan sikap anti-nasional,

d. Politik dilapangan agraria jang reaksioner dan antjaman terhadap kaum tani jang sudah sedar akan rol dan kewadjibannya sebagai tenaga jang penting dalam pelaksanaan Revolusi Nasional dan karenanja telah bergerak menghilangkan segala sisa feodalisme dilapangan agraria.

e. Perintah untuk mendaftar nama2 dan mengamat-amati tindakan2 pemimpin2 Rakjat pekerja. Teranglah, bahwa tindakan pemerintah jang reaksioner itu, jang bermaksud mempertahankan kedudukannja dan menguntungkan beberapa kelompok kaum burdjuis, tidak boleh tidak tentu makin meruntjingkan pertentangan
Lifting the Curtain on the Coup of October 1st 1965 – Suing for the Justice

antara Rakjat pekerdja dan pemerintah. Djadi bukanna kaum buruh jang meruntjingkan pertentangan klas, melainkan kaum burdjuis sendiri.

Sudah mendjadi kewadjiban kaum Komunis untuk menjedarkan Rakjat pekerdja dan kaum progresif terhadap berkembangnya politik reaksioner jang berbahaja dari pemerintah jang achimja pasti akan mendjerumuskan Revolusi Nasional kita kedjurang kegagalan dan kemusnahan. Dengan demikian dimaksudkan supaja tenaga massa Rakjat pekerdja bersama dengan tenaga progresif lainnya dapat merubah haluan politik pemerintah jang tidak sehat dan berbahaja itu kearah djuruskan jang sehat. Walaupun kaum Komunis sekarang telah mendapat pengaruh lebih besar daripada diwaktu sebelum meninggalkan pemerintah, akan tetapi oleh karena tidak tahu tentang kesalahannja jang pokok dalam lapangan politik, maka sikap sebagian besar daripada Rakjat terhadap Komunisme djuga masih belum tjukup terang dan tegas.


Dalam perundingan2 ini PKI sanggup memberikan sekedar kondisi dilapangan ekonomi dan kebudajaan kepada orang2 Belanda jang tidak menentang Revolusi kita, lebih daripada jang sekarang biasa diberikan di-negeri2 kapitalis. Dalam

Dalam perdjuangannja melawan imperialisme, PKI harus menghubungkan diri dengan gerakan2 anti-imperialis di Asia, di Eropa dan di Amerika, terutama sekali dengan Rakjat negeri Belanda jang progresif, jang sebagian besar dari mereka dipimpin oleh CPN. Partai ini walaupun sudah membuat kesalahan2, adalah satu-satunja Partai klas buruh dinegeri Belanda jang sungguh2 membantu gerakan keinerdekaan kita pada waktu sebelum dan sesudah peperangan dunia kedua. CPN adalah djuga mendjadi sekutu kita jang semestinja, dan perhubungan kita dengan CPN harus lebih dikokohkan lagi. Lain daripada itu PKI harus terus-menerus mendesak CPN supaja benar2 meninggalkan politik jang bersembun : "Unie-verband" jang djahat itu dan menggantin ja dengan politik "INDONESIA MERDEKA SEPENUH-PENUHNJA". Tudjuan PKI jalah mendirikan Republik Indonesia berdasarkan Demokrasi Rakjat, yang meliputi seluruh daerah Indonesia dan jang bebas dari pengaruh imperialisme serta tentaranja.

Politis Dalam negeri

Soal jang penting jalah, bahwa PKI dengan semua djalan harus menghalangi pemerintah sekarang ini djangan sampai terus-menerus memberi konsensi kepada imperialisme karena ini berarti menjerahkan Republik kedalam tangan imperialisme. Lagi pula dalam pekerdjaannja sehari-hari PKI harus dengan giat membela kepentingan2 kaum buruh dan kaum tani. Selandjutnja PKI harus djuga berusaha, se-lekas2nja melikwidasi segala kelemahan Revolusi kita. Kelemahan itu jalah :


2. Pimpinan Revolusi Nasional kita, walaupun hegemoninja harus ada ditangan klas buruh, harus diwudjudkan oleh PKI ber-sama2 dengan partai2 atau elemen2 lain jang progresif berdasarkan sebuah program nasional jang revolusioner, jang disetudjui oleh bagian terbesar daripada Rakjat kita.
Dengan demikian dapat terbentuk suatu pimpinan revolusi jang seia-sekata dan jang erat bekerdja bersama dengan dan disokong oleh seluruh Rakjat atau se-tidak2nja oleh sebagian terbesar daripadanja. Hingga sekarang hal ini belum tertjapai.

3. Hingga sekarang Revolusi Nasional kita belum melandasi alat2 kekuasaan negara jang lama, jang dijwa, susunan ataupun tjara bekerdjanja masih sangat berbau pendjadjahan. Dalam hal ini PKI tidak boleh melupakan peladjaran Marx jang mengatakan, bahwa kewadjiban tiap revolusi jalah menghantjurkan alat kekuasaan negara jang lama dan menjusun alat kekuasaan negara jang baru. Dengan demikian dapatlah ditjegah usaha musuh untuk merebut kembali kekuasaan negara. Revolusi kita dengan melalaikan kewadjiban ini teiah membahayakan nasibnja sendiri. Oleh karena itu mendjadi kewajibkan jang penting bagi PKI dan semua tenaga progresif untuk selekas-lekasnya memperbaiki kesalahan jang besar ini. Alat2 kekuasaan negara jang dengan segera harus dirubah dan disusun kembali ialah :

a. Pemerintahan dalamnegeri


b. Kepolisian Negara


c. Pengadilan negeri

d. Ketentaraan

'I'entara sebagai alat kekuasaan negara yang terpenting harus istimewa mendapat perhatian. Kader2 dan anggota2nya harus diberi pendidikan istimewa yang sesuai dengan kewajiban tentara sebagai aparat terpenting untuk membela Revolusi Nasional kita, yang berarti pula membela kepentin-an Rakjat pekerdja. Tentara harus bersatu dengan dan disukai oleh Rakjat. Tentara harus dipimpin oleh kader2 yang progresif... Dengan sendirinya dan terutama dikalangan kader2nya harus dibersihkan dari anasir2 yang reaksioner dan kontra-revolusioner.

e. Alat2 negara lainnya jana penting2 seperti djawatan2 yang mengurus keuangan negara, alat2 produksi dan distribusi, pada umumnya harus dibersihkan dari anasir2 yang reaksioner dan kontra-revolusioner, terutama dalam pimpinannya, agar supaya kepentingan negara dan Rakjat dapat terdjamin.


Selain itu harus diperduangkan pula segera terlakasananja:

a. bagi kaum buruh : hak2 demokrasi disegala lapangan, oleh karena mereka sebagai pelopor revolusi harus terutama diberi keuntungan banjak.


c. Bagi pekerdja intelektuil: penghargaan jang lajak oleh pemerintah, sebab banjak pekerdja intelektuil jang merasa diri dan pekerdjaannya samasekali tidak dihargai oleh pemerintah.
1. Kelalaian dalam memperluas alat produksi jang lama dan membangun alat produksi jang baru jang dikuasai negara serta mengerdjakannya jang mempertinggi kemakmuran Rakjat.

2. Kelalaian dalam mengadakan aparat distribusi negara jang baik jang dapat memenuhi kewadjibannya dengan beres.


4. Kelalaian dalam membangun koperasi2 Rakjat, tentang koperasi dilapangan keradjinan tangan dan perusahaan ketjil, dilapangan kredit dan distribusi jang dapat bekerdja bersama dengan pemerintah, baik dalam usaha pengumpulan bahan2 makanan, maupun dalam usaha distribusi barang2 dari pemerintah.

5. Kelalaian dilapangan sosial, jaitu terutama jang mengenai pemberian pertolongan kepada tentara jang berhidjrah, pengungsi, djuga jang mengenai perumahan jang lajak bagi kaum buruh, perawatan kesehatan dan pemberian obat kepada Rakjat.

6. Tidak adanja perhatian samasekali dari fihak pemerintah kepada masaalah golongan minoritet, jang sebagian besar terdiri dari orang2 jang memiliki perusahaan2 ketjil dan dari orang2 intelektuil. Harus diperjuangkan oleh PKI supaja se-lekas2 nja dapat diatasi. Jang mengenai hal produksi dilapangan industri harus diandjurkan kepada kaum buruh, bahwa produksi harus diperbesar se-banjak2nja dengan sjarat, bahwa produksi dan distribusi serta perdagangan barang2 milik negara harus diawasi oleh serikatburuh.

Dengan pendek dapat dikatakan, bahwa dalam pekerdjaan se-hari2 PKI harus membela dengan giat kepentingan2 Rakjat pekerdja umumnja. Kepada pemerintah harus dituntut dengan tegas oleh PKI, supaja sebab2 jang dapat menimbulkan pemogokan segera dihilangkan.

Dalam menetapkan kewadjiban tersebut diatas, ditambah dengan kewadjiban melawan imperialism jang mana sadja dengan tjara jang se-hebat2nja, maka kaum Komunis se-kalii2 tidak boleh melupakan bahwa kewadjibkan PKI pada saat ini dalam tingkatan revolusi sekarang ini jahal tidak melebihi daripada penjelesaian REVOLUSI NASIONAL atau REVOLUSI DEMOKRASI BURDJUIS TYPE BARU, sebagai tingkatan persediaan untuk revolusi jang lebih tinggi jaitu Revolusi Sosialis atau Revolusi Proletar.

Pendorong Revolusi Nasional sekarang ini jahal Rakjat progresif dan anti-imperialis seluruhnya terutama sekali klas buruh sebagai pemimpinnya dan kaum tani sebagai sekutu klas buruh jang terpenting. Djikalau diantara Rakjat progresif itu tidak ada persatuan, maka revolusi tidak akan menang! Sebaliknya, hanja persatuan jang kuat diantara seluruh Rakjat jang anti-imperialis itu akan membawa Revolusi kita kepada kemenangan.
Menguak Tabir Peristiwa 1 Oktober 1965 – Mencari Keadilan

Wudjud satu2nja daripada persatuan itu, jalah Front Nasional jang disusun dari bawah jang disokong oleh semua Partai dan golongan serta orang2 jang progresif.

III Front Nasional

Setelah menindjau riwajat gerakan kemerdekaan semendjak permulaan pendudukan negeri kita oleh Djepang hingga kini, maka Polit-Biro menetapkan dengan menjesal bahwa kaum Komunis teleh lalai mengadakan Front Nasional sebagai sendjata Revolusi Nasional terhadap imperialism. Walaupun kemudian mereka mulai sedar akan kepentingan Front Nasional itu, akan tetapi kaum Komunis belum faham sungguh2 tentang hakekat Front Persatuan Nasional dan tentang tjara membentuknya. Beberapa matjam bentuk Front Nasional selama tiga tahun ini telah didirikan, akan tetapi selalu tinggal diatas kertas belaka, bahwa hanja berupa konvensi diantara organisasi2 atau diantara pemimpin2 sadja, sehingga dijalalau ada sedikit perselisihan diantara pemimpin2 Front Nasional itu lalu menjababkan bubarnja.

PKI berkejakinan, bahwa pada saat ini Partai klas buruh tidak dapat menjelesaikan sendiri revolusi demokrasi burdjuis ini dan oleh karena itu PKI harus bekerja bersama dengan partai2 lain. Kaum Komunis sudah semestinja berusaha mengadakan persatuan dengan anggota2 partai dan organisasi2 lain. Satu2nja persatuatn usatjam itu jalah FRONT NASIONAL. Dalam menjusun ini PKI harus mengambil inisiatif dan dalam Front Nasional itu PKI harus djuga memainkan rol yang memimpin. Ini se-kali2 tidak berarti, bahwa kaum Komunis memaksa partai lain atau orang lain supaja mengikutina, melainkan PKI harus mejakinkan dengan setjara sabar kepada orang2 jang tulus hati, bahwa satu2nja djalan untuk mendapat kemenangan jalah membentuk Front Nasional jang disokong oleh semua Rakjat jang progresif dan anti-imperialis. Tiap2 Komunis harus jakin benar2, bahwa dengan tidak adanja Front Nasional kemenangan tidak akan datang.

Oleh karena pada dewasa ini telah ada program nasional yang sudah disusun, disetudjui dan diterima pula oleh semua partai, maka tidak salah dika program nasional ini dipakai dengan segera sebagai dasar untuk meuwudjudak Front Nasional. Front Nasional jang tulen harus disusun dari bawah, semua anggota partai2 jang sudah menjetudjui Front Nasional seharusnja memasukin, setjara individual. Selain daripada itu diberi djuga kesempatan kepada beribu orang jang tidak berpartai dan jang progresif turut serta dalam Front Nasional. Komite2 Front Nasional, baik didaerah maupun sipatja, harus dipilih setjara demokratis dari bawah. Front Nasional sematjam ini, sekali berdiri, tidak akan mudah hantjur, bahkan tidak terlalu bergantung lagi kepada kehendak pemimpin2 partai. Front Nasional sematjam itu memungkinkan djuga pengurangan perselisihan politik dan djuga memperketjil adanja oposisi sampai pada batas minimum.

Bersamaan dengan itu, PKI harus berbaja-upaja supaja pemerintah sekarang selekas2nja diganti dengan pemerintah FRONT NASIONAL jang berdasar atas program nasional dan jang, bertanggung djawab. Hanja pemerintah sematjam itulah jang akan berakar kuat dikalangan Rakjat dan sanggup mengatasi kesukaran2 dalamnegeri serta meneruskan perlawanan anti-imperialis setjara konsekwen.

IV PKI dan daerah pendudukan

V Ideologi


Kawan Stalin mengatakan, bahwa tidak ada satu bentengpun djuga jang tidak dapat direbut oleh kaum Bolsjewik. Maka itu jakinlah, bahwa kaum Bolsjewik Indonesia akan dapat merebut benteng jang terantjam bahaja dihadapan mereka, jaitu benteng Indonesia Merdeka.

Polit-Biro Central Comite
Partai Komunis Indonesia

Djokjakarta, Agustus 1948.

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Self- Criticism by the Indonesian Communist Party, 1966

Starting in October 1965 and continuing into 1966, pro-U.S. fascist militarists unleashed a massacre of horrible proportions against the Indonesian people. Several hundred thousand Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) members and sympathizers as well as masses not involved in any political activity were murdered in cold blood. The number of people shot in the streets or arrested, tortured, and killed in prison is still not known with any accuracy. The massacre resulted in the crushing of the PKI, the fall of the Sukarno government, and the rise to power of a right-wing military clique led by Suharto which still holds sway in Indonesia today.

If the U.S. imperialists were not directly involved in Suharto's coup (and there is some evidence that they were), they openly applauded the fascist takeover in Indonesia. "We must say it's refreshing to read of young Moslems burning down Communist Party headquarters for a change and shouting 'Long Live America,'" said a Chicago Tribune editorial in October 1965. In July 1966, when the immensity of the bloodbath in Indonesia was already becoming clear, Time declared that the ousting of Sukarno was "the West's best news for years in Asia."

Sukarno had presided over a coalition government contained various forces, including the PKL. Despite the nationalist rhetoric and some actions reflecting national bourgeois interests, Sukarno certainly did not stand for new democracy and genuine independence from imperialism. Under Sukarno, Indonesia, with its rich oil reserves and strategic position in Southeast Asia, remained under imperialist domination and was a prized neocolony for the U.S. But by the mid-‘60s the U.S., neck deep in trouble in Vietnam, needed an outright lackey regime in place in Indonesia. The clique of right-wing generals under Suharto lit the bill to a tee.

The responsibility for the monstrous crime of several hundred thousand murders must be laid squarely at the doorsteps of the Indonesian reactionaries and their U.S. imperialist masters. At the same time, it's true that the PKI was extremely vulnerable to such an onslaught, and no effective, organized resistance to Suharto and the massacre was ever built. By the mid-‘60s the core of the PKI leadership had become rotten with years of revisionism. The PKI put forward a wrong view of the state and in practice participated in and glorified Sukarno and the coalition government, which decidedly was not under proletarian leadership. The PKI also went down the revisionist path on the question of the process of revolution, seconding the thesis of a "peaceful road to socialism" advocated by the Soviet revisionists who came to power in 1956.

These and other serious errors were summarized and criticized in two documents by forces who were attempting a revolutionary regroupment of the PKI: "Statement by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party" (August 17, 1966) and "Self-Criticism by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party" (September 1966). In 1968 China's Foreign Languages Press published a pamphlet, titled People of Indonesia, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime. The pamphlet contained excerpts from the two documents as well as an editorial from Hongqi (Red Flag), magazine of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. In this issue of Revolution we are reprinting large sections from this pamphlet.

What happened in Indonesia in the mid-'60s has many particularities relating to that country, to the specific array of class forces involved, and to that period of time. But the PKI summations are right to the point, for example, in emphasizing the importance of Mao Tsetung Thought. As the Declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement points out, "Without upholding and building on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought it is not possible to defeat revisionism, imperialism and reaction in general." This and many other points made in the PKI summations are still very relevant today and warrant close study, including in relation to events in the world within the past year.

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January 1987

From: People of Indonesia, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime - Editorial of Hongqi (Red Flag), No.11, 1967 –

After staging the counter-revolutionary 1965 coup d'etat, the Suharto-Nasution Right-wing military clique, faithful lackey of U.S. imperialism and anti-communist ally of Soviet revisionism, established a fascist dictatorship of unprecedented ruthlessness in Indonesia. For the past year or more, it has followed an out-and-out traitorous, dictatorial, anti-communist, anti-China and anti-popular counter-revolutionary policy.

It has imposed a white terror in Indonesia on an unprecedented scale, slaughtered several hundred thousand Communists and revolutionary people and thrown into prison another several hundred thousand fine sons and daughters of the Indonesian people. All Indonesia has been turned into one vast hell. By engaging in bloody suppression, it attempts in vain to wipe out the Indonesian Communist party and stamp out the Indonesian revolution.

This clique cherishes an inveterate hatred for socialist China, which resolutely supports the revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian people. It has repeatedly carried out serious provocations against the Chinese people, whipped up anti-China, anti-Chinese campaigns and practised inhuman racist persecution against overseas Chinese. It has vainly tried to sabotage the traditional friendship between the Chinese people and the overseas Chinese in Indonesia on the one hand and the Indonesian people on the other, and to prevent the Chinese people from supporting the Indonesian people's revolution.

In the final analysis, the many kinds of persecution against the Indonesian Communist Party and the Indonesian people by the Suharto-Nasution Right-wing military clique will only serve to hasten the arrival of the upsurge in the Indonesian revolution and speed its own doom. The heroic Indonesian Communists and people can neither be cowed, suppressed, nor wiped out. The determination of the Indonesian people to make revolution is unshakable, so is the Chinese people's determination to support their revolution. No reactionary force on earth can obstruct this.
At present, the Indonesian Communists and revolutionary people are regrouping their forces for a new battle. The August 17, 1966 Statement of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party and the Self-Criticism it endorsed in September, which were published by the magazine Indonesian Tribune not long ago, are a call to the Indonesian Communists and the Indonesian working class, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and all anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolutionary forces to unite and engage in a new struggle.

The two documents of the Political Bureau of the Indonesian Communist Party are a telling blow at U.S. imperialism and its flunkies, the Suharto-Nasution fascist military dictatorial regime, and the revisionist leading clique of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and a tremendous encouragement to the revolutionary people of Indonesia. In these two documents, the Political Bureau of the Indonesian Communist Party sums up the experience and lessons of the Party in leading the Indonesian people's revolutionary struggle, criticizes the Right opportunist errors committed by the leadership of the Party in the past, points out the road for the Indonesian revolution, and lays down the principles for future struggle.

From: Statement by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party August 17, 1966

The Main Problem of Every Revolution Is The Problem of State Power

The statement declares that it is an absolute condition for every revolutionary, and even more so for every Communist, to grasp the truth that "the main problem of every revolution is the problem of state power".

The oppressed classes, in liberating themselves from exploitation and oppression, have no other way but to make a revolution, that is to say, overthrowing by force the oppressor classes from state power, or seizing state power by force. Because, the state is an instrument created by the ruling classes to oppress the ruled classes.

But, for a genuine people's revolution in the present modern era, it is not enough just to wrest the power from the hands of the oppressor classes, and to make use of the power that has been wrested. Marx has taught us that the destruction of the old military-bureaucratic state machine is "the prerequisite for every genuine people's revolution" (Lenin, State and Revolution). A genuine people's revolution will achieve decisive victory only after it has accomplished this prerequisite, while at the same time it sets up a completely new state apparatus whose task is to suppress by force and mercilessly the resistance put up by the overthrown oppressor classes.

What should the August Revolution of 1945 (1) have done with regard to the state power?

As a prerequisite, the August Revolution of 1945 should have smashed the colonial state machine along with all of its apparatuses that had been established to maintain colonial domination of Indonesia, and not merely transferred the power to the Republic of Indonesia. The August Revolution of 1945 should have established a completely new state, a state jointly ruled by all the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes under the leadership of the working class. This is what is to be called a people's democratic state.
The statement points out that due to the absence of the working class' leadership, the Republic of Indonesia was inevitably a state ruled by the bourgeoisie, despite the participation of the proletariat. A state with such a class character can never become an instrument of the 1945 August Revolution. Without the dictatorship of people's democracy, the August Revolution of 1945 did not have an instrument to defeat its enemies, and consequently was unable to accomplish its tasks, namely the complete liquidation of imperialist domination and the remnants of feudalism.

The Communists' voluntary withdrawal of a cabinet led by themselves in 1948 had opened up the broadest opportunity for the reactionary bourgeoisie led by Muhamad Hatta to make the state power fall into its hands. This reactionary bourgeoisie then betrayed the August Revolution by unleashing white terror, the Madiun affair, as a prelude to the restoration of the Dutch imperialist interests through the conclusion of the despicable agreement of the round-table conference, which turned Indonesia into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country.

The statement says that the resurgence of the revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian people in continuing the fight against the oppression by imperialism and the remnants of feudalism after the round-table conference, had gained certain political victories of partial and reform nature, which had led to the lessening of the anti-democratic character of the bourgeois power.

It was a great mistake to assume that the existence of such a government signified a fundamental change in the class character of the state power. It was equally incorrect to assume that the above-mentioned facts marked the birth and the development of an aspect representing the interests of the people, or of a pro-people aspect, within the state power. Such an error, that was formulated in the "theory of two aspects in state power", led to the conclusion that according to the before-mentioned facts, within the state power of the Republic of Indonesia there existed two aspects, the "anti-people aspect" consisting of comprador, bureaucrat capitalist and landlord classes on the one hand, and the 'pro-people aspect' composed mainly of the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat on the other hand.

According to this "two-aspect theory", a miracle could happen in Indonesia. namely that the state could cease to be an instrument of the ruling oppressor classes to subjugate other classes, but it could be made an instrument shared by both the oppressor classes and the oppressed classes. And the fundamental change in state power, that is to say, the birth of a people's power. could be peacefully accomplished by developing the "pro-people aspect" and gradually liquidating the "anti-people aspect".

The statement points out that hoping for a fundamental change in state power. to usher the people into the position of power, through the victory of the "pro-people aspect" over the "anti-people aspect" in line with the "theory of two aspects in state power". was but a pure illusion. The people will be able to gain power only through an armed revolution under the leadership of the working class to overthrow the power of the comprador bourgeoisie, the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords which represent the interests of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism.
The "theory of two aspects in state power" has in practice deprived the proletariat of its independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie, dissolved the interests of the proletariat in that of the national bourgeoisie, and placed the proletariat in a position as a tail-end of the national bourgeoisie.

To return the proletariat to its position of leadership in the liberation struggle of the Indonesian people, it is absolutely necessary to rectify the mistake of the "theory of two aspects in state power". and to do away with the erroneous view with regard to Marxist-Leninist teaching on state and revolution. The Road To a Completely Independent and Democratic New Indonesia. The statement indicates that the main contradiction in the present Indonesian society is still the same with what existed at the outbreak of the August Revolution of 1945, that is to say, imperialism and the remnants of feudalism are involved in a contradiction with the masses of the people who desire full independence and democracy.

Thus the target of the revolution remains the same: imperialism and the remnants of feudalism. Classes which are the enemies of the revolution, in the main, are also the same: imperialism. the compradors. the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords. The driving forces of the revolution. too. are still the same: the working class. the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.

The statement says that after the imperialists no longer directly hold political power in Indonesia, their political interests are represented by the comprador bourgeoisie. the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords who are holding the state power in their hands.

Therefore, only by overthrowing the power of the domestic reactionary classes can the overthrow of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism be concretely realized. This is the main task of the present stage of the Indonesian revolution.

The statement points out that today. the Indonesian people are faced by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Suharto and Nasution and their accomplices. which is the manifestation of power of the most reactionary classes in our country.

The absence of democracy for the people. and the suppression by force of arms of every revolutionary and democratic movement. inevitably compel the whole people to take up arms in order to defend their rights. The armed struggle of the people against the armed counter-revolution is unavoidable and constitutes the chief form of struggle of the coming revolution. Only by taking the road of armed struggle, the Indonesian people will succeed in overthrowing the power of the armed counter-revolutionaries. as a pre-condition to realize their aspiration for which they have fought for scores of years: independence and freedom. The statement maintains that the armed struggle to defeat armed counter-revolution. as a revolution, must not be waged, in the form of military adventurism, in the form of a putsch, which is detached from the awakening of the popular masses.

The statement emphasizes that since the present stage of the Indonesian revolution is essentially an agrarian revolution by the peasantry. the armed struggle of the Indonesian people. too, essentially will be the armed struggle of the peasants to
liberate themselves from the oppression by the remnants of feudalism. The armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution can never be lasting and in the end will surely be defeated, unless it is essentially an armed struggle of the peasants in realizing the agrarian revolution. And the armed struggle of the peasants to realize the agrarian revolution will only succeed in achieving a complete victory, and in really liberating the peasantry from the oppression by the remnants of feudalism, only when it is waged under the leadership of the proletariat, and when it is not limited to just overthrowing the power of the landlords in the countryside, but is aimed at smashing the entire power of the internal counter-revolutionaries who are now represented by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Suharto and Nasution and their accomplices.

From: Self-Criticism by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party September 1966

Indonesian Tribune published in its January issue (No.3) the self-criticism adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.) in September 1966. The self-criticism is entitled "Build the P.K.I. Along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's Democratic Revolution in Indonesia".

The self-criticism says that the disaster which has caused such serious losses to the P.K.I. and the revolutionary movement of the Indonesian people after the outbreak and the defeat of the September 30th Movement(3) has lifted up the curtain which for a long period has hidden the grave weaknesses of the P.K.I.

The Political Bureau is aware that it has the greatest responsibility with regard to the grave weaknesses and mistakes of the Party during the period under review. Therefore, the Political Bureau is giving serious attention to and highly appreciates all criticisms from cadres and members of the Party given in a Marxist-Leninist spirit, as well as honest criticism from Party sympathizers that have been expressed in different ways. The Political Bureau is resolved to make self-criticism in a Marxist-Leninist way, putting into practice the teaching of Lenin and the example of Comrade Musso in unfolding Marxist-Leninist criticism and self-criticism.

The self-criticism says that under the situation where the most vicious and cruel white terror is being unleashed by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Nasution and Suharto, it is not easy to make as complete criticism and self-criticism as possible. To meet the urgent necessity, it is necessary to point out the main issues in the ideological, political and organizational fields, in order to facilitate the study of the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party during the current rectification movement.

With all modesty and sincerity the Political Bureau presents this self-criticism. The Political Bureau expects all members to take an active part in the discussions of the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party leadership, critically analyse them, and do their utmost to improve this self- criticism of the Political Bureau by drawing lessons from their respective experiences, collectively or individually. The Political Bureau expects all members to take firm hold of the principle: "unity - criticism - unity" and "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the patient, in order to achieve the twofold objective of clarity in ideology and unity.
among comrades". (4) The Political Bureau is convinced that, by holding firmly to this correct principle, every Party member will take part in the movement to study and surmount these weaknesses and mistakes with the determination to rebuild the P.K.I. along the Marxist-Leninist line, to strengthen communist unity and solidarity, to raise the ideological, political and organizational vigilance, and to heighten the fighting spirit in order to win victory.

The Main Weaknesses in the Ideological Field

The serious weaknesses and mistakes of the Party in the period after 1951, the self-criticism says, certainly had as their source the weaknesses in ideological field, too, especially among the Party leadership. Instead of integrating revolutionary theories with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution, the Party leadership adopted the road which was divorced from the guidance of the most advanced theories. This experience shows that the P.K.I. had not succeeded as yet in establishing a core of leadership that was composed of proletarian elements, which really had the most correct understanding of Marxism-Leninism, systematic and not fragmentary, practical and not abstract understanding.

During the period after 1951, subjectivism continued to grow, gradually became greater and greater and gave rise to Right opportunism that merged with the influence of modern revisionism in the international communist movement. This was the black line of Right opportunism which became the main feature of the mistakes committed by the P.K.I. in this period. The rise and the development of these weaknesses and errors were caused by the following factors: First, the tradition of criticism and self-criticism in a Marxist-Leninist way was not developed in the Party, especially among the Party leadership.

The rectification and study movements which from time to time were organized in the Party were not carried out seriously and persistently, their results were not summed up in a good manner, and they were not followed by the appropriate measures in the organizational field. Study movements were aimed more at the rank and file, and never at unfolding criticism and self-criticisms among the leadership. Criticism from below far from being carefully listened to, was even suppressed.

Second, the penetration of the bourgeois ideology along two channels, through contacts with the national bourgeoisie when the Party established a united front with them, and through the bourgeoisification of Party cadres, especially the leadership, after the Party obtained certain positions in governmental and semi-governmental institutions. The increasing number of Party cadres who occupied certain positions in governmental and semi-governmental institutions in the centre and in the regions, created "the rank of bourgeoisified workers" and this constituted "the real channels for reformism". (5) Such a situation did not exist before the August Revolution of 1945.

Third, modern revisionism began to penetrate into our Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Fifth Congress uncritically approved a report which supported the lines of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., and adopted the line of "achieving socialism peacefully through parliamentary means as the line of the P.K.I. This "peaceful road", one of the characteristics of modern revisionism, was
further reaffirmed in the Sixth National Congress of the P.K.I. which approved the following passage in the Party Constitution: "There is a possibility that a people's democratic system as a transitional stage to socialism in Indonesia can be achieved by peaceful means, in parliamentary way. The P.K.I. persistently strives to transform this possibility into a reality." This revisionist line was further emphasized in the Seventh National Congress of the P.K.I. and was never corrected, not even when our Party was already aware that since the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., the leadership of the C.P.S.U. had been following the road of modern revisionism.

The self-criticism stresses that the experience of the P.K.I. provides the lesson that by criticizing the modern revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership alone, it does not mean that the P.K.I. itself will automatically be free from errors of Right opportunism, the same as what the modern revisionists are doing. The experience of the P.K.I. provides the lesson that modern revisionism, the greatest danger in the international communist movement, is also the greatest danger for the P.K.I. For the P.K.I., modern revisionism is not "a latent but not an acute danger", but a concrete danger that has brought great damage to the Party and serious losses for the revolutionary movement of the Indonesian people. Therefore, we must not in any way underestimate the danger of modern revisionism and must wage a resolute and ruthless struggle against it. The firm stand against modern revisionism in all fields can be effectively maintained only when our Party abandons the line of "preserving friendship with the modern revisionists".

It is a fact that the P.K.I., while criticizing the modern revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership, also made revisionist mistakes itself, because it had revised Marxist-Leninist teachings on class struggle, state and revolution. Furthermore, the P.K.I. leadership not only did not wage a struggle in the theoretical field against other "revolutionary" political thoughts which could mislead the proletariat, as Lenin has taught us to do, but had voluntarily given concessions in the theoretical field. The P.K.I. leadership maintained that there was an identity between the three components of Marxism: materialist philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism, and the so-called "three components of Sukarno's teachings" - They wanted to make Marxism, which is the ideology of the working class, the property of the whole nation which includes the exploiting classes hostile to the working class.

**The Main Errors in the Political Field**

The self-criticism says that the mistakes of Right opportunism in the political field which are now under discussion include three problems: (1) the road to people's democracy in Indonesia, (2) the question of state power, and (3) the implementation of the policy of the national united front.

One of the fundamental differences and problems of disputes between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism lies precisely in the problem of choosing the road to socialism. Marxism-Leninism teaches that socialism can only be achieved through the road of proletarian revolution and that in the case of colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries like Indonesia, socialism can only be achieved by first completing the stage of the people's democratic revolution. On the contrary, revisionism dreams of achieving socialism through the "peaceful road".
During the initial years of this period since 1951, our Party had achieved certain results in the political struggle as well as in the building of the Party. One important achievement of this period was the formulation of the main problems of the Indonesian revolution. It was formulated that the present stage of the Indonesian revolution was a new-type bourgeois democratic revolution, whose tasks were to liquidate imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism and to establish a people's democratic system as a transitional stage to socialism. The driving forces of the revolution were the working class, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie: the leading force of the revolution was the working class and the principal mass strength of the revolution was the peasantry. It was also formulated that the national bourgeoisie was a wavering force of the revolution who might side with the revolution to certain limits and at certain periods but who, at other times, might betray the revolution. The Party furthermore formulated that the working class in order to fulfil its obligation as the leader of the revolution, must forge a revolutionary united front with other revolutionary classes and groups based on worker-peasant alliance and under the leadership of the working class.

However, there was a very important shortcoming which in later days developed into Right opportunism or revisionism, namely, that the Party had not yet come to the clearest unity of minds on the principal means and the main form of struggle of the Indonesian revolution.

The Chinese revolution, the self-criticism says, has provided the lesson concerning the main form of struggle of the revolution in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, namely, the people's armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution. In line with the essence of the revolution as an agrarian revolution, then the essence of the people's armed struggle is the armed struggle of the peasants in an agrarian revolution under the leadership of the working class. The practice of the Chinese revolution is first and foremost the application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China. At the same time, it has laid down the general law for the revolutions of the peoples in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries.

To achieve its complete victory, it stresses, the Indonesian revolution must also follow the road of the Chinese revolution. This means that the Indonesian revolution must inevitably adopt this main form of struggle, namely, the people's armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution which, in essence, is the armed agrarian revolution of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat. All forms of legal and parliamentary work should serve the principal means and the main form of struggle, and must not in any way impede the process of the ripening of armed struggle.

The experience during the last fifteen years has taught us that starting from not explicitly denying the "peaceful road" and not firmly holding to the general law of revolution in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, the P.K.I. gradually got bogged down in parliamentary and other forms of legal struggle. The Party leadership even considered this to be the main form of struggle to achieve the strategic aim of the Indonesian revolution. The legality of the Party was not considered as one method of struggle at a given time and under certain conditions, but was rather regarded as a principle, while other forms of struggle should serve this
principle. Even when counter-revolution not only has trampled underfoot the legality
of the Party, but has violated the basic human rights of the Communists as well, the
Party leadership still tried to defend this "legality" with all their might. The "peaceful
road" was firmly established in the Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the
Central Committee of the Fifth Congress in 1956 adopted a document which
approved the modern revisionist line of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. In such a
situation, when the revisionist line was already firmly established in the Party, it was
impossible to have a correct Marxist-Leninist line of strategy and tactics. The
formulation of the main lines of strategy and tactics of the Party started from a
vacillation between the "peaceful road" and the "road of armed revolution", in the
process of which the "peaceful road" finally became dominant.

Under such conditions, the General Line of the P.K.I. was formulated by the Sixth
National Congress (1959). It reads, "To continue the forging of the national united
front, and to continue the building of the Party, so as to accomplish the demands of
the August Revolution of 1945." Based on the General Line of the Party, the slogan
"Raise the Three Banners of the Party" was decided. These were: (1) the banner of
the national united front, (2) the banner of the building of the Party, and (3) the
banner of the 1945 August Revolution. The General Line was meant as the road to
people's democracy in Indonesia.

The Party leadership tried to explain that the Three Banners of the Party were the
three main weapons to win the people's democratic revolution which, as Comrade
Mao Tsetung has said, were "a well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of
Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of
the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party: a united front of all
revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a
Party".(6)

Thus the second main weapon means that there must be a people's armed struggle
against armed counterrevolution under the leadership of the Party. The Party
leadership tried to replace this with the slogan "Raise the banner of the 1945 August
Revolution".

In order to prove that the road followed was not the opportunist "peaceful road", the
Party leadership always spoke of the two possibilities, the possibility of a "peaceful
road" and the possibility of a non-peaceful road. They held that the better the Party
prepared itself to face the possibility of a non-peaceful road, the greater would be the
possibility of a "peaceful road". By doing so the Party leadership cultivated in the
minds of Party members, the working class and the masses of the working people
the hope for a peaceful road which in reality did not exist.

In practice, the Party leadership did not prepare the whole ranks of the Party, the
working class and the masses of the people to face the possibility of a non-peaceful
road. The most striking proof of it was the grave tragedy which happened after the
outbreak and the failure of the September 30th Movement. Within a very short space
of time, the counter-revolution succeeded in massacring and arresting hundreds of
thousands of Communists and non-communist revolutionaries who found themselves
in a passive position, paralysing the organization of the P.K.I. and the revolutionary
mass organizations. Such a situation surely would never happen if the Party leadership did not deviate from the revolutionary road.

The Party leadership declared, says the self-criticism that "our Party must not copy the theory of armed struggle abroad, but must carry out the Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle: guerrilla warfare in the countryside (especially by farm labourers and poor peasants) revolutionary actions by the workers (especially transport workers) in cities, and intensive work among the enemy's armed forces". The Party leadership criticized some comrades who, in studying the experience of the armed struggle of the Chinese people, were considered seeing only its similarities with the conditions in Indonesia. On the contrary, the Party leadership put forward several allegedly different conditions that must be taken into account, until they arrived at the conclusion that the method typical to the Indonesian revolution was the "Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle". To fulfil its heavy but great and noble historical mission, to lead the people's revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists must firmly reject the revisionist "peaceful road", reject the "theory of the Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle" and hold aloft the banner of armed people's revolution.

Following the example of the glorious Chinese revolution, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists must establish revolutionary base areas; they must "turn the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural bastions of the revolution".

While working for the realization of this most principal question we must also carry out other forms of struggle; armed struggle will never advance without being coordinated with other forms of struggle.

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The line of Right opportunism followed by the Party leadership was also reflected in their attitude with regard to the state, in particular to the state of the Republic of Indonesia, the self-criticism says.

Based on this Marxist-Leninist teaching on state, the task of the P.K.I., after the August Revolution of 1945 failed, should have been the education of the Indonesian working class and the rest of the working people, so as to make them understand as clearly as possible the class nature of the state of the Republic of Indonesia as a bourgeois dictatorship. The P.K.I. should have aroused the consciousness of the working class and the working people that their struggle for liberation would inevitably lead to the necessity of "superseding the bourgeois state" by the people's state under the leadership of the working class through a "violent revolution". But the P.K.I. leadership took the opportunist line that gave rise to the illusion among the people about bourgeois democracy.

The self-criticism says that the climax of the deviation from Marxist-Leninist teaching on state committed by the Party leadership was the formulation of the "theory of the two aspects in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia".

The "two-aspect theory" viewed the state and the state power in the following way:
The state power of the Republic, viewed as contradiction, is a contradiction between two opposing aspects. This first aspect is the aspect which represents the interests of the people (manifested by the progressive stands and policies of President Sukarno that are supported by the P.K.I. and other groups of the people). The second aspect is the aspect that represents the enemies of the people (manifested by the stands and policies of the Right-wing forces and die-hards). The people's aspect has now become the main aspect and takes the leading role in the state power of the Republic.

The "two-aspect theory" obviously is an opportunist or revisionist deviation, because it denies the Marxist-Leninist teaching that "the state is an organ of the rule of a definite class which cannot be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it)".(7) It is unthinkable that the Republic of Indonesia can be jointly ruled by the people and the enemies of the people.

The self-criticism says that the Party leadership who wallowed in the mire of opportunism claimed that the "people's aspect" had become the main aspect and taken the hegemony in the state power of the Republic. It was as if the Indonesian people were nearing the birth of a people's power. And since they considered that the forces of the national bourgeoisie in the state power really constituted the "people's aspect", the Party leadership had done everything to defend and develop this "people's aspect". The Party leadership had altogether merged themselves in the interests of the national bourgeoisie. By considering the national bourgeoisie the "people's aspect" in the state power of the Republic, and President Sukarno the leader of this aspect, the Party leadership erroneously recognized that the national bourgeoisie was able to lead the new-type democratic revolution. This is contrary to historical necessity and historical facts. The Party leadership declared that the "two-aspect theory" was completely different from the "theory of structural reform" (8) of the leadership of the revisionist Italian Communist Party. However, the fact is, theoretically or on the basis of practical realities, there is no difference between the two "theories". Both have for their starting point the "peaceful road" to socialism. Both dream of a gradual change in the internal balance of forces in the state power. Both reject the road of revolution and both are revisionist.

The anti-revolutionary "two-aspect theory" glaringly exposed itself in the statement that "the struggle of the P.K.I. with regard to the state power is to promote the pro-people aspect so as to make it bigger and dominant, and the anti-people force can be driven out from the state power".

The Party leadership even had a name for this anti-revolutionary road; they called it the road of "revolution from above and below". By "revolution from above" they meant that the P.K.I. "must encourage the state power to take revolutionary steps aimed at making the desired changes in the personnel and in the state organs". While by "revolution from below" they meant that the P.K.I. "must arouse, organize and mobilize the people to achieve the same changes". It is indeed an extraordinary phantasy! The Party leadership did not learn from the fact that the concept of President Sukarno on the formation of a co-operation cabinet (the old-type government of national coalition), eight years after its announcement, had not been realized as yet. There was even no sign that it would ever be realized, despite the insistent demands. Let alone a change in the state power!
The self-criticism stresses that to clean itself from the mire of opportunism, our Party must discard this "theory of two-aspect in the state power" and re-establish the Marxist-Leninist teaching on state and revolution.

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The 5th National Congress of the Party in the main had solved theoretically the problem of the national united front. It formulated that the worker-peasant alliance was the basis of the national united front. With regard to the national bourgeoisie a lesson had been drawn on the basis of the experience during the August Revolution that this class had a wavering character. In a certain situation, the national bourgeoisie took part in the revolution and sided with the revolution, while in another situation they followed in the steps of the comprador-bourgeoisie to attack the driving forces of the revolution and betrayed the revolution (as shown by their activities during the Madiun Provocation and their approval of the Round Table Conference Agreement). Based on this wavering character of the national bourgeoisie, the Party formulated the stand that must be taken by the P.K.I., namely, to make continuous efforts to win the national bourgeoisie over to the side of revolution, while guarding against the possibility of its betraying the revolution. The P.K.I. must follow the policy of unity and struggle towards the national bourgeoisie, the self-criticism says.

Nevertheless, since the ideological weakness of subjectivism in the Party, particularly among the Party leadership, had not yet been eradicated, the Party was dragged into more and more serious mistakes, to such an extent that the Party lost its independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie. This mistake had led to the situation in which the Party and the proletariat were placed as the appendage of the national bourgeoisie.

The self-criticism states that a manifestation of this loss of independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie was the evaluation and the stand of the Party leadership towards Sukarno. The Party leadership did not adopt an independent attitude towards Sukarno. They had always avoided conflicts with Sukarno and, on the contrary, had greatly over-emphasized the similarities and the unity between the Party and Sukarno. The public saw that there was no policy of Sukarno that was not supported by the P.K.I. The Party leadership went so far as to accept without any struggle the recognition to Sukarno as "the great leader of the revolution" and the leader of the "people's aspect" in the state power of the Republic. In many articles and speeches, the Party leaders frequently said that the struggle of the P.K.I. was based not only on Marxism-Leninism, but also on "the teachings of Sukarno", that the P.K.I. made such a rapid progress because it realized Sukarno's idea of Nasakom unity,(9) etc. Even the concept of the people's democratic system in Indonesia was said to be in conformity with Sukarno's main ideas as expressed in his speech "The Birth of Pantjasila"(10) on June 1, 1945.

The self-criticism repudiates the erroneous view that "to implement the Political Manifesto in a consistent manner is the same as implementing the programme of the P.K.I."

The statement that consistently implementing the Political Manifesto meant implementing the programme of the P.K.I. could only be interpreted that it was not
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the pro-gramme of the P.K.I. that was accepted by the bourgeoisie, but that, on the contrary, it was the programme of the national bourgeoisie which was accepted by the P.K.I., and was made to replace the programme of the P.K.I., it points out.

The self-criticism says that the abandonment of principle in the united front with the national bourgeoisie had developed even further in the so-called "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" that was formulated as follows: "With the national united front having the workers and peasants as its pillars, the Nasakom as the core and the Pantjasila as its ideological basis, to complete the national democratic revolution in order to advance towards Indonesian Socialism." This so-called "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" had not even the faintest smell of the revolution. Because, from the three preconditions to win the revolution, namely, a strong Marxist-Leninist Party, a people's armed struggle under the leadership of the Party, and a united front, only the united front was retained. Even then, it was not a revolutionary united front, because it was not led by the working class, nor was it based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class, but on the contrary it was based on the Nasakom.

The Party leadership said that "the slogan for national co-operation with the Nasakom as the core will by no means obscure the class content of the national united front". This statement is incorrect. The class content of the Nasakom was the working class, the national bourgeoisie, and even elements of the compradors, the bureaucrat-capitalists and the landlords. Obviously, putting the Nasakom in the core not only meant obscuring the class content of the national united front, but radically changing the meaning of the revolutionary national united front into an alliance of the working class with all other classes in the country, including the reactionary classes, into class collaboration. This error must be corrected. The Party must throw to the dust-bin the erroneous "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" and return to the correct conception of a revolutionary national united front based on the alliance of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class.

The abandonment of principle in the united front with the national bourgeoisie was also the result of the Party's inability to make a correct and concrete analysis of the concrete situation, the self-criticism says.

The self-criticism points out that ever since the failure of the August Revolution of 1945, except in West Irian, the imperialists did not hold direct political power in Indonesia. In Indonesia, political power was in the hands of compradors and landlords who represented the interests of imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism. Besides, there was no imperialist aggression in Indonesia taking place. Under such a situation, provided that the P.K.I. did not make political mistakes, the contradiction between the ruling reactionary classes and the people would develop and sharpen, constituting the main contradiction in Indonesia. The primary task of the Indonesian revolution is the overthrow of the rule of the reactionary classes within the country who also represent the interests of the imperialists, in particular the United States imperialists. Only by taking this road can the real liquidation of imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism be realized.

By correcting the mistakes made by the Party in the united front with the national bourgeoisie it does not mean that now the Party need not unite with this class. On
the basis of the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class, our Party must work to win the national bourgeois class over to the side of the revolution.

**The Main Mistakes in the organizational Field**

The self-criticism says that the erroneous political line which dominated the Party was inevitably followed by an equally erroneous organizational line. The longer and the more intensive the wrong political line ruled in the Party, the greater were the mistakes in the organizational field, and the greater the losses caused by them. Right opportunism which constituted the wrong political line of the Party in the period after 1951 had been followed by another Right deviation in the organizational field, namely, liberalism and legalism.

The line of liberalism in the organizational field manifested itself in the tendency to make the P.K.I. a Party with as large a membership as possible, a Party with a loose organization, which was called a mass Party.

It says that the mass character of the Party is not determined above all by the large membership, but primarily by the close ties linking the Party and the masses, by the Party's political line which defends the interests of the masses, or in other words by the implementation of the Party's mass line. And the mass line of the Party can only be maintained when the prerequisites determining the Party's role as the advanced detachment are firmly upheld, when the Party members are made up of the best elements of the proletariat who are armed with Marxism-Leninism. Consequently, to build a Marxist-Leninist Party which has a mass character is impossible without giving primary importance to Marxist-Leninist education.

The self-criticism points out that during the last few years, the P.K.I. had carried out a line of Party building which deviated from the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the organizational field.

The self-criticism says that this liberal expansion of Party membership could not be separated from the political line of the "peaceful road". The large membership was intended to increase the influence of the Party in the united front with the national bourgeoisie. The idea was to effect the gradual change in the balance of forces that would make it possible to completely defeat the die-hard forces, with a Party that was growing bigger and bigger, in addition to the continued policy of unity with the national bourgeoisie.

The stress was no longer laid on the education and the training of Marxist-Leninist cadres to prepare them for the revolution, for work among the peasants in order to establish revolutionary bases, but on the education of intellectuals to serve the needs of the work in the united front with the national bourgeoisie, and to supply cadres for the various positions in the state institutions that were obtained thanks to the cooperation with the national bourgeoisie. The slogan of "total integration with the peasants" had become empty talk. What was being done in practice was to draw cadres from the countryside to the cities, from the regions to the centre, instead of sending the best cadres to work in the rural areas.
To raise the prestige of the P.K.I. in the eyes of the bourgeoisie, and to make it respected as the Party of intellectuals, the 4-Year Plan stipulated that all cadres of the higher ranks must obtain academic education, cadres of the middle ranks high school education, and cadres of the lower ranks lower middle school education. For this purpose the Party had set up a great number of academies, schools and courses. So deep-rooted was the intellectualism gripping the Party leadership that all Party leaders and prominent figures of the popular movements were obliged to write four theses in order to obtain the degree of "Marxist Scientists".

The deeper the Party was plunged into the mire of opportunism and revisionism, the greater it lacked organizational vigilance and the more extensively legalism developed in the organization. The Party leadership had lost its class prejudice towards the falsehood of bourgeois democracy. All the activities of the Party indicated as if the "peaceful road" was an inevitable certainty. The Party leadership did not arouse the vigilance of the masses of Party members to the danger of the attacks by the reactionaries who were constantly on the look for the chance to strike. Due to this legalism in the organizational field, within a short span of time counter-revolution has succeeded in paralysing the P.K.I. organizationally.

Liberalism in organization had destroyed the principle of internal democracy in the Party, destroyed collective leadership and had given rise to personal leadership and personal rule, to autonomism.

In a situation when liberalism dominated the organizational line of the Party, it was impossible to realize the Party's style of work "to combine theory and practice, to keep close bonds with the masses and to conduct self-criticism". It was equally impossible to realize the method of leadership whose essence is the unity of the leadership and the masses; to realize it the leadership must give an example to the rank-and-file.

The self-criticism points out that thus, in general the wrong political line which ruled in the Party was followed by the wrong line in the organizational field which violated the principles of a Marxist-Leninist Party, destroyed the organizational foundation of the Party, namely, democratic centralism, and trampled on the Party's style of work and method of leadership.

The self-criticism emphatically points out that to build the P.K.I. as a Marxist-Leninist Party, we must thoroughly uproot liberalism in the organizational field and its ideological source. The P.K.I. must be rebuilt as a Lenin-type Party, a Party that will be capable of fulfilling its role as the advanced detachment and the highest form of class organization of the Indonesian proletariat, a Party with a historical mission of leading the masses of the Indonesian people to win victory in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-bureaucrat-capitalist revolution, and to advance towards socialism. Such a Party must fulfil the following conditions: Ideologically, it is armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, and free from subjectivism, opportunism and modern revisionism; politically, it has a correct programme which includes a revolutionary agrarian programme, has a thorough understanding of the problems of the strategy and tactics of the Indonesian revolution, masters the main form of struggle, namely, the armed struggle of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat, as well as other forms of struggle, is capable of establishing a
revolutionary united front of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes based on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class; organizationally, it is strong and has a deep root among the masses of the people, consists of trustworthy, experienced and steeled Party members who are models in the implementation of the national tasks.

Today, we are rebuilding our Party under the reign of counter-revolutionary white terror which is most cruel and ferocious. The legality of the Party and the basic human rights of the Communists have been wantonly violated. The Party, therefore, has to be organized and has to work in complete illegality. While working in complete illegality, the Party must be adept at utilizing to the full all possible opportunities to carry out legal activities according to circumstances, and to choose ways and means that are acceptable to the masses with the aim of mobilizing the masses for struggle and leading this struggle step by step to a higher stage.

The self-criticism stresses that in rebuilding the P.K.I. along the Marxist-Leninist line, the greatest attention should be devoted to the building of Party organizations in the rural areas, to the establishment of revolutionary bases.

The task to rebuild a Marxist-Leninist Party as has been stated above requires arduous and protracted work, and is full of danger, and consequently it must be carried out courageously, perseveringly, carefully, patiently and persistently.

The Way Out

The self-criticism says that once we know the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party during the period after 1951 as have been explained above, obviously what we have to do is to realize the most urgent tasks faced by the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists at the present time, the first one being the rebuilding of the P.K.I. as a Marxist-Leninist Party which is free from subjectivism, opportunism and modern revisionism.

To rebuild the P.K.I. as such a Marxist-Leninist Party, Party cadres of all levels and then all Party members must reach a unanimity of mind with regard to the mistakes made by the Party in the past, as well as concerning the new road that must be taken.

Subjectivism can be effectively combated and liquidated when the ability of the whole Party to distinguish proletarian ideology from the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie is raised, and when criticism and self-criticism is encouraged. To raise the ability of the whole Party to distinguish proletarian ideology from the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie will be possible only by intensifying the education of Marxism-Leninism. The Party must educate its members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method in analysing the political situation and in evaluating the forces of the existing classes, so that subjective analysis and evaluation can be avoided. The Party must draw the attention of the members to the importance of investigation and study of social and economic conditions, in order to be able to define the tactics of struggle and the corresponding method of work. The Party must help the members to understand that without an investigation of the actual conditions they will get bogged down in phantasy.
The self-criticism emphatically points out that the experience of the struggle waged by the Party in the past has shown how indispensable it is for the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists, who are resolved to defend Marxism-Leninism and to combat modern revisionism, to study not only the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but also to devote special attention to studying the Thought of Mao Tsetung who has succeeded in brilliantly inheriting, defending and developing Marxism-Leninism to its peak in the present era.

The P.K.I. will be able to hold aloft the banner of Marxism-Leninism, only when it takes a resolute stand in the struggle against modern revisionism which today is centred around the leading group of the C.P.S.U. The fight against modern revisionism cannot be consistently carried out while, at the same time, preserving friendship with the modern revisionists. The P.K.I. must abandon the wrong attitude it held in the past with regard to the question of the relations with the modern revisionists. Loyalty to proletarian internationalism can only be manifested by a merciless stand in the struggle against modern revisionism, because modern revisionism has destroyed proletarian internationalism, and betrayed the struggle of the proletariat and the oppressed people all over the world.

In rebuilding the Party, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists must devote their attention to the creation of the conditions to lead the armed agrarian revolution to the peasants that will become the main form of struggle to win victory for the people's democratic revolution in Indonesia. This means that the greatest attention should be paid to the rebuilding of Party organizations in the rural areas. The greatest attention must be paid to the solution of the problem of arousing, organizing and mobilizing the peasants in an anti-feudal agrarian revolution. The integration of the Party with the peasants, in particular with farm labourers and poor peasants, must be conscientiously carried out. Because, only through such an integration will the Party be able to lead the peasantry, and the peasantry, for their part, will be capable of becoming the invincible bulwark of the people's democratic revolution.

As a result of the attacks of the third white terror, Party organizations in the rural areas in general have suffered greater damage. This fact has rendered it more difficult and arduous to work in the countryside. But this does not in any way change the inexorable law that the main force of the people's democratic revolution in Indonesia is the peasantry, and its base area is the countryside. With the most resolute determination that everything is for the masses of the people, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists will certainly be able to overcome the gravest difficulties. By having the most whole-hearted faith in the masses and by relying on the masses, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists will certainly be able to transform the backward Indonesian villages into great and consolidated military, political and cultural bastions of the revolution.

The Indonesian peasants are the most interested in the people's democratic revolution. Because, only this revolution will liberate them from the life of backwardness and inequality as a result of feudal suppression. It is only this revolution that will give them what they have dreamt all their lives and which will give them life: land. That is why the peasants will surely take this road of revolution for
land and liberation, no matter how arduous and full of twists and turns this road will be.

Obviously, the second task of the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists at present is the creation of the necessary conditions for the armed agrarian revolution of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat. Provided that the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists succeed in arousing, organizing and mobilizing the peasants to carry through an anti-feudal agrarian revolution, the leadership of the working class in the people's democratic revolution and the victory of this revolution are assured.

However, the Party must continue the efforts to establish a revolutionary united front with other anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes and groups. Based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat, the Party must work to win over the urban petty bourgeoisie and other democratic forces, and must also work to win over the national bourgeoisie as an additional ally in the people's democratic revolution. The present objective conditions offer the possibility for the establishment of a broad revolutionary united front.

The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Nasution and Suharto is the manifestation of the rule by the most reactionary classes in the country, namely, the comprador-bourgeoisie, the bureaucrat-capitalists and the landlords. The internal reactionary classes under the leadership of the clique of Right-wing army generals exercise dictatorship over the Indonesian people, and act as watch-dogs guarding the interests of imperialism, in particular United States imperialism, in Indonesia. Consequently, the coming into power of the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals will certainly serve to intensify the suppression and exploitation of the Indonesian people by imperialism and feudalism.

The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals represents the interests of only a very small minority who suppresses the overwhelming majority of the Indonesian people. That is why the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals will certainly meet with resistance from the broad masses of the people.

Thus, the third urgent task faced by the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists is to establish the revolutionary united front with all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes and groups based on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class.

Thus, it has become clear that to win victory for the people's democratic revolution, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists must hold aloft the Three Banners of the Party, namely:

The first banner, the building of a Marxist-Leninist Party which is free from subjectivism, opportunism and modern revisionism.

The second banner, the armed people's struggle which in essence is the armed struggle of the peasants in an anti-feudal agrarian revolution under the leadership of the working class.

The third banner, the revolutionary united front based on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class.
The tasks forced by the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists are very arduous. They have to work under the most savage and barbarous terror and persecution which have no parallel in history. However, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists do not have the slightest doubt that, by correcting the mistakes made by the Party in the past, they are now marching along the correct road, the road of people's democratic revolution. No matter how protracted, tortuous and full of difficulties, this is the only road leading to a free and democratic New Indonesia, an Indonesia that will really belong to the Indonesian people. For this noble cause, we must have the courage to traverse the long road.

The self-criticism points out that the Indonesian Marxist-leninists and revolutionaries on the basis of their own experience in struggle, do not have the slightest doubt about the correctness of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's thesis that at "the imperialists and all reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance they are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful. The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals which is now in power is also a paper tiger. In appearance they are powerful and terrifying. But in reality they are not so powerful, because they are not supported but on the contrary are opposed by the people, because their ranks are beset by contradictions, and because they are quarrelling among themselves for a bigger share of their plunder and for greater power. The imperialists, in particular the United States imperialists who are the mainstay of the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals, are also paper tigers. In appearance they are powerful and terrifying, but in reality they are weak and nearing their complete downfall. The weakness of imperialism, in particular United States imperialism, is vividly demonstrated by their inability to conquer the heroic Vietnamese people and to check the tide of the anti-imperialist struggle waged by the people all over the world, including the American people themselves, who are furiously dealing blows at the fortresses of imperialism. From a strategic point of view, the imperialists and all reactionaries are weak, and consequently we must despise them. By despising the enemies strategically we can build up the courage to fight them and the confidence to defeat them. At the same time we must take them all seriously, take into full account of their strength tactically, and refrain from taking adventurist steps against them.

The Indonesian Marxist-Leninists will spare neither efforts nor energy to fulfil the best wishes of the world Marxist-Leninists by resolutely defending Marxism-Leninism and struggling against modern revisionism, by working still better for the liberation of their people and country, and for the world proletarian revolution. The Indonesian Marxist-Leninists who are united in mind and determined to take the road of revolution, by putting their wholehearted faith in the people, by relying on the people, by working courageously, perseveringly, Conscientiously, patiently, persistently and vigilantly, will surely be able to accomplish their historical mission, to lead the people's democratic revolution, to smash the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals and to set up a completely new power, the people's democratic dictatorship. With the people's democratic dictatorship, the joint power of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes and groups under the leadership of the working class, the Indonesian people will completely liquidate imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism, build a free and democratic new society, and advance toward Socialism.
where the suppression and exploitation of man by man no longer exists. Let us unite closely to take the road of revolution which is illuminated by the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, the road leading to the liberation of the Indonesian people and proletariat, the road leading to Socialism.

was but a pure illusion. The people will be able to gain power only through an armed revolution under the leadership of the working class to overthrow the power of the comprador bourgeoisie, the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords which represent the interests of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism.

The "theory of two aspects in state power" has in practice deprived the proletariat of its independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie, dissolved the interests of the proletariat in that of the national bourgeoisie. and placed the proletariat in a position as a tail-end of the national bourgeoisie.

To return the proletariat to its position of leadership in the liberation struggle of the Indonesian people, it is absolutely necessary to rectify the mistake of the "theory of two aspects in state power". and to do away with the erroneous view with regard to Marxist-Leninist teaching on state and revolution. The Road To a Completely Independent and Democratic New Indonesia. The statement indicates that the main contradiction in the present Indonesian society is still the same with what existed at the outbreak of the August Revolution of 1945, that is to say, imperialism and the remnants of feudalism are involved in a contradiction with the masses of the people who desire full independence and democracy.

Thus the target of the revolution remains the same: imperialism and the remnants of feudalism. Classes which are the enemies of the revolution, in the main, are also the same: imperialism. the compradors. the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords. The driving forces of the revolution, too, are still the same: the working class. the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.

The statement says that after the imperialists no longer directly hold political power in Indonesia, their political interests are represented by the comprador bourgeoisie. the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords who are holding the state power in their hands.

Therefore, only by overthrowing the power of the domestic reactionary classes can the overthrow of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism be concretely realized. This is the primary task of the present stage of the Indonesian revolution.

The statement points out that today. the Indonesian people are faced by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Suharto and Nasution and their accomplices. which is the manifestation of power of the most reactionary classes in our country.

The absence of democracy for the people, and the suppression by force of arms of every revolutionary and democratic movement, inevitably compel the whole people to take up arms in order to defend their rights. The armed struggle of the people against the armed counter-revolution is unavoidable and constitutes the chief form of struggle of the coming revolution. Only by taking the road of armed struggle. the Indonesian people will succeed in overthrowing the power of the armed counter-revolutionaries,
as a pre-condition to realize their aspiration for which they have fought for scores of years: independence and freedom. The statement maintains that the armed struggle to defeat armed counter-revolution, as a revolution, must not be waged in the form of military adventurism, in the form of a putsch, which is detached from the awakening of the popular masses.

The statement emphasizes that since the present stage of the Indonesian revolution is essentially an agrarian revolution by the peasantry, the armed struggle of the Indonesian people, too, essentially will be the armed struggle of the peasants to liberate themselves from the oppression by the remnants of feudalism. The armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution can never be lasting and in the end will surely be defeated, unless it is essentially an armed struggle of the peasants in realizing the agrarian revolution. And the armed struggle of the peasants to realize the agrarian revolution will only succeed in achieving a complete victory, and in really liberating the peasantry from the oppression by the remnants of feudalism, only when it is waged under the leadership of the proletariat, and when it is not limited to just overthrowing the power of the landlords in the countryside, but is aimed at smashing the entire power of the internal counter-revolutionaries who are now represented by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Suharto and Nasution and their accomplices.

From: Self-Criticism by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party September 1966

Indonesian Tribune published in its January issue (No.3) the self-criticism adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.) in September 1966. The self-criticism is entitled "Build the P.K.I. Along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's Democratic Revolution in Indonesia".

The self-criticism says that the disaster which has caused such serious losses to the P.K.I. and the revolutionary movement of the Indonesian people after the outbreak and the defeat of the September 30th Movement(3) has lifted up the curtain which for a long period has hidden the grave weaknesses of the P.K.I.

The Political Bureau is aware that it has the greatest responsibility with regard to the grave weaknesses and mistakes of the Party during the period under review. Therefore, the Political Bureau is giving serious attention to and highly appreciates all criticisms from cadres and members of the Party given in a Marxist-Leninist spirit, as well as honest criticism from Party sympathizers that have been expressed in different ways. The Political Bureau is resolved to make self-criticism in a Marxist-Leninist way, putting into practice the teaching of Lenin and the example of Comrade Musso in unfolding Marxist-Leninist criticism and self-criticism.

The self-criticism says that under the situation where the most vicious and cruel white terror is being unleashed by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Nasution and Suharto, it is not easy to make as complete criticism and self-criticism as possible. To meet the urgent necessity, it is necessary to point out the main issues in the ideological, political and organizational fields, in order to facilitate the study of the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party during the current rectification movement.
With all modesty and sincerity the Political Bureau presents this self-criticism. The Political Bureau expects all members to take an active part in the discussions of the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party leadership, critically analyse them, and do their utmost to improve this self-criticism of the Political Bureau by drawing lessons from their respective experiences, collectively or individually. The Political Bureau expects all members to take firm hold of the principle: "unity - criticism - unity" and "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the patient, in order to achieve the twofold objective of clarity in ideology and unity among comrades". (4) The Political Bureau is convinced that, by holding firmly to this correct principle, every Party member will take part in the movement to study and surmount these weaknesses and mistakes with the determination to rebuild the P.K.I. along the Marxist-Leninist line, to strengthen communist unity and solidarity, to raise the ideological, political and organizational vigilance, and to heighten the fighting spirit in order to win victory.

The Main Weaknesses in the Ideological Field

The serious weaknesses and mistakes of the Party in the period after 1951, the self-criticism says, certainly had as their source the weaknesses in ideological field, too, especially among the Party leadership. Instead of integrating revolutionary theories with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution, the Party leadership adopted the road which was divorced from the guidance of the most advanced theories. This experience shows that the P.K.I. had not succeeded as yet in establishing a core of leadership that was composed of proletarian elements, which really had the most correct understanding of Marxism-Leninism, systematic and not fragmentary, practical and not abstract understanding.

During the period after 1951, subjectivism continued to grow, gradually became greater and greater and gave rise to Right opportunism that merged with the influence of modern revisionism in the international communist movement. This was the black line of Right opportunism which became the main feature of the mistakes committed by the P.K.I. in this period. The rise and the development of these weaknesses and errors were caused by the following factors: First, the tradition of criticism and self-criticism in a Marxist-Leninist way was not developed in the Party, especially among the Party leadership.

The rectification and study movements which from time to time were organized in the Party were not carried out seriously and persistently, their results were not summed up in a good manner, and they were not followed by the appropriate measures in the organizational field. Study movements were aimed more at the rank and file, and never at unfolding criticism and self-criticisms among the leadership. Criticism from below far from being carefully listened to, was even suppressed.

Second, the penetration of the bourgeois ideology along two channels, through contacts with the national bourgeoisie when the Party established a united front with them, and through the bourgeoisification of Party cadres, especially the leadership, after the Party obtained certain positions in governmental and semi-governmental institutions. The increasing number of Party cadres who occupied certain positions in governmental and semi-governmental institutions in the centre and in the regions, created "the rank of bourgeoisified workers" and this constituted "the real channels
for reformism". (5) Such a situation did not exist before the August Revolution of 1945.

Third, modern revisionism began to penetrate into our Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Fifth Congress uncritically approved a report which supported the lines of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., and adopted the line of "achieving socialism peacefully through parliamentary means as the line of the P.K.I. This "peaceful road", one of the characteristics of modern revisionism, was further reaffirmed in the Sixth National Congress of the P.K.I. which approved the following passage in the Party Constitution: "There is a possibility that a people's democratic system as a transitional stage to socialism in Indonesia can be achieved by peaceful means, in parliamentary way. The P.K.I. persistently strives to transform this possibility into a reality." This revisionist line was further emphasized in the Seventh National Congress of the P.K.I. and was never corrected, not even when our Party was already aware that since the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., the leadership of the C.P.S.U. had been following the road of modern revisionism.

The self-criticism stresses that the experience of the P.K.I. provides the lesson that by criticizing the modern revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership alone, it does not mean that the P.K.I. itself will automatically be free from errors of Right opportunism, the same as what the modern revisionists are doing. The experience of the P.K.I. provides the lesson that modern revisionism, the greatest danger in the international communist movement, is also the greatest danger for the P.K.I. For the P.K.I., modern revisionism is not "a latent but not an acute danger", but a concrete danger that has brought great damage to the Party and serious losses for the revolutionary movement of the Indonesian people. Therefore, we must not in any way underestimate the danger of modern revisionism and must wage a resolute and ruthless struggle against it. The firm stand against modern revisionism in all fields can be effectively maintained only when our Party abandons the line of "preserving friendship with the modern revisionists".

It is a fact that the P.K.I., while criticizing the modern revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership, also made revisionist mistakes itself, because it had revised Marxist-Leninist teachings on class struggle, state and revolution. Furthermore, the P.K.I. leadership not only did not wage a struggle in the theoretical field against other "revolutionary" political thoughts which could mislead the proletariat, as Lenin has taught us to do, but had voluntarily given concessions in the theoretical field. The P.K.I. leadership maintained that there was an identity between the three components of Marxism: materialist philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism, and the so-called "three components of Sukarno's teachings" - They wanted to make Marxism, which is the ideology of the working class, the property of the whole nation which includes the exploiting classes hostile to the working class.

The Main Errors in the Political Field

The self-criticism says that the mistakes of Right opportunism in the political field which are now under discussion include three problems: (1) the road to people's democracy in Indonesia, (2) the question of state power, and (3) the implementation of the policy of the national united front.
One of the fundamental differences and problems of disputes between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism lies precisely in the problem of choosing the road to socialism. Marxism-Leninism teaches that socialism can only be achieved through the road of proletarian revolution and that in the case of colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries like Indonesia, socialism can only be achieved by first completing the stage of the people's democratic revolution. On the contrary, revisionism dreams of achieving socialism through the "peaceful road".

During the initial years of this period since 1951, our Party had achieved certain results in the political struggle as well as in the building of the Party. One important achievement of this period was the formulation of the main problems of the Indonesian revolution. It was formulated that the present stage of the Indonesian revolution was a new-type bourgeois democratic revolution, whose tasks were to liquidate imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism and to establish a people's democratic system as a transitional stage to socialism. The driving forces of the revolution were the working class, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie: the leading force of the revolution was the working class and the principal bourgeoisie of the revolution the peasantry. It was also formulated that the national bourgeoisie was a wavering force of the revolution who might side with the revolution to certain limits and at certain periods but who, at other times, might betray the revolution. The Party furthermore formulated that the working class in order to fulfil its obligation as the leader of the revolution, must forge a revolutionary united front with other revolutionary classes and groups based on worker-peasant alliance and under the leadership of the working class.

However, there was a very important shortcoming which in later days developed into Right opportunism or revisionism, namely, that the Party had not yet come to the clearest unity of minds on the principal means and the main form of struggle of the Indonesian revolution.

The Chinese revolution, the self-criticism says, has provided the lesson concerning the main form of struggle of the revolution in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, namely, the people's armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution. In line with the essence of the revolution as an agrarian revolution, then the essence of the people's armed struggle is the armed struggle of the peasants in an agrarian revolution under the leadership of the working class. The practice of the Chinese revolution is first and foremost the application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China. At the same time, it has laid down the general law for the revolutions of the peoples in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries.

To achieve its complete victory, it stresses, the Indonesian revolution must also follow the road of the Chinese revolution. This means that the Indonesian revolution must inevitably adopt this main form of struggle, namely, the people's armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution which, in essence, is the armed agrarian revolution of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat. All forms of legal and parliamentary work should serve the principal means and the main form of struggle, and must not in any way impede the process of the ripening of armed struggle.
The experience during the last fifteen years has taught us that starting from not explicitly denying the "peaceful road" and not firmly holding to the general law of revolution in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, the P.K.I. gradually got bogged down in parliamentary and other forms of legal struggle. The Party leadership even considered this to be the main form of struggle to achieve the strategic aim of the Indonesian revolution. The legality of the Party was not considered as one method of struggle at a given time and under certain conditions, but was rather regarded as a principle, while other forms of struggle should serve this principle. Even when counter-revolution not only has trampled underfoot the legality of the Party, but has violated the basic human rights of the Communists as well, the Party leadership still tried to defend this "legality" with all their might. The "peaceful road" was firmly established in the Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Fifth Congress in 1956 adopted a document which approved the modern revisionist line of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. In such a situation, when the revisionist line was already firmly established in the Party, it was impossible to have a correct Marxist-Leninist line of strategy and tactics. The formulation of the main lines of strategy and tactics of the Party started from a vacillation between the "peaceful road" and the "road of armed revolution", in the process of which the "peaceful road" finally became dominant.

Under such conditions, the General Line of the P.K.I. was formulated by the Sixth National Congress (1959). It reads, "To continue the forging of the national united front, and to continue the building of the Party, so as to accomplish the demands of the August Revolution of 1945." Based on the General Line of the Party, the slogan "Raise the Three Banners of the Party" was decided. These were: (1) the banner of the national united front, (2) the banner of the building of the Party, and (3) the banner of the 1945 August Revolution. The General Line was meant as the road to people's democracy in Indonesia.

The Party leadership tried to explain that the Three Banners of the Party were the three main weapons to win the people's democratic revolution which, as Comrade Mao Tsetung has said, were "a well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party: a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a Party". (6)

Thus the second main weapon means that there must be a people's armed struggle against armed counterrevolution under the leadership of the Party. The Party leadership tried to replace this with the slogan "Raise the banner of the 1945 August Revolution".

In order to prove that the road followed was not the opportunist "peaceful road", the Party leadership always spoke of the two possibilities, the possibility of a "peaceful road" and the possibility of a non-peaceful road. They held that the better the Party prepared itself to face the possibility of a non-peaceful road, the greater would be the possibility of a "peaceful road". By doing so the Party leadership cultivated in the minds of Party members, the working class and the masses of the working people the hope for a peaceful road which in reality did not exist.
In practice, the Party leadership did not prepare the whole ranks of the Party, the working class and the masses of the people to face the possibility of a non-peaceful road. The most striking proof of it was the grave tragedy which happened after the outbreak and the failure of the September 30th Movement. Within a very short space of time, the counter-revolution succeeded in massacring and arresting hundreds of thousands of Communists and non-communist revolutionaries who found themselves in a passive position, paralysing the organization of the P.K.I. and the revolutionary mass organizations. Such a situation surely would never happen if the Party leadership did not deviate from the revolutionary road.

The Party leadership declared, says the self-criticism that "our Party must not copy the theory of armed struggle abroad, but must carry out the Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle: guerrilla warfare in the countryside (especially by farm labourers and poor peasants) revolutionary actions by the workers (especially transport workers) in cities, and intensive work among the enemy's armed forces". The Party leadership criticized some comrades who, in studying the experience of the armed struggle of the Chinese people, were considered seeing only its similarities with the conditions in Indonesia. On the contrary, the Party leadership put forward several allegedly different conditions that must be taken into account, until they arrived at the conclusion that the method typical to the Indonesian revolution was the "Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle". To fulfil its heavy but great and noble historical mission, to lead the people's revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists must firmly reject the revisionist "peaceful road", reject the "theory of the Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle" and hold aloft the banner of armed people's revolution. Following the example of the glorious Chinese revolution, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists must establish revolutionary base areas; they must "turn the backward villages into advanced. consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural bastions of the revolution".

While working for the realization of this most principal question we must also carry out other forms of struggle; armed struggle will never advance without being coordinated with other forms of struggle.

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The line of Right opportunism followed by the Party leadership was also reflected in their attitude with regard to the state, in particular to the state of the Republic of Indonesia, the self-criticism says.

Based on this Marxist-Leninist teaching on state, the task of the P.K.I., after the August Revolution of 1945 failed, should have been the education of the Indonesian working class and the rest of the working people, so as to make them understand as clearly as possible the class nature of the state of the Republic of Indonesia as a bourgeois dictatorship. The P.K.I. should have aroused the consciousness of the working class and the working people that their struggle for liberation would inevitably lead to the necessity of "superseding the bourgeois state" by the people's state under the leadership of the working class. through a "violent revolution". But the P.K.I. leadership took the opportunist line that gave rise to the illusion among the people about bourgeois democracy.
The self-criticism says that the climax of the deviation from Marxist-Leninist teaching on state committed by the Party leadership was the formulation of the "theory of the two aspects in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia".

The "two-aspect theory" viewed the state and the state power in the following way:

The state power of the Republic, viewed as contradiction, is a contradiction between two opposing aspects. This first aspect is the aspect which represents the interests of the people (manifested by the progressive stands and policies of President Sukarno that are supported by the P.K.I. and other groups of the people). The second aspect is the aspect that represents the enemies of the people (manifested by the stands and policies of the Right- wing forces and die-hards). The people's aspect has now become the main aspect and takes the leading role in the state power of the Republic.

The "two-aspect theory" obviously is an opportunist or revisionist deviation, because it denies the Marxist-Leninist teaching that "the state is an organ of the rule of a definite class which cannot be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it)." (7) It is unthinkable that the Republic of Indonesia can be jointly ruled by the people and the enemies of the people.

The self-criticism says that the Party leadership who wallowed in the mire of opportunism claimed that the "people's aspect" had become the main aspect and taken the hegemony in the state power of the Republic. It was as if the Indonesian people were nearing the birth of a people's power. And since they considered that the forces of the national bourgeoisie in the state power really constituted the "people's aspect", the Party leadership had done everything to defend and develop this "people's aspect". The Party leadership had altogether merged themselves in the interests of the national bourgeoisie. By considering the national bourgeoisie the "people's aspect" in the state power of the Republic, and President Sukarno the leader of this aspect, the Party leadership erroneously recognized that the national bourgeoisie was able to lead the new-type democratic revolution. This is contrary to historical necessity and historical facts. The Party leadership declared that the "two-aspect theory" was completely different from the "theory of structural reform" (8) of the leadership of the revisionist Italian Communist Party. However, the fact is, theoretically or on the basis of practical realities, there is no difference between the two "theories". Both have for their starting point the "peaceful road" to socialism. Both dream of a gradual change in the internal balance of forces in the state power. Both reject the road of revolution and both are revisionist.

The anti-revolutionary "two-aspect theory" glaringly exposed itself in the statement that "the struggle of the P.K.I. with regard to the state power is to promote the pro-people aspect so as to make it bigger and dominant, and the anti-people force can be driven out from the state power".

The Party leadership even had a name for this anti-revolutionary road; they called it the road of "revolution from above and below". By "revolution from above" they meant that the P.K.I. "must encourage the state power to take revolutionary steps aimed at making the desired changes in the personnel and in the state organs". While by "revolution from below" they meant that the P.K.I. "must arouse, organize and mobilize the people to achieve the same changes". It is indeed an extraordinary
phantasy! The Party leadership did not learn from the fact that the concept of President Sukarno on the formation of a co-operation cabinet (the old-type government of national coalition), eight years after its announcement, had not been realized as yet. There was even no sign that it would ever be realized, despite the insistent demands. Let alone a change in the state power!

The self-criticism stresses that to clean itself from the mire of opportunism, our Party must discard this "theory of two-aspect in the state power" and re-establish the Marxist-Leninist teaching on state and revolution.

The 5th National Congress of the Party in the main had solved theoretically the problem of the national united front. It formulated that the worker-peasant alliance was the basis of the national united front. With regard to the national bourgeoisie a lesson had been drawn on the basis of the experience during the August Revolution that this class had a wavering character. In a certain situation, the national bourgeoisie took part in the revolution and sided with the revolution, while in another situation they followed in the steps of the comprador-bourgeoisie to attack the driving forces of the revolution and betrayed the revolution (as shown by their activities during the Madiun Provocation and their approval of the Round Table Conference Agreement). Based on this wavering character of the national bourgeoisie, the Party formulated the stand that must be taken by the P.K.I., namely, to make continuous efforts to win the national bourgeoisie over to the side of revolution, while guarding against the possibility of its betraying the revolution. The P.K.I. must follow the policy of unity and struggle towards the national bourgeoisie, the self-criticism says.

Nevertheless, since the ideological weakness of subjectivism in the Party, particularly among the Party leadership, had not yet been eradicated, the Party was dragged into more and more serious mistakes, to such an extent that the Party lost its independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie. This mistake had led to the situation in which the Party and the proletariat were placed as the appendage of the national bourgeoisie.

The self-criticism states that a manifestation of this loss of independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie was the evaluation and the stand of the Party leadership towards Sukarno. The Party leadership did not adopt an independent attitude towards Sukarno. They had always avoided conflicts with Sukarno and, on the contrary, had greatly over-emphasized the similarities and the unity between the Party and Sukarno. The public saw that there was no policy of Sukarno that was not supported by the P.K.I. The Party leadership went so far as to accept without any struggle the recognition to Sukarno as "the great leader of the revolution" and the leader of the "people's aspect" in the state power of the Republic. In many articles and speeches, the Party leaders frequently said that the struggle of the P.K.I. was based not only on Marxism-Leninism, but also on "the teachings of Sukarno", that the P.K.I. made such a rapid progress because it realized Sukarno's idea of Nasakom unity, etc. Even the concept of the people's democratic system in Indonesia was said to be in conformity with Sukarno's main ideas as expressed in his speech "The Birth of Pantjasila"(10) on June 1, 1945.
The self-criticism repudiates the erroneous view that "to implement the Political Manifesto in a consistent manner is the same as implementing the programme of the P.K.I."

The statement that consistently implementing the Political Manifesto meant implementing the programme of the P.K.I. could only be interpreted that it was not the programme of the P.K.I. that was accepted by the bourgeoisie, but that, on the contrary, it was the programme of the national bourgeoisie which was accepted by the P.K.I., and was made to replace the programme of the P.K.I., it points out.

The self-criticism says that the abandonment of principle in the united front with the national bourgeoisie had developed even further in the so-called "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" that was formulated as follows: "With the national united front having the workers and peasants as its pillars, the Nasakom as the core and the Pantjasila as its ideological basis, to complete the national democratic revolution in order to advance towards Indonesian Socialism." This so-called "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" had not even the faintest smell of the revolution. Because, from the three preconditions to win the revolution, namely, a strong Marxist-Leninist Party, a people's armed struggle under the leadership of the Party, and a united front, only the united front was retained. Even then, it was not a revolutionary united front, because it was not led by the working class, nor was it based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class, but on the contrary it was based on the Nasakom.

The Party leadership said that "the slogan for national co-operation with the Nasakom as the core will by no means obscure the class content of the national united front". This statement is incorrect. The class content of the Nasakom was the working class, the national bourgeoisie, and even elements of the compradors, the bureaucrat-capitalists and the landlords. Obviously, putting the Nasakom in the core not only meant obscuring the class content of the national united front, but radically changing the meaning of the revolutionary national united front into an alliance of the working class with all other classes in the country, including the reactionary classes, into class collaboration. This error must be corrected. The Party must throw to the dust-bin the erroneous "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" and return to the correct conception of a revolutionary national united front based on the alliance of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class. The abandonment of principle in the united front with the national bourgeoisie was also the result of the Party's inability to make a correct and concrete analysis of the concrete situation, the self-criticism says.

The self-criticism points out that ever since the failure of the August Revolution of 1945, except in West Irian, the imperialists did not hold direct political power in Indonesia. In Indonesia, political power was in the hands of compradors and landlords who represented the interests of imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism. Besides, there was no imperialist aggression in Indonesia taking place. Under such a situation, provided that the P.K.I. did not make political mistakes, the contradiction between the ruling reactionary classes and the people would develop and sharpen, constituting the main contradiction in Indonesia. The primary task of the Indonesian revolution is the overthrow of the rule of the reactionary classes within the country.
who also represent the interests of the imperialists, in particular the United States imperialists. Only by taking this road can the real liquidation of imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism be realized.

By correcting the mistakes made by the Party in the united front with the national bourgeoisie it does not mean that now the Party need not unite with this class. On the basis of the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class, our Party must work to win the national bourgeois class over to the side of the revolution.

**The Main Mistakes in the organizational Field**

The self-criticism says that the erroneous political line which dominated the Party was inevitably followed by an equally erroneous organizational line. The longer and the more intensive the wrong political line ruled in the Party, the greater were the mistakes in the organizational field, and the greater the losses caused by them. Right opportunism which constituted the wrong political line of the Party in the period after 1951 had been followed by another Right deviation in the organizational field, namely, liberalism and legalism.

The line of liberalism in the organizational field manifested itself in the tendency to make the P.K.I. a Party with as large a membership as possible, a Party with a loose organization, which was called a mass Party.

It says that the mass character of the Party is not determined above all by the large membership, but primarily by the close ties linking the Party and the masses, by the Party's political line which defends the interests of the masses, or in other words by the implementation of the Party's mass line. And the mass line of the Party can only be maintained when the prerequisites determining the Party's role as the advanced detachment are firmly upheld, when the Party members are made up of the best elements of the proletariat who are armed with Marxism-Leninism. Consequently, to build a Marxist-Leninist Party which has a mass character is impossible without giving primary importance to Marxist-Leninist education.

The self-criticism points out that during the last few years, the P.K.I. had carried out a line of Party building which deviated from the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the organizational field.

The self-criticism says that this liberal expansion of Party membership could not be separated from the political line of the "peaceful road". The large membership was intended to increase the influence of the Party in the united front with the national bourgeoisie. The idea was to effect the gradual change in the balance of forces that would make it possible to completely defeat the die-hard forces, with a Party that was growing bigger and bigger, in addition to the continued policy of unity with the national bourgeoisie.

The stress was no longer laid on the education and the training of Marxist-Leninist cadres to prepare them for the revolution, for work among the peasants in order to establish revolutionary bases, but on the education of intellectuals to serve the needs of the work in the united front with the national bourgeoisie, and to supply cadres for the various positions in the state institutions that were obtained thanks to the co-
operation with the national bourgeoisie. The slogan of "total integration with the peasants" had become empty talk. What was being done in practice was to draw cadres from the countryside to the cities, from the regions to the centre, instead of sending the best cadres to work in the rural areas.

To raise the prestige of the P.K.I. in the eyes of the bourgeoisie, and to make it respected as the Party of intellectuals, the 4-Year Plan stipulated that all cadres of the higher ranks must obtain academic education, cadres of the middle ranks high school education, and cadres of the lower ranks lower middle school education. For this purpose the Party had set up a great number of academies, schools and courses. So deep-rooted was the intellectualism gripping the Party leadership that all Party leaders and prominent figures of the popular movements were obliged to write four theses in order to obtain the degree of "Marxist Scientists".

The deeper the Party was plunged into the mire of opportunism and revisionism, the greater it lacked organizational vigilance and the more extensively legalism developed in the organization. The Party leadership had lost its class prejudice towards the falsehood of bourgeois democracy. All the activities of the Party indicated as if the "peaceful road" was an inevitable certainty. The Party leadership did not arouse the vigilance of the masses of Party members to the danger of the attacks by the reactionaries who were constantly on the look for the chance to strike. Due to this legalism in the organizational field, within a short span of time counter-revolution has succeeded in paralysing the P.K.I. organizationally.

Liberalism in organization had destroyed the principle of internal democracy in the Party, destroyed collective leadership and had given rise to personal leadership and personal rule, to autonomism. In a situation when liberalism dominated the organizational line of the Party, it was impossible to realize the Party's style of work "to combine theory and practice, to keep close bonds with the masses and to conduct self-criticism". It was equally impossible to realize the method of leadership whose essence is the unity of the leadership and the masses; to realize it the leadership must give an example to the rank-and-file.

The self-criticism points out that thus, in general the wrong political line which ruled in the Party was followed by the wrong line in the organizational field which violated the principles of a Marxist-Leninist Party, destroyed the organizational foundation of the Party, namely, democratic centralism, and trampled on the Party's style of work and method of leadership.

The self-criticism emphatically points out that to build the P.K.I. as a Marxist-Leninist Party, we must thoroughly uproot liberalism in the organizational field and its ideological source. The P.K.I. must be rebuilt as a Lenin-type Party, a Party that will be capable of fulfilling its role as the advanced detachment and the highest form of class organization of the Indonesian proletariat, a Party with a historical mission of leading the masses of the Indonesian people to win victory in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-bureaucrat-capitalist revolution, and to advance towards socialism. Such a Party must fulfil the following conditions: Ideologically, it is armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, and free from subjectivism, opportunism and modern revisionism; politically, it has a correct programme which includes a revolutionary agrarian programme, has a thorough understanding of the problems of
the strategy and tactics of the Indonesian revolution, masters the main form of
struggle, namely, the armed struggle of the peasants under the leadership of the
proletariat, as well as other forms of struggle, is capable of establishing a
revolutionary united front of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes based on the
worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class; organizationally, it
is strong and has a deep root among the masses of the people, consists of
trustworthy, experienced and steeled Party members who are models in the
implementation of the national tasks.

Today, we are rebuilding our Party under the reign of counter-revolutionary white
terror which is most cruel and ferocious. The legality of the Party and the basic
human rights of the Communists have been wantonly violated. The Party, therefore,
has to be organized and has to work in complete illegality. While working in complete
illegality, the Party must be adept at utilizing to the full all possible opportunities to
carry out legal activities according to circumstances, and to choose ways and means
that are acceptable to the masses with the aim of mobilizing the masses for struggle
and leading this struggle step by step to a higher stage.

The self-criticism stresses that in rebuilding the P.K.I. along the Marxist-Leninist line,
the greatest attention should be devoted to the building of Party organizations in the
rural areas, to the establishment of revolutionary bases.

The task to rebuild a Marxist-Leninist Party as has been stated above requires
arduous and protracted work, and is full of danger, and consequently it must be
carried out courageously, perseveringly, carefully, patiently and persistently.

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